Is Iran Trying to Reengineer the Militia Weapons File?

The visit of Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf to Baghdad does not appear to be merely another stop on the itinerary of parliamentary relations between Iraq and Iran. The timing, the nature of the issues surrounding the visit, and the Iranian moves that preceded it all suggest that Baghdad has entered a highly sensitive political moment, whose immediate headline is the state’s monopoly over weapons, but whose deeper substance concerns who controls Iraq’s security and political decisions, and how the relationship between the state and armed factions can be restructured without triggering an intra-Shiite confrontation.

With the Iraqi government’s deadline for implementing its plan to place all weapons under state control approaching at the end of September, the issue appears to have moved beyond a legal and constitutional question to become a test of the balance of power within Iraq’s political system itself.

Against this backdrop, Ghalibaf’s visit acquires significance beyond his formal position as speaker of the Iranian parliament. The indicators cited in the report suggest that Tehran does not view the issue of militia weapons as merely an internal Iraqi matter that Baghdad can resolve on its own. Rather, it appears to regard it as part of a broader system of regional interests, influence, and security arrangements.

From this perspective, the Iranian move can be interpreted as an attempt to find a political exit that preserves the essence of the factions’ influence while preventing the dispute over weapons from turning into an intra-Shiite war.

The Issue Is Not Merely About Weapons

On the surface, the crisis appears to revolve around a straightforward question: Will the armed factions surrender their weapons to the state or not?

But the real question is more complicated:

Who controls Iraq’s security decisions?

Placing weapons under state control does not simply mean collecting heavy weapons or closing unofficial headquarters. It would effectively redefine the relationship between the state and armed forces that emerged or expanded outside the traditional structure of the armed forces.

This is why resistance by some factions to the government’s plan cannot necessarily be understood as merely opposition to an administrative measure.

It represents resistance to what the measure could mean politically: the restoration of the state’s monopoly over security decisions and, consequently, the redistribution of a portion of political power within Iraq’s political system.

This is precisely where the issue becomes so sensitive.

The factions do not necessarily view their weapons simply as a stockpile of heavy arms that can be surrendered or concealed. Rather, the weapons are part of their political position, their ability to exert influence, protect their interests, and guarantee the continuation of their power.

Accordingly, giving up the weapons may be perceived by some of these forces not merely as surrendering a military tool, but as surrendering part of the political weight they have accumulated over many years.

Why Is Iran Moving Now?

The more important question is not why Iran cares about Iraqi militia weapons—that is clear in light of the role played by armed factions within Iran’s regional influence network—but rather:

Why is Tehran moving at this particular moment?

The timing is highly significant.

The Iraqi government is adhering to a deadline at the end of September, coinciding with the completion of the U.S. withdrawal according to the timetable referenced in the report. At the same time, the government has already begun institutional steps to implement its plan, including forming a committee to organize disengagement and integration, establishing a weapons database, and closing facilities linked to the Popular Mobilization Forces.

This means that the issue has moved from political discussion of weapons control to attempts to build practical mechanisms for implementing it.

Time is therefore becoming a source of pressure.

The closer the deadline gets, the narrower the room for political maneuver becomes, and the greater the possibility that the dispute will shift from open-ended negotiations to a test of strength.

Iran’s current move may therefore be an attempt to reach an arrangement before that point is reached.

Iran Appears to Want Neither Confrontation nor the Loss of the Factions

If the information in the report concerning proposals to “freeze” or conceal heavy weapons, and possibly transfer part of them temporarily to Iran, is accurate, the significance of these proposals lies less in their technical details than in what they reveal about Iran’s dilemma.

Tehran appears to be pursuing two conflicting objectives.

The first is to prevent the Iraqi government from turning the weapons-control process into an operation that effectively dismantles the military capabilities of the factions aligned with Iran.

The second is to prevent those factions from entering into an open confrontation with the Iraqi government, which could lead to an intra-Shiite conflict whose consequences would be difficult for Iran to control.

This is where the idea of “freezing” or “concealing” the weapons—if such a proposal does indeed exist—can be understood as an attempt to formulate a compromise between two competing principles.

The government could argue that the process of placing weapons under state control is continuing.

The factions could argue that they have not abandoned the “weapons of resistance.”

Iran could preserve its relationships with the factions without pushing them into a direct confrontation with the state.

In other words, the proposal may not actually resolve the weapons issue so much as postpone the struggle over its future.

“Concealment” May Be a Tactical Solution—but Not a Strategic One

If the proposal is indeed to move heavy weapons outside Iraq or place them in storage, it could reduce the risk of confrontation in the short term.

But it would not answer the central question:

Will the weapons become subordinate to the Iraqi state, or will they remain an independent source of power?

A concealed weapon is still a weapon.

Weapons stored abroad can be brought back.

And military capabilities that have not been institutionally dismantled can regain their political function when circumstances require.

The distinction between disarmament and freezing weapons is therefore not semantic. It is strategic.

The former changes the balance of power.

