Washington and Tehran Between the Impossibility of Settlement and the Logic of Truce

Despite growing talk of potential understandings between the United States and Iran, a careful reading of the trajectory of relations between the two sides reveals that what is unfolding falls far short of the concept of “comprehensive peace.” Rather, it reflects a renewed attempt to manage the conflict and reduce its political, economic, and military costs. The crisis, which has persisted for more than four decades, has never been a simple dispute that could be resolved through a technical agreement or a temporary understanding. Instead, it is a complex confrontation tied to regional power balances, global energy security, Iran’s nuclear program, and the nature of the American presence in the Middle East.

Previous experiences provide clear evidence of the fragility of any agreement that fails to address the roots of the crisis. The 2015 nuclear agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), temporarily succeeded in lowering tensions, but it failed to establish a lasting settlement because the core disagreements remained unresolved. The withdrawal of the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump from the agreement in 2018, followed by the reimposition of the “maximum pressure” policy, demonstrated that any understanding can quickly collapse once political calculations in Washington change.

Since then, U.S.-Iranian relations have entered a phase of “low-intensity mutual deterrence.” Iran has expanded uranium enrichment levels to unprecedented levels and reduced its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, while the United States has intensified economic and military sanctions and strengthened its naval presence in the Arabian Gulf. According to reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency, Tehran now possesses quantities of enriched uranium approaching weapons-grade levels, bringing the nuclear file once again to the forefront of Western concerns.

At the same time, Washington recognizes that the military option does not guarantee the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program and could instead push the region into a broader war whose consequences would be difficult to contain. American experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have created a growing conviction within U.S. institutions that prolonged wars in the Middle East drain American power without producing stable strategic outcomes. Consequently, the U.S. administration appears more inclined toward a policy of “containment and tension management” rather than direct confrontation.

This is where the importance of the Strait of Hormuz emerges as one of the central pillars of balance in the crisis. Roughly one-fifth of global oil trade passes through the strait, making it a strategic pressure card for Iran while simultaneously representing a red line for international powers. Any threat to close the waterway immediately impacts oil prices and global energy markets. Previous incidents — whether during the 2019 tanker crisis or the attacks targeting Saudi Aramco facilities — proved that even a limited rise in tensions in the Gulf can trigger worldwide economic disruption.

This explains the international interest in any signs of de-escalation, even if temporary or incomplete. Financial markets react rapidly to the prospect of reduced tensions because the global economy is already in a fragile state due to international conflicts, supply chain disruptions, and global economic slowdown. As a result, the current Western priority appears to revolve more around protecting energy market stability than achieving a historic political settlement with Iran.

Meanwhile, Iran faces mounting internal pressures that make it increasingly in need of economic and political breathing space. Years of American sanctions have significantly weakened the Iranian economy, causing the national currency to depreciate sharply, inflation and unemployment to rise, and social protests to intensify. International economic estimates indicate that Iran has lost tens of billions of dollars due to restrictions on oil exports and financial transactions.

Nevertheless, economic pressure has not pushed Tehran toward surrender or a fundamental change in policy. Instead, it has reinforced Iran’s strategy of “strategic patience” and encouraged the expansion of its regional deterrence tools, whether through advancing its missile program or maintaining networks of influence across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. This suggests that Iran does not view negotiations as a final concession, but rather as part of managing the conflict and improving its bargaining position.

The central dilemma remains the absence of mutual trust. Iran believes the United States offers no genuine guarantees that any future agreement will be respected, particularly after Washington’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal. On the other hand, the United States views Tehran as using negotiations to buy time and expand its nuclear and regional capabilities. Consequently, any new understanding will remain fragile and vulnerable to collapse in the face of the first major political or security shift.

The regional environment itself also complicates the possibility of a stable settlement. The Middle East is already undergoing a profound reshaping of regional balances amid the continuing war in Gaza, rising tensions in the Red Sea, regional competition among major powers, and Israeli efforts to prevent Iran from becoming a military nuclear power. For this reason, any U.S.-Iran agreement will remain constrained by broader regional calculations that extend beyond the bilateral relationship itself.

All of this indicates that the region is not moving toward an “American-Iranian peace,” but rather toward a new phase of “managed tension” — in other words, a situation in which large-scale confrontation is prevented without eliminating its underlying causes. This model may produce a degree of temporary calm, but it keeps the Middle East trapped in a cycle of anxiety and instability, where conflict shifts from open warfare to a prolonged war of attrition driven by sanctions, mutual deterrence, indirect confrontations, and intermittent negotiations.

Accordingly, the real question is no longer whether Washington and Tehran will sign an agreement, but whether the two sides genuinely possess the political will to resolve the conflict at its roots. So far, the answer appears far closer to “no” than “yes.”