Abstract

The study examines the problem of the impact of the practices of Arab and Amazigh identities on political stability in the North African states, where the political framework of identity was shaped by the circumstances surrounding the formation of these political systems. Conflictual interactions between Arab and Amazigh groups varied across the countries of the region due to demographic differences among them. In Morocco and Algeria, where the Amazigh population constitutes a relatively significant proportion of the population compared to the rest of the region, the Amazigh movement appeared more visible and influential. Moreover, the practices associated with Amazigh identity were affected by the nature of the ruling systems in the region. While the Moroccan monarchy demonstrated a degree of flexibility in dealing with Amazigh demands, compared to the republican regime in Algeria, Amazigh activism in Algeria was characterized by a higher degree of confrontation and violence.

In Libya, the severe repression suffered by the Amazigh community throughout the Gaddafi era, in addition to the security and political turmoil that followed the collapse of the regime, gave Amazigh practices a more radical and confrontational character. The Egyptian case, however, represented an exception within the region due to Egypt’s cultural and social homogeneity, as well as the very limited number of Amazigh within Egyptian society.

The study concludes that the inclination of political regimes in North African states toward Arab identity through policies of Arabization and Arab nationalism contributed to the growing emergence of the Amazigh movement. This movement operated through both domestic and external channels in order to pressure political systems and exploit the political opportunities provided by the surrounding environment to secure various gains. Such practices ranged from human rights and political activism to violent actions that affected political and security stability. These practices also differed among the countries of the region according to the approaches adopted by political regimes, as well as the varying demographic proportions of Amazigh populations within those states.

Keywords: Identity, Amazigh, Political Stability, North Africa.

Introduction

With the entrenchment of the identity question in North African states since the pre-independence period, and despite the later inclination of ruling political systems toward Arab identity, the practices of these systems regarding identity were profoundly shaped by the predominance of the military character within most regimes that emerged from anti-colonial liberation movements. Naturally, the ruling elites’ perception of identity was reflected in state-building processes.

In light of this, the central problem of the study revolves around the nature of the relationship between Arab and Amazigh identities, which has often been characterized by conflictual tendencies at the expense of loyalty and belonging to a broader national identity. This situation has produced negative repercussions on political stability in North African states. Accordingly, the study seeks to answer the following questions:

1. To what extent has the identity question affected political stability in North African states?
2. To what extent has the rise of the Amazigh movement influenced political stability in North African states?

 

The study seeks to test the validity of a central hypothesis, namely that the escalation of conflict and confrontation between Arab and Amazigh identities negatively affects political stability in North African countries. Consequently, the study adopts the “Group Model,” which represents one of the significant transformations in political studies, reflecting a shift from focusing on the formal structures and institutions of the political system toward processes, activities, and interactions. This contributed to a transition from static studies to dynamic approaches in political analysis. Accordingly, this study focuses on the interactions between Arab and Amazigh groups and their implications for political stability through the following two axes:

First: The Impact of Arab Identity

The practices associated with Arab identity in North Africa are not limited to the post-independence period. Efforts to revive and preserve Arabism and strengthen religious consciousness were central elements in the discourse of resistance movements led by religious scholars and intellectuals. Following independence, Arab identity profoundly influenced the policies of ruling elites that operated under the banner of Arab nationalism. This influence took several forms, ranging from attempts at Arab unity to policies of Arabization and beyond, making Arab identity a principal driver of elite orientations during that period.

In this context, Arab nationalism passed through three phases since its emergence as an intellectual and political movement directed against colonialism. In its early phase, Arabism represented a desire for an independent identity and autonomous existence. During this stage, it crystallized in efforts to free Arab societies from Ottoman Turkish domination. In the second phase, Arabism evolved through struggles against European colonialism. In the third phase, following independence, Arab nationalism became associated with concerns related to social change, development, and state-building processes.

Within this framework, the impact of Arab identity can be traced through Arabization policies and the Arab nationalist orientations of political regimes as indicators of the extent to which Arab identity influenced political stability. This can be examined as follows:

1. Arabization Policies

The Arabization policies adopted by political regimes in North Africa were closely associated with efforts to achieve political stability through the nationalist orientation embraced by ruling elites at the time. Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella, during his return flight from Cairo to Algeria in the spring of 1963, reportedly stepped onto the runway and shouted three times: “We are Arabs.”

