The Most Dangerous Clause in the Agreement

The promised “Memorandum of Understanding” or “Framework Agreement” reportedly contains a number of significant commitments, all of which could become the seeds of future geopolitical transformations. Yet it will not address every issue, including the nuclear file.

One of these provisions, according to leaks, is a mutual regional non-aggression agreement. Such a clause would effectively divide the region into two camps and obligate each side to refrain from attacking the states and actors aligned with the other. If true, it could amount to an unprecedented regional peace project with no historical precedent in the Middle East.

This “hypothetical” clause is important, although I have not yet been able to independently verify it and it may ultimately appear in a different form. Its significance lies in the fact that it would overturn many of the assumptions upon which both conflict and peace in the region have long been based.

The provision reportedly stipulates that Iran and its allies would refrain from attacking the United States and its allies, while the United States and its allies would likewise refrain from attacking Iran and its allies. This is a vague formulation that requires careful unpacking. The first question is obvious: who exactly qualifies as an ally?

Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthi movement are generally considered Iranian allies, though the status of Iraq and Iran-backed Iraqi militias remains unclear. Hamas appears to fall outside the framework.

On the American side, Israel, the Gulf states, and Jordan are considered U.S. allies.

The first conclusion is that if Iran signs such a provision—whether in a framework agreement or a final settlement—it would effectively amount to Tehran signing onto the end of its forty-year conflict with Israel. Yet that is not the only surprise embedded in the proposal.

The second conclusion is that this hypothetical clause would effectively recognize and protect Hezbollah against the very efforts that the Lebanese state is now pursuing with unprecedented determination. The same would apply to the Houthi movement, which Yemen’s internationally recognized government and other political forces seek to remove from Sana’a and ultimately defeat.

This suggests that the negotiators focused primarily on preventing the return of the broader regional warfare that followed the U.S.-Israeli-Iranian conflict of last February. What began as a triangular confrontation expanded into a wider regional conflict. It opened with American and Israeli strikes and an Iranian counterattack, followed by Iranian attacks against Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Jordan. In response, Saudi and Emirati forces launched counterstrikes against Iran. Iraqi and Iranian-aligned forces attacked Gulf states, clashes erupted between Hezbollah and Israel, and the Houthis later entered the conflict with drone attacks against Israel and international shipping lanes.

The negotiators concentrated on ending this collective confrontation. But were the Americans and Iranians truly seeking to expand such a broad and loosely defined commitment?

I recall a statement by President Donald Trump that was largely lost amid his endless stream of remarks. He said that this agreement could bring peace to the entire Middle East. Few took the statement seriously. After all, even the limited dispute with Iran had not yet been resolved, nor had the Strait of Hormuz been reopened. How, then, could anyone speak of constructing a regional peace order on such a vast scale?

The intentions of the negotiators—whether they seek only a temporary peace or envision a larger regional project—remain unclear from the information that has leaked so far. What is known is that approximately sixty days of detailed negotiations lie ahead, and the process may well be extended. The memorandum itself has already increased the complexity of the issue and expanded the number of parties involved in the hypothetical agreement to roughly thirteen states and organizations.

From an arbitration and implementation standpoint, dozens of questions and scenarios will inevitably arise.

For example, can Iran be prevented from supplying weapons to Hezbollah? If Israel attacks Hezbollah to prevent its military capabilities from expanding, would that constitute a violation of the agreement?

If the Houthis launch offensives and seize territory beyond their current areas of control, would they not be considered aggressors, threatening the rest of Yemen as well as neighboring Saudi Arabia?

What if the Houthis attack a commercial vessel belonging to a country that is not one of the thirteen parties—say, a ship flying the Panamanian flag? How would such a scenario be addressed?

Even more concerning is the possibility that this still-unconfirmed clause, under the banner of preventing conflict, could ultimately institutionalize and legitimize armed militias.

Hezbollah remains an armed force operating outside the authority of the Lebanese state and is designated as a terrorist organization by various Lebanese, Arab, and Western entities.

Under such an agreement, the United States could be seen as granting Hezbollah implicit recognition as a legitimate regional actor, making future efforts to isolate, designate, or disarm it far more difficult. The agreement would also reinforce the phenomenon of a “state within a state” in Lebanon and Yemen and could potentially create similar challenges in Iraq if Iraqi groups are included within its framework.

I am also highly skeptical of Washington’s ability to restrain Israel. Israel is unlikely to halt its operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon or against Iranian influence throughout the region if it views such actions as preventive self-defense. No American guarantee is likely to fully deter Israeli decision-makers.

The leaked agreement bears a striking resemblance to the 1975 Helsinki Accords, at least in structural terms. The Helsinki framework sought to prevent direct confrontation between the Western and Soviet blocs and effectively involved Western recognition of Soviet influence over Eastern Europe. Similarly, this proposed arrangement could be interpreted as a form of political and geographic recognition of Iran’s network of allied organizations across the region.

It is possible that American negotiators are simply seeking détente and buying time, betting that Iran will eventually change. Under that assumption, the proposed agreement would lay the groundwork for a broader peace capable of ending multiple regional conflicts rather than merely reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

I am not convinced that such change will come quickly.

Iran’s political system is deeply entrenched, and it may take considerable time before meaningful transformation becomes visible. That, however, is a subject for another article.