Sudan Between War and Paths to Settlemen

Major General Al-Nour Ahmed Adam (“Al-Nour Al-Qubba”), the former commander in Sudan’s Border Guard Forces and one of the founders of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), announced his defection and return to the Sudanese army on April 13, 2026. The idea of defecting began to take shape after the fall of El-Fasher, where he had commanded the besieged force for more than 500 days. However, the position of commander of the Sixth Division was instead assigned to Major General “Jadou Ibn Shouk,” despite Al-Nour being the more senior officer according to military hierarchy. The RSF attack on “Mastariha,” the stronghold of the Mahamid tribe from which he hails, along with an alleged attempt to assassinate tribal leader Sheikh Musa Hilal using a drone in February 2026, ultimately sealed his decision and triggered contacts and coordination for its execution.

Al-Nour left North Darfur on April 9, accompanied by a convoy of combat vehicles fully equipped with weapons and supplies. He was later joined by his deputy, Major General Mahmoud Al-Wali. The group headed toward “Dar Zaghawa,” where they were received by armed movements allied with the Sudanese army. Together, nearly 90 vehicles moved toward the Northern State under the protection of five army drones, which successfully neutralized an RSF force tasked with intercepting them. After nine days, they arrived in Dongola, where they were welcomed by regional commanders and later by Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan himself, who reportedly offered Al-Nour his presidential vehicle as a gesture of appreciation for his return. Only days later, another defecting commander, Ali Rizqallah “Al-Safana,” joined the army with his forces and equipment. The erosion of trust is now shaking the RSF from within.

Internal disputes intensified among factions of the Rizeigat tribe, from which Al-Nour and several other commanders originate. This helped the Sudanese army advance its strategy of “internally dismantling the enemy” through attracting and integrating certain leaders into state institutions. The army also exploited tribal favoritism within the RSF in the distribution of resources and weaponry, as well as the dominance of hardline elements over supply and logistics hubs in Nyala, Zalingei, and El-Geneina.

Defections from the RSF are not new. They were preceded by the defection of Abu Aqla Keikal, commander of the “Sudan Shield” militias, in October 2024. Keikal had initially helped the RSF seize Al-Jazira State before later aiding the army in retaking it. However, his defection appeared more like a negotiated arrangement combining political and military dimensions, with intelligence agencies reportedly playing a central role, particularly since Keikal originated from outside the RSF structure. By contrast, Al-Qubba’s defection emerged from within the RSF itself, reflecting a deterioration in internal cohesion and growing discontent in its ranks, itself a response to fractures within its social base. These defections have strengthened the army’s intelligence and operational capabilities, given the defectors’ field experience and detailed knowledge of the RSF’s structure and deployment map — factors that could tilt the balance in favor of the army in the future.

The war entered its fourth year in mid-April. After several weeks of relative calm, the Sudanese army launched attacks in North Kordofan targeting strategic points controlling the vital road linking El-Obeid, Kadugli, and Al-Dilling, potentially paving the way to lift the siege on the latter. The operation included the axes of Kazgil, Al-Hamadi, and Alouba southwest of El-Obeid, and expanded toward Al-Dubeibat in South Kordofan State. It also covered Umm Samima and Al-Khowi in West Kordofan State. These areas lie within a geographical range of roughly 50 kilometers from El-Obeid and had mostly been under RSF control. During the first phase of the operation, the army succeeded in forcing RSF units to withdraw from Al-Riyash, Kazgil, and Al-Hamadi, reaching the outskirts of Al-Dubeibat. In the second phase, army forces conducted sweeping operations in Kazgil, Shawaya, Al-Hamadi, and Al-Dubeibat, before later withdrawing from some positions in the face of militia counterattacks in order to minimize losses, after inflicting heavy casualties on their opponents. The battlefield equation in North Kordofan is gradually shifting in favor of the army, largely due to its recapture of key routes previously used by the RSF to reinforce positions and besiege cities.

The current military situation reflects a division of control across Sudan’s eighteen states. The army maintains control over the eastern states — Red Sea, Kassala, Al-Qadarif, and Sennar — as well as the northern states of River Nile and Northern State, the central states of Khartoum, White Nile, and Al-Jazira, broad areas of North Kordofan in south-central Sudan, most of the Blue Nile region in the south, and parts of South and West Kordofan. Meanwhile, the RSF controls the five Darfur states in the west, except for portions of North and West Darfur where the army and allied joint forces hold territory near the Chadian border. The RSF also controls parts of South Kordofan, most of West Kordofan, and limited areas of Blue Nile State.

The Sudanese army had been counting on a Pakistani arms deal reportedly worth $1.5 billion, including weapons systems and aircraft, to decisively settle the conflict and impose dominance across Sudan. However, Reuters reported on April 20, citing two Pakistani security sources and a diplomatic source, that Islamabad had suspended the deal after Saudi Arabia declined to finance it. Some analysts interpreted the decision in light of media reports about a visit by an Iranian delegation to Port Sudan on March 22, during which the delegation allegedly met Al-Burhan and senior officials to reactivate military cooperation agreements, establish a naval base in the Osif area on the Red Sea, and prepare for a maritime delegation visit aimed at reviving a suspended container shipping line inactive since 2018. Others viewed the U.S. decision to classify the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist entity as a reaction to the alleged visit.

In reality, however, all of these interpretations appear flawed. Sudan’s Foreign Ministry promptly issued a categorical denial of the alleged Iranian visit. Moreover, the U.S. designation decision had already been issued on March 9 — two weeks before the reported visit — while the dynamics of the Saudi decision make it unlikely that Riyadh would wait an entire month to respond to such a development. Al-Burhan is highly unlikely to approve any move that would anger Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has every right to reconsider financing arrangements in light of shifting spending priorities driven by the economic repercussions of Gulf disruptions. Had those interpretations been accurate, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman would not have received Al-Burhan in جدة on April 20 in an effort to revive the جدة mediation platform after growing European activism during the Berlin Conference on April 15, where calls were made for the establishment of civilian rule and for holding both warring sides accountable — effectively equating the state with the rebel militias.