In this context, the National Commission for Arabization was established in Algeria through a decree issued by President Houari Boumediene in 1972. The process of Arabization subsequently accelerated, culminating in the National Conference on Arabization in 1975, which produced decisions promoting the widespread use of the Arabic language. Institutional support for these policies was strengthened through the establishment of the Supreme Council for the National Language in 1981, followed by the Algerian Academy of the Arabic Language in 1986, and eventually by the Law on the Generalization of the Use of Arabic issued during the presidency of Chadli Bendjedid.

However, the process of Arabization was not isolated from political realities, as it sometimes encountered opposition from Amazigh groups. Although Bendjedid himself did not fully implement the law, his successor President Liamine Zéroual announced its enforcement beginning on July 5, 1998. This decision prompted demonstrations in the Kabylie region, where protesters carried banners written in both Amazigh and Arabic demanding official recognition of the Amazigh language. This was not the only instance of unrest; the riots and confrontations associated with the “Amazigh Spring” of 1980 were likewise linked to Amazigh opposition to Arabization policies and to the state’s stance toward Amazigh identity.

In Morocco, Arabization represented one of the pillars of national cohesion and a cornerstone of the nationalist movement in its response to colonial attempts to divide Arabs and Amazigh, most notably through the so-called “Berber Dahir” of 1930. After independence, Arabization became linked to the concept of “Moroccanization,” which referred to replacing foreign administrative and professional cadres inherited from the colonial era with Moroccan personnel.

In Tunisia, Arabization assumed the character of a national demand connected to independence, freedom, and resistance to cultural assimilation and integration. After independence, Arabization became tied to the political regime’s vision of state-building, largely shaped by President Habib Bourguiba’s personal outlook. Bourguiba viewed Arabization as part of a broader modernization and development project. Nevertheless, Tunisia’s Arabization experience passed through fluctuating phases, oscillating between support during the first two years and setbacks beginning in 1985 due to tensions in Tunisian-Egyptian relations. Consequently, the Tunisian political system reconsidered its Arab nationalist orientation and pursued modernization independently of broader Arab affiliations. However, the difficult economic circumstances Tunisia faced in the late 1960s prompted what became known as a “pause for reflection,” during which Tunisia reassessed its relations with the Arab world and moved closer to Gulf states for economic reasons. Tunisia even assumed an important role in promoting Arab solidarity, making Arabization a central issue once again.

Although Tunisia’s Arabization experience initially developed in conjunction with the concept of “Tunisification,” meaning the prioritization of national literary, political, and cultural production, the lack of sustained political will rendered the project hesitant and weak, which in turn affected the relationship between Arabization and political stability.

In Libya, Arab identity was employed for political purposes, particularly during the Libyan–Chadian War (1975–1994). The regime’s focus on supporting the Zuwaya tribes in the Kufra region socially and militarily, while simultaneously accusing the Tebu of acting as a “fifth column” serving Chad, fueled resentment among Libya’s Amazigh population in general. This sentiment was reflected in their support for the popular uprising that overthrew Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

In Egypt, however, Arabization was not intended to replace other languages or cultures, as was the case with French and Amazigh languages in other North African states. Rather, it primarily aimed at consolidating and affirming Egypt’s Arab identity. Egypt’s Arabism—grounded in its language, religion, and broader cultural framework—was regarded as a self-evident reality despite the debates that emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Consequently, the process of Arabization in Egypt was more political than cultural. Therefore, Arabization did not emerge as a significant factor affecting political stability in the Egyptian case, owing to the remarkable linguistic homogeneity of Egyptian society, as well as the prevailing perception among Egyptians regarding their country’s civilizational role in Arab and Islamic history.

The researcher argues that Arabization policies benefited from the determination of ruling regimes, as they formed part of broader modernization projects and state-building strategies. This provided them with a social base that strengthened their continuity despite the limited success of linguistic Arabization itself, particularly in societies characterized by linguistic duality (Arabic/French), such as Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco.

2. The Arab Nationalist Orientations of Political Regimes

Arab nationalist orientations occupied a central place in the political discourse of ruling regimes in North African states following independence. The concept of the “Arab Nation” emerged as an unquestioned reality and daily lived experience within the Nasserist discourse in Egypt. This explains the rapid establishment of the union between Egypt and Syria on February 23, 1958. Despite the optimism that initially surrounded this experiment, its collapse only three years later revealed deep contradictions between the ideal of unity and its practical implementation.