The latter may merely change where the power is located or how visible it is.

For this reason, the success of any such arrangement would depend on whether the freezing phase becomes the beginning of a genuine political process to reintegrate the factions into the state, or whether it becomes a mechanism for bypassing the deadline and reproducing the existing situation in a less visible form.

Al-Zeidi’s Battle Is Not a Personal Battle

One notable feature of the report is that Prime Minister Ali Faleh al-Zeidi appears determined to uphold both the deadline and the substance of the plan despite pressure and threats from some factions.

It would be a mistake, however, to reduce this position to the personality or political ambitions of the prime minister.

For him, the issue is larger than his own survival in office.

Backing away from the deadline or hollowing out the weapons-control plan could send a dangerous political message: that the government can issue decisions but cannot implement them when confronted by armed centers of power.

This is precisely what al-Zeidi appears determined to avoid.

If he succeeds in implementing the plan, the office of prime minister will emerge stronger.

If he is forced to retreat under pressure from the factions, the office itself could become the subject of a political test, because the message would be that political authority is insufficient when confronted by armed power operating independently of the government’s decision-making process.

The struggle over weapons control is therefore, in part, a struggle over the authority of the state.

Why Are the Threats Politically More Significant Than Their Content?

The sharp statements and threats cited in the report, including language directed at the prime minister, are not merely another component of Iraq’s familiar political rhetoric.

Their political function extends beyond the immediate threat.

They are an attempt to define the limits of what the government can do.

When armed factions tell the prime minister, directly or indirectly, that he must not cross certain “red lines,” they are not addressing the prime minister personally alone. They are sending a message to the political system as a whole.

The message is:

There are areas of power that the state cannot easily approach.

This may explain why al-Zeidi has avoided responding to the factions in kind.

The government needs to prevent a legal and constitutional dispute from becoming an existential confrontation, because shifting the rhetoric from “enforcing the law” to “confronting the resistance” could recast the conflict in a more dangerous sectarian and identity-based framework.

The Dilemma Within the Coordination Framework

Perhaps the most important political point is that the crisis does not exist solely between the government and the armed factions.

It exists within Iraq’s Shiite political environment itself.

The Coordination Framework therefore faces an exceptionally difficult equation.

On one side is a government seeking to consolidate state authority, receiving—according to the report—American and regional support, and determined to complete the weapons-control process.

On another side are Shiite forces with close ties to the factions, some of which view the weapons as part of a security and political protection system that cannot easily be abandoned.

On a third side are internal pressures related to corruption investigations and cases involving figures associated with this political environment, making the current moment more sensitive and encouraging some actors to seek a settlement rather than enter into a full-scale confrontation.

The dispute over weapons thus becomes a struggle to reorder Iraq’s Shiite political house itself.

Iran Faces a New Dilemma in Iraq

Historically, Iran has benefited from the presence of Iraqi armed groups capable of providing influence and leverage outside the full control of the state.

But the circumstances that enabled this model are not static.

Iraq is moving, according to the information in the report, toward a different phase coinciding with the completion of the U.S. withdrawal.

This creates a paradox.

If Iran wants an Iraq less dependent on the United States, the withdrawal of U.S. forces removes one of the main arguments used to justify the continued existence of weapons outside state control.

But if the U.S. withdrawal strengthens the Iraqi state, it could simultaneously mean a reduction in the factions’ ability to operate as independent forces.

Iran therefore faces a strategic question:

Does it want to preserve the factions as independent armed forces, or does it want to preserve its political influence inside a stronger Iraqi state?

This may be the essence of the current Iranian maneuver.

Why Ghalibaf—and Not Only the Commander of the Quds Force?

Ghalibaf’s visit acquires additional significance because the report places it in the context of an earlier, undisclosed visit to Baghdad by Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani.

There is an important political signal here.

Qaani’s presence in Baghdad could naturally be associated with the immediate security dimension of the issue.

The appearance of the Iranian parliament speaker on the crisis line, by contrast, gives the issue broader political and institutional cover.

This may indicate that Tehran is attempting to move from managing the issue exclusively through security and factional channels toward finding a political formula that can be marketed within Iraq’s political system.

In other words, Iran may have recognized that the next phase cannot be managed through security influence alone.

What is needed is a political settlement that protects its interests without appearing to be an Iranian dictate to Baghdad.

This interpretation becomes more significant in light of Ghalibaf’s statements about “resistance” and the construction of a “new regional system” free from foreign intervention. Those remarks place the Iraqi weapons issue within a broader Iranian vision of regional security.

The U.S. Withdrawal Changes the Function of the Weapons

There is another highly important paradox.

The Iraqi factions can portray their weapons as part of “resistance” so long as there is a U.S. military presence that can be presented as a direct threat.

But if the U.S. withdrawal is completed according to the stated timetable, the argument for maintaining weapons outside state control becomes more complicated.

This does not mean that the factions will lose all of their political justifications. But they will face a more difficult question:

Resistance against whom? Against what? And under whose authority?

