Test broadcast

Drones and Operational Stalemate: The Difficulty of Achieving a Breakthrough in the Russia–Ukraine War

Reports and files - Foresight

As the war between Russia and Ukraine enters its fifth year, achieving a decisive breakthrough on the battlefield appears increasingly difficult for either side, particularly for Russia. A meaningful strategic shift in the course of the conflict remains elusive, as the war has settled into a prolonged operational stalemate. Much of this deadlock can be attributed to the growing role of unmanned aerial systems, which have become central to modern military operations. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have performed a wide range of missions, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), in addition to conducting direct strike operations. Most importantly, however, they have significantly reduced the possibility of achieving large-scale operational surprise, thereby limiting the prospects for a decisive strategic breakthrough on the battlefield.

Ukraine’s geography—characterized by vast, open terrain with limited vegetation—has further amplified the effectiveness of drone warfare. This exposed landscape provides few opportunities for advancing ground forces to benefit from concealment or cover, leaving them highly vulnerable to persistent aerial surveillance and attack. As a result, the combination of continuous aerial observation and precision strike capabilities has constrained the ability of either side to achieve large-scale operational breakthroughs. In this sense, drones have effectively assumed the role of “flying artillery,” a concept first recognized by German commanders during the Second World War and later refined by Israeli military doctrine through the integration of airpower with ground operations.

One-way attack drones—employed by both sides, particularly Ukrainian forces—have demonstrated destructive capabilities comparable to conventional artillery. Yet, in many cases, drone-based firepower has strengthened defensive operations more than offensive ones. By providing both flexible firepower and real-time aerial intelligence, drones have made it increasingly difficult for adversaries to achieve operational or strategic breakthroughs. Consequently, large-scale battlefield surprise has become far more difficult to attain.

Nevertheless, the assumption that drones constitute a definitive “game changer” in warfare should be approached with caution. While the tactical defence has clearly been strengthened in the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, it is historically well established that defence tends to possess an inherent advantage in warfare. There is little reason to assume that the current tactical stalemate in Ukraine will persist indefinitely or necessarily characterize future wars. Rather, the current dynamics are shaped as much by battlefield circumstances and tactical adaptation as by technological innovation.

 

Historical Precedents: Breaking Tactical Deadlock

Military history provides valuable insights into how tactical stalemates have been overcome. During the Boer War (1899–1902), British forces initially relied on massed frontal assaults, only to discover that defensive firepower inflicted severe casualties on their troops. In response, they adapted their tactics by dividing their forces into smaller, more mobile units and conducting flanking manoeuvres against Boer positions using mounted troops.

Similarly, during the Russo–Japanese War of 1905, Japanese forces adopted decentralized tactics by dividing into smaller assault teams as they approached enemy positions. Each team pursued a specific objective, culminating in close-range bayonet assaults. These attacks were preceded by methodical advances toward enemy lines, with troops remaining concealed during the day and advancing under the cover of darkness.

During the First World War (1914–1918), defensive military technologies—such as heavy artillery, machine guns, and small arms—reached unprecedented levels of effectiveness, greatly strengthening defensive capabilities. However, towards the end of the war, both German and Allied forces introduced new operational and tactical approaches designed to overcome entrenched defensive positions. These approaches relied on manoeuvre warfare, including flanking and envelopment operations.

Importantly, these changes were not driven primarily by technological breakthroughs but rather by tactical innovation. Success often resulted from short bursts of intense suppressive artillery fire, followed by small, highly mobile infantry units that bypassed fortified positions through coordinated combined-arms manoeuvre. These tactics reflected the operational adjustments introduced by German General Erich Ludendorff during the offensives of late 1917 and early 1918. However, logistical constraints and transportation limitations prevented Germany from sustaining these offensives. In contrast, the Allied powers were able to maintain operational momentum due to superior manpower, logistics, and transportation infrastructure.

Adaptation on the Contemporary Battlefield

In the Ukrainian theatre today, tactical defence supported by unmanned aerial systems is often portrayed as nearly impregnable. First-person-view (FPV) drones used in close combat have proven particularly lethal, while drones targeting positions behind the frontlines have made the advance of infantry and mechanized units extremely hazardous.

The widespread use of drones has significantly restricted the operational mobility of ground forces, effectively transforming the conflict into a prolonged war of attrition. However, the emergence of UAVs should not necessarily be viewed as a permanent or insurmountable feature of modern warfare.

In attempts to circumvent drone surveillance, Russian forces have utilized subterranean infrastructure—including tunnels, unused gas pipelines, and sewer systems—to covertly move infantry units close to Ukrainian positions. These tactics enabled certain tactical successes, including the capture of Avdiivka in 2024. Nevertheless, Ukrainian forces quickly adapted by identifying and sealing tunnel exits, thereby reducing the effectiveness of such infiltration methods.

Russian forces have also attempted to exploit Soviet-era pipeline networks around Pokrovsk in the Donetsk region to move small infantry teams toward Ukrainian positions. These efforts, however, have achieved limited success. As retired Australian Major General Mick Ryan has observed, drones—despite their tactical value—cannot replace soldiers who physically hold territory on the battlefield.

The Limits of UAV Warfare and the Primacy of Ground Forces

Despite some territorial gains—approximately 4,700 square kilometres captured by Russian forces in 2025—progress has been extremely slow. Russian forces have relied on a methodical strategy of encircling and capturing villages and towns across the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which together form the Donbas area in eastern Ukraine. In contrast, advances in areas west of these regions, particularly in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, have been significantly slower.

Ultimately, ground forces remain indispensable in modern warfare, as do combined-arms tactics. Changes in battlefield dynamics are driven not solely by technological innovation but also by tactical adaptation and evolving operational strategies. The current stalemate in Ukraine reinforces a broader trend: the defensive firepower enabled by drone technology tends to favor the defender, despite the tactical successes achieved by both Ukrainian and Russian forces at various stages of the conflict.