With the exception of Tunisia, Arab nationalism constituted the political framework within which the regimes of the remaining North African states operated during the first three decades after independence. Nevertheless, a dual dysfunction emerged as a result of the unilateral Arab nationalist practices adopted by ruling elites. On the one hand, the neglect of other dimensions of national identity—particularly the Amazigh dimension—and the exclusive emphasis on Arabism contributed to the later emergence of Amazigh identity consciousness movements, which were reinforced by both domestic and external factors.

On the other hand, the failure of Arab nationalist elites to achieve the modernization project they had initially promised created political and social vacuums that were subsequently filled by religious movements. These movements intersected with Arab nationalism in affirming the Arab identity of the state, while differing fundamentally in their ideological reference points. Whereas nationalist currents adopted a secular framework aimed at accommodating religious diversity within the Arab world, religious groups relied on doctrinal concepts rooted in ideas such as Hakimiyyah (divine sovereignty) and jihad. These developments significantly affected political stability in North African states.

On the one hand, the “Amazigh Spring” represented a pivotal turning point in the emergence of Amazigh political activism, which entered into violent confrontations with political regimes in Morocco and Algeria beginning in the 1980s, and later in Tunisia and Libya following the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in 2011. On the other hand, religious groups also confronted ruling regimes, leading the modern nation-state into violent conflicts with Islamist movements operating within what became known as “Identity Groups,” most notably the Muslim Brotherhood during different periods, especially in 1954 and the first half of the 1960s.

During this period, the concept of Hakimiyyah, advanced by Sayyid Qutb, emerged as a source of inspiration for numerous religious and jihadist movements that challenged political regimes. Although former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat attempted to reconcile with such groups in order to confront leftist currents while revising the socialist orientation inherited from Gamal Abdel Nasser, relations between Sadat and the Muslim Brotherhood deteriorated following Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem. This conflict culminated in Sadat’s assassination by members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization, which had been preparing for a popular uprising based on a radical religious ideology originating in Upper Egypt.

In Algeria, the country witnessed during the 1990s what became known as the “Black Decade,” a period of severe political turmoil that plunged the country into civil war. The “Salafi trend,” as described by Rached Ghannouchi, was among the leading forces behind the October 1988 uprising, which Islamists considered an “Islamic revolution.” Its prominent leader, Ali Belhadj, called for active participation in the protests beginning on October 9 of the same year.

In Tunisia, the first confrontations faced by Bourguiba’s political regime came from groups that raised slogans of Arabism and Islam and used mosques as centers of mobilization and propaganda. Some of these groups represented extensions of the Youssefist current, which had attempted a coup in 1961 and was also linked to what became known as the “Gafsa Operation.” During Bourguiba’s rule, the Tunisian state dealt with the religious trend through a strategy centered on combating backwardness, which Bourguiba described as a “jihad for development.” Through this approach, Bourguiba aimed to reshape the collective imagination and dismantle what he viewed as deteriorating psychological and cultural foundations within national memory, which had become central targets of political Islam.

The researcher argues that despite the apparent overlap between Arabism and Islam within the discourse of religious movements regarding Arab identity, there also existed overlapping interests and political alignments between components of the religious trend and external powers whose orientations diverged from Arab nationalism—such as Turkey and Iran—or even with international actors whose identities conflicted with Arab-Islamic identity, particularly Western states led by the United States.

This overlap demonstrates the functional nature of identity within the ideological and political discourse of religious groups. In addition, Arab identity itself remained largely instrumentalized and politically manipulated. It was adapted to serve the political objectives of Islamist movements in their interactions with the outside world. The Muslim Brotherhood, as the leading actor among Islamist movements, sought to demonstrate flexibility in engaging with liberal and secular discourse despite the profound contradiction between its ideological foundations and secular liberalism. Most writings of Islamist theorists—from Abu al-A‘la al-Mawdudi to Sayyid Qutb—carried a deeply confrontational view toward liberalism and secularism.

Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood was particularly eager to project an image more compatible with Western perceptions. In Tunisia, Rached Ghannouchi attempted to bridge the gap between religious and liberal discourse despite contradictions evident in his political practices while in power. During his tenure as Speaker of Parliament, Ghannouchi became one of the fiercest opponents of secular currents within parliament, to the extent that confrontations occasionally escalated into acts of aggression against female parliamentarians. This situation paved the way for an even more intense confrontation with the executive branch, ultimately ending with President Kais Saied’s decision to suspend parliament—dominated by Ghannouchi and his movement—on July 25, 2021.

Second: The Impact of Amazigh Identity

Despite the deep historical roots of Amazigh identity practices in modern North Africa—dating back to the final decades of the colonial era—their confinement during that period to the cultural sphere, away from direct political activity, limited their impact on political stability. Political activity remained under the control of colonial authorities, while national efforts were largely devoted to anti-colonial resistance in all its forms.

Within this framework, Amazigh identity practices assumed diverse forms ranging from participation in civil society organizations to, in some cases, violent activism. The forms and intensity of these practices varied across the countries of the region, leading to differing levels of impact on political stability. In order to measure the impact of Arab and Amazigh identity practices on political stability, the researcher adopts several indicators commonly used in political studies. Among these indicators, the study focuses on national unity and the decline of subnational loyalties, the responsiveness of political systems to domestic and external environments, and the involvement of Amazigh movements in violent acts against ruling authorities as key indicators of the Amazigh movement’s impact on political stability in North Africa.

1. National Unity and the Decline of Primordial Loyalties

Societies that do not experience forms of ethnic, religious, or sectarian plurality are generally considered more likely to enjoy political stability. More important than the mere existence of diversity, however, is whether ruling elites possess an effective strategy for managing such plurality. In both Morocco and Algeria, the Amazigh movement evolved from a primarily cultural framework into overt political activism during the 1980s and 1990s, highlighting the growing prominence of subnational loyalties at the expense of broader national loyalties.

In November 2017, the World Amazigh Congress held its seventh conference in the Moroccan city of Ifrane, issuing a statement calling for autonomy for Amazigh regions in North Africa. This trend was also reflected in Tunisia, where early signs of Amazigh political activism emerged following the political openness that swept North African states after 2011. Several civil society organizations associated with the Amazigh movement were established, including the Tunisian Amazigh Culture Association, which demanded the teaching of the Amazigh language in schools and official recognition of Amazigh culture as an integral component of Tunisian identity.

The researcher argues that this transformation within Tunisian Amazigh activism resembles the developments previously witnessed in Morocco and Algeria, representing a repetition of the same trajectory in Tunisia. The post-2011 Tunisian political environment created fertile ground for a range of challenges, including the growing role of radical religious organizations and the intensification of primordial loyalties.

In Libya, the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime opened the door for the rise of Amazigh subnational loyalties. Libyan Amazigh groups became politically active through the establishment of the Supreme Council of Libyan Amazigh in 2012. The Council objected to the Constitutional Drafting Assembly’s reliance on majority voting and insisted that the constitution should be approved through consensus among all components of Libyan society. As a result, the Council withdrew from the General National Congress.

In addition, the issue of Amazigh demographic representation constitutes another major point of contention within North African societies. According to the researcher, Amazigh populations in Morocco number approximately 10.64 million people out of a total population of 37.95 million, representing around 28% of the population. In Algeria, Amazigh populations are estimated at 8 million, or roughly 17.5% of the country’s 45.4 million inhabitants. In Tunisia, Amazigh populations exceed 500,000 people, accounting for approximately 5% of the population. In Libya, estimates range between 10% and 15% of the population, although no official statistics exist. In Egypt, Amazigh populations are comparatively very small, estimated between 20,000 and 30,000 people within a total population exceeding 106 million.

However, these figures remain highly contested among Amazigh activists due to their political implications within North African societies. On October 27, 2011, Amazigh activists in Tunisia organized a conference titled “Tunisia: Troubling Prospects,” issuing a statement criticizing earlier remarks by Ennahda leader Rached Ghannouchi, who had declared that “the Tunisian people are Arab and their language is Arabic.” The statement asserted instead that Tunisia was historically an Amazigh land whose original language and culture had been marginalized. It further claimed that nearly one million people in Tunisia speak Amazigh. Likewise, the World Amazigh Congress has repeatedly stated in its official declarations that Amazigh speakers across North Africa and the diaspora number approximately 50 million people worldwide.