The debate therefore shifts from the legitimacy of resisting occupation to the legitimacy of monopolizing the use of force within the state.

That transition could fundamentally alter the factions’ position in Iraqi politics.

Does Iran Want to Surrender the Weapons—or Redefine Them?

Perhaps this is a more accurate question than asking whether Iran will support weapons control.

Tehran may not be facing a binary choice between:

complete disarmament and complete preservation of the weapons.

Instead, it may be seeking a third option:

redefining the function of the weapons.

This could mean moving from an independent armed force toward varying degrees of integration into state institutions, retaining undeclared capabilities that could be activated under exceptional circumstances, or preserving political and security influence even after reducing the visible military dimension of that power.

This helps explain why the idea of “freezing” the weapons may be attractive to some actors.

It allows the form to change without settling the question of the underlying function.

The problem, however, is that a modern state cannot establish a stable monopoly over force if there remains a dual monopoly over security decision-making: an official declared decision, and an unofficial decision that can emerge when circumstances require it.

The Real Battle: Who Will Define Iraq After the U.S. Withdrawal?

From this perspective, the weapons issue becomes part of a much larger question:

What will Iraq look like after the completion of the U.S. withdrawal?

Three broad trajectories are possible.

The first is an Iraq in which the state gradually restores its monopoly over security decisions and the factions evolve primarily into political forces.

The second is an Iraq in which the factions retain their military capabilities in less visible forms, while the state accepts the reality on the ground in order to avoid confrontation.

The third is a hybrid arrangement in which part of the capabilities is integrated into official institutions while another part remains outside them, directly or indirectly.

If the information in the report is accurate, the current Iranian maneuver appears aimed at preventing the most dangerous scenario: a direct confrontation between the government and the factions before a political formula can be reached.

The Real Test Is Not September 30

The deadline may appear to be the heart of the crisis.

In reality, it is only a test point.

Even if the government reaches September 30 without confrontation, the fundamental question will remain:

What happens afterward?

Will weapons control become a sustained institutional process?

Will heavy weapons actually be dismantled?

Will the factions genuinely integrate into state institutions?

Will they relinquish independent military decision-making?

Or will the crisis simply be recycled under new terminology?

The government's real success, therefore, will not be measured solely by whether it gets past the deadline. It will be measured by its ability to turn the deadline into the beginning of a long-term process for rebuilding the state's monopoly over force.

Conclusion: Iran Is Looking for an Exit—and Iraq Is Testing Its Ability to Become a State

In light of the information presented in the report, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s visit to Baghdad appears to be part of an Iranian effort to prevent the weapons-control issue from becoming a point of explosion inside Iraq.

But more importantly, Tehran may have recognized that defending the status quo in its previous form has become increasingly difficult.

The U.S. withdrawal is changing the security environment. The Iraqi government appears more determined to implement its plan. There is broad political support within the State Administration Coalition for the weapons-control process, while some factions are facing growing internal and external pressures.

The current struggle between Iran and the Iraqi government may therefore not be fundamentally about whether the weapons will remain or disappear.

It may instead be about who will determine the terms of their disappearance, where the weapons will be located, what function they will retain, who will control them, and who will have the authority to reactivate them in the future.

This is where the issue goes beyond heavy weapons or unofficial headquarters.

It is a struggle over the definition of the Iraqi state itself.

If Baghdad succeeds in transforming weapons control into a genuine institutional process, Iraq could be approaching a historic turning point: a gradual transition from a state coexisting with multiple armed centers of power toward a state seeking to monopolize security decision-making.

If, however, the crisis ends in nothing more than “freezing” the weapons, moving them abroad, or concealing them pending a deferred political settlement, Baghdad may have avoided confrontation without actually resolving the underlying problem.

In that case, the appearance of the weapons will have changed, but the substance of the problem will remain.

For Iran, meanwhile, the optimal outcome may not be preserving the weapons exactly as they are, but reaching an arrangement that preserves the factions’ position and influence without forcing Tehran into a direct confrontation with an Iraqi government determined to restore state authority.

The Iranian maneuver can therefore be understood as an attempt to move from protecting the weapons to managing their withdrawal from the political scene in a way that does not result in the loss of Iranian influence.

But the success of this equation will ultimately depend on one question:

Can Iran persuade the factions that preserving their political influence has become more important than preserving their military autonomy—and can the Iraqi government, in return, prove that the state can absorb forces that surrender their weapons without marginalizing them?

If both sides succeed, September could become the beginning of a historic settlement.

If they fail, the weapons-control deadline could become more than an administrative milestone. It could become a genuine test of the balance of power inside Iraq, the limits of Iranian influence, and the Iraqi state's ability to monopolize decisions of war and peace.

Ultimately, the issue is not about weapons alone.

It concerns the question that Iraq has postponed for years:

Can the state become stronger than the forces operating within and alongside it, or will the political system continue to rest on coexistence between formal authority and parallel centers of power?

The answer may prove far more consequential than the fate of any individual weapons depot or any single armed faction.