2. The Responsiveness of Political Systems to Domestic and External Environments

Amazigh identity practices have traditionally taken cultural forms aimed at reviving the authentic features of Amazigh heritage in its folkloric expressions. Amazigh organizational activities also developed through associations and civil society institutions, many of which initially benefited from French support and later from the broader evolution of civil society. As a result, Amazigh identity practices had little significant impact on political stability until the late 1970s.

The early 1980s, however, witnessed the first clear indications that Amazigh identity could influence political and security stability, serving as a warning sign for North African political regimes. This was most notably reflected in the events of the “Amazigh Spring” in Algeria’s Kabylie region between April 20 and May 3, 1980. The protests erupted after Algerian authorities prohibited a lecture by the Amazigh writer and scholar Mouloud Mammeri on Amazigh literature. In response, widespread demonstrations demanded recognition of Amazigh culture, resulting in violent confrontations between protesters and state authorities.

The researcher argues that these events represented an opportunity that North African regimes should have utilized to better understand the social, cultural, and security dimensions underlying the unrest rather than treating it solely as a political and security challenge. The protests revealed the emergence of a social movement rooted in cultural and identity-based demands that could later evolve into a broader threat to societal security and political stability—which indeed occurred.

In contrast, Amazigh actors proved more capable of exploiting these opportunities and transforming them into a path toward cumulative gains closely linked to political stability in Morocco, Algeria, and to some extent Tunisia. Alongside the security challenges of the 1980s and 1990s—such as terrorism and the turmoil of Algeria’s “Black Decade”—and with the accession of King Mohammed VI to the Moroccan throne in 1999, the Amazigh movement increasingly relied on social mobilization and public pressure as mechanisms to influence ruling regimes while simultaneously taking advantage of the pressures generated by transformations in the international order after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Amazigh movement sought to exploit the political space created by these transformations, a process that can be interpreted through the lens of Political Opportunity Theory, which argues that social movements strive to operate within favorable environments that provide opportunities for political change while enabling them to mobilize resources effectively.

At the same time, changes in the external environment of North African political systems encouraged new strategies of mobilization and political engagement. The Amazigh movement increasingly shifted toward direct political participation, a process described by David S. Meyer in his analysis of how social movements transition into political actors through organizational structures, interest groups, political parties, electoral participation, and protest mobilization aimed at influencing decision-making processes. Such transformations often compel ruling regimes to respond rapidly at political and cultural levels, even as they simultaneously produce political and social tensions that regimes attempt to contain.

Within this context, the mobilizational and protest-oriented approach adopted by the Amazigh movement can be understood as a continuation of the long cultural struggle it had pursued throughout previous decades, especially in light of the transformations that affected the political environment of North African states during the 1980s.

In Algeria, the Constitution of February 23, 1989 attempted to establish the foundations of political pluralism, abandon the socialist option, and reinforce the principle of separation of powers. Likewise, President Liamine Zéroual’s regime sought to contain the crisis of the “Black Decade” by expanding the role of civil society through the Constitution of November 16, 1996 and by improving the conditions under which civil society organizations operated.

During this period, and amid the growing phenomenon of terrorism, the Kabylie region witnessed several protests, including student strikes known as the “Schoolbag Boycott” of 1994–1995. In response, President Zéroual introduced the Amazigh language into education within Kabylie, established the High Commission for Amazigh Language, launched radio programs in various Amazigh dialects—including Kabyle, Chaoui, and Mozabite—and incorporated the Amazigh dimension as one of the components of Algerian national identity in the 1996 Constitution.

In Morocco, following the political deadlock that emerged after the failed coup attempt of 1971—which involved several officers from Amazigh regions—the Amazigh issue gained greater attention after King Mohammed VI ascended to the throne. This enabled the Amazigh movement to exploit political opportunities in order to renew its demands, engage in broader civil rights activism, and invoke international legal frameworks such as the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the movement regarded as an international legal basis for defending Amazigh rights.

Consequently, the Amazigh movement intensified its reliance on mobilization structures, particularly through the Moroccan National Coordination Council, which played a significant role in rallying domestic and international solidarity with members of the “Tilili Association” who were arrested in May 1994 after participating in public demonstrations carrying banners written in Tifinagh script and demanding recognition of Amazigh identity.

In 2000, Amazigh activists issued what became known as the “Amazigh Manifesto,” followed by regular marches throughout Morocco aimed at keeping the Amazigh question continuously present in public debate. Among these initiatives was the “Tawada March,” launched by the World Amazigh Congress on April 21, 2001, which later evolved into a recurring Amazigh mobilization event.

In 2007, the “Movement for the Autonomy of the Rif” was established in northern Morocco, advocating for regional autonomy and emphasizing the political strength of the Rif region. Following the outbreak of the February 20, 2011 protests in Morocco, Amazigh activists continued organizing marches in Al Hoceima, Nador, and Souss, where they raised the Amazigh flag and displayed slogans written in Tifinagh script.

In Libya, the collapse of state institutions in 2011 produced profound transformations in the domestic environment as the country descended into civil conflict. Amid increasing pressure exerted by the Supreme Council of Libyan Amazigh on successive governments, the Council sought to influence political authorities by boycotting the 2013 elections and refusing to participate in the constitutional drafting committee whose draft constitution was adopted in 2017.

The Council issued a statement demanding that the constitution should reflect Libya’s identity in all its Arab and Amazigh components in the interest of justice and should recognize Amazigh as an official language in the Libyan constitution. The response of Libyan authorities remained inconsistent. Although the General National Congress issued Resolution No. 18 of 2013 mandating the teaching of the Amazigh language in schools, the decision was never fully implemented.

Facing continued Amazigh demands, the head of Libya’s interim government, Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, announced on November 20, 2021 his approval of Amazigh language instruction. Yet this response can be viewed as politically unstable, as it came only days before parliamentary elections that had been expected in December 2021, while Dbeibeh’s government itself was transitional in nature. This reinforces the argument that Libyan governmental responses to Amazigh demands since 2011 have remained inconsistent and unstable.

In Egypt, a delegation representing Amazigh communities participated in the constitutional hearings held by the constitutional drafting committee.

3. The Involvement of the Amazigh Movement in Violent Confrontations with Ruling Authorities

The confrontation between the Amazigh movement and North African political regimes intensified alongside the growth of rights-based activism and the expansion of civil society throughout the region. However, the security-oriented approach adopted by most political systems produced reactions that at times escalated into direct clashes with state authorities.

In Algeria, Amazigh activism was characterized by a greater degree of intensity and a stronger tendency toward confrontation with the ruling authorities. As social conditions deteriorated during the late 1970s and President Chadli Bendjedid assumed power in 1979, Amazigh activists sought to take advantage of the political opening that followed the long rule of President Houari Boumediene, especially by operating within universities and public institutions.

However, after authorities prohibited a lecture scheduled at Tizi Ouzou University on March 10, 1980 by the Amazigh writer Mouloud Mammeri concerning Amazigh poetry, widespread protests erupted. Violent clashes between Amazigh demonstrators and security forces resulted in approximately 120 deaths and 5,000 injuries. This event later acquired symbolic significance among Amazigh communities across North Africa and the diaspora under the name “The Amazigh Spring.”

The Kabylie region witnessed renewed protests in April 2001 following the killing of a young Amazigh man in Tizi Ouzou. These protests evolved into what became known as the “Second Amazigh Spring” or the “Black Spring” because of the high number of casualties.

The researcher argues that the killing itself was probably not the sole cause of the unrest, as the region had already experienced deep tensions since the first Amazigh Spring, in addition to growing Amazigh opposition to what activists described as the government’s “Arabization policies.”

Confrontations resurfaced again in May 2013, leaving seventeen people injured, including sixteen police officers. Several Amazigh-owned shops were damaged, looted, or burned. On November 24 of the same year, the city of Ghardaïa witnessed violent clashes between Arabs and Amazigh that initially began after a football match but rapidly acquired sectarian dimensions between Ibadis and Sunnis, continuing for several days and followed by large-scale arrests. Additional confrontations erupted in Tizi Ouzou on January 18, 2014 and again on October 14 of the same year in protest against deteriorating living conditions.

In Morocco, after the prolonged political closure that characterized the country following the attempted coup against King Hassan II on August 16, 1972, the political system gradually moved toward openness during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In response, Amazigh actors increasingly adopted a rights-based approach. Six Amazigh associations submitted a series of demands in what became known as the “Agadir Charter” in August 1991, foremost among them constitutional recognition of the Amazigh language.

Over the following two decades, the Amazigh movement succeeded in advancing many of its demands in parallel with efforts by the Moroccan regime to contain Amazigh aspirations through a number of royal initiatives. These included the establishment of the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture, the introduction of Amazigh language instruction in schools, the launch of Amazigh-language television channels, and ultimately the recognition of Amazigh as an official language through the constitutional amendments of 2011.

Nevertheless, these reforms did not prevent more intense confrontations between the Amazigh movement and Moroccan authorities during what became known as the “Hirak al-Rif” protests. These protests consisted of a series of demonstrations that erupted in the Rif region of northern Morocco on October 28, 2016. Despite attempts by the Moroccan government to contain the unrest, Amazigh activists criticized the government’s security-centered response, arguing that it ignored the fundamentally social nature of the crisis. The government arrested several protest leaders and activists on May 29, 2017, and on June 26, 2018 they received prison sentences of up to twenty years.

On July 29, 2017, King Mohammed VI, in his Throne Day speech, accused Moroccan political parties of abandoning their responsibilities and argued that security intervention in the Rif protests had become necessary because of the absence of effective political mediation. However, the king later gradually issued royal pardons for several detainees associated with the protests, the latest of which occurred on July 30, 2020.

In Libya, the ruling regime’s absolute refusal during Muammar Gaddafi’s era to recognize or engage with the Amazigh issue confined Amazigh identity practices largely to activism abroad. Libyan Amazigh groups became involved in the broader Amazigh movement by taking advantage of the extensive freedoms available in European countries. In this context, the Libyan Amazigh Congress was established in London on September 17, 2000, alongside a number of electronic platforms serving as Amazigh voices, including the website Tawalt.

As a result of the authoritarian grip that characterized the Libyan political system under Gaddafi, Amazigh identity practices within Libya itself remained limited and had little direct impact on political stability. However, the broader political opening that followed Gaddafi’s fall in 2011 transformed Amazigh activism into one of the influential variables shaping the country’s political process.

This new environment energized Amazigh, Tuareg, and Tebu political forces, all of which sought to exploit the opportunities created by the post-Gaddafi order. One of the earliest manifestations of this activism was the raising of the Amazigh flag alongside the Libyan national flag during celebrations marking the collapse of the Gaddafi regime. Following the establishment of the General National Congress (parliament), one of its leading Amazigh figures, Nouri Abusahmain, assumed the presidency of the institution. Several Amazigh factions also participated in supporting the “Libya Dawn” coalition, while Amazigh representatives boycotted the negotiations that ultimately resulted in the Skhirat Agreement.

As the security situation deteriorated and Libya descended further into civil war, Amazigh tribal leaders increasingly advocated a “federal model,” which they formally proposed on March 6, 2012 during the meeting of the Transitional Cyrenaica Region Council. Their proposal sought legitimacy from the 1951 Constitution established during the reign of King Idris al-Senussi.

The statement issued following the meeting declared that a federal union system should constitute the preferred framework for a unified Libyan state under a constitutional civil order deriving its legitimacy from the Qur’an and the authentic Sunnah. The vision proposed by the Cyrenaica Council for resolving Libya’s political and security crisis called for dividing the country into three major federal regions—Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan—each enjoying local self-government within a federal state.

Indeed, a federal region in Cyrenaica was officially announced on October 24, 2013, and a local government composed of two ministries was formed to administer the region. Cyrenaica itself was divided into four administrative provinces: Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Tobruk, and al-Jabal al-Akhdar, all based on the framework established by the 1951 Constitution.

Conclusion

Following independence, ruling political systems in North African states increasingly employed identity discourse as part of broader state-building projects, emphasizing Arab identity as the official national identity. While these regimes succeeded in consolidating this orientation during the first decades after independence, new variables began to reshape the political environment from the 1980s onward.

Amazigh identity interacted with these transformations in ways that significantly affected political stability in North African states, albeit to varying degrees across the region. Through three principal indicators—national unity and the persistence of primordial loyalties, the responsiveness of political systems to domestic and external environments, and the involvement of the Amazigh movement in violent confrontations with ruling authorities—the study traced the interaction between Amazigh identity and numerous political developments beginning with the events of the “Amazigh Spring” in Algeria.

These events reinforced the transformation of Amazigh identity consciousness from a predominantly cultural movement into an overtly political one, at times even leading to violent confrontations between Amazigh groups and state authorities. However, this trajectory did not follow a uniform pattern across the region. While violence expanded significantly in Algeria’s Kabylie region, the Moroccan regime adopted a strategy aimed at containing the Amazigh issue through institutional accommodation. Tunisia, meanwhile, experienced comparatively lower levels of tension due to the smaller size of its Amazigh population relative to Morocco and Algeria.

In Libya, the severe security-centered policies and the outright refusal of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime to recognize Amazigh identity produced a far more intense reaction following the regime’s collapse in 2011. This reaction reached the level of direct participation in the violent conflicts that engulfed the country in subsequent years.

In Egypt, by contrast, the strong social cohesion among Egyptians and the very limited number of Egyptian Amazigh meant that no significant tensions emerged between Amazigh communities and the broader population. Instead, Amazigh communities became integrated into the Egyptian social fabric while preserving their cultural distinctiveness within the framework of an inclusive Egyptian national identity.

References

 

First: Arabic References

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Studies

1. Mustafa Belour, “Political Reforms in Algeria 1988–1990,” دفاتر السياسة والقانون (Algeria: University of Ouargla, Issue 1, 2009).
2. Yusuf Mohammed Al-Sawani, “Identity, Nation, and the Future: Questions,” Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, Vol. 43, No. 506, April 2021).

Published Studies

1. Ismail Hammoudi, “Securitizing the Rif Movement and Its Political Consequences,” published paper, Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis, available at:
   Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis
2. Abdel Aleem Mohamed, “Identity in the Perspective of Political Islam: Deconstructing the Illusions of Unilateralism, Reductionism, and Exclusivity,” published study (Cairo: Arab Center for Research, Issue 3, June 2013).
3. Mahmoud Gamal Abdel Aal, “Motives Behind the Algerian Government’s Escalation Against the Separatist MAK Movement,” published paper, Future Center for Advanced Research and Studies, available at:
   Future Center for Advanced Research and Studies

Academic Theses

1. Ben Halima Sahraoui, Religious-Political Movements in Algeria Between Rupture and Continuity: A Khaldunian Approach to Representations of Authority and Social Change – University of Tiaret Professors as a Model, PhD Dissertation (Algeria: University of Oran, Faculty of Social Sciences, 2011).
2. Badr الدين مسعودي, Strategies for Addressing the Kabylie Events in the Algerian Press: El Khabar Newspaper as a Model, Master’s Thesis (Algeria: Mentouri Brothers University/Constantine, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2005).

Newspapers

1. Al-Masry Al-Youm, June 25, 2013.
2. Al-Ahram, May 30, 2014.
3. Asharq Al-Awsat, July 5, 2020.
4. Asharq Al-Awsat, September 8, 2021.
5. Rai Al-Youm (electronic edition), June 14, 2018.

Second: Foreign References

Books and Articles

1. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenges to North African States (USA: University of Texas Press, 2011).
2. David S. Meyer and Debra Minkoff, “Conceptualizing Political Opportunity,” Social Forces (USA: University of North Carolina Press, Vol. 82, No. 4, June 2004).
3. John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,” The American Journal of Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Vol. 82, No. 6, May 1977).

Published Papers

1. Thiago Lima, “A Berber in Agadir: Exploring the Urban/Rural Shift in Amazigh Identity,” published paper (USA: School for International Training, 2011).
2. Frederic Wehrey, “The Struggle for Security in Eastern Libya,” published paper, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2012:
   Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
3. Wolfram Lacher, Supporting Stabilization in Libya: The Challenges of Finalizing and Implementing the Skhirat Agreement (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July 2015).

Theses

1. John E. Kruse, Amazigh-State Relations in Morocco and Algeria, Master’s Thesis (California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013).
2. Nina Eggert, The Impact of Political Opportunity Structures on Networks of Immigrants, PhD Thesis (Canada: Faculty of Sociology and Social Research, University of Trento, 2011).

Internet Sources

1. Ignacio Cembrero, “Face à la montée des périls, le roi est nu derrière son bouclier sécuritaire,” available at:
   Le Desk
2. Sahar Lahdifi, “The Struggle for Ethnic Identities in Morocco and Algeria: A Colonial Legacy of Inequalities,” available at:
   Article Link
3. Yacine Boudhane, “What Have the Amazigh Achieved in Algeria? Brief Analysis,” Washington Institute, October 27, 2017, available at:
   Washington Institute