A Scenario That No Longer Seems Remote
As U.S. military operations against Iran intensify, targeting both military capabilities and critical infrastructure, the prospect of Iran pursuing nuclear weapons is no longer merely an external concern—it has increasingly become a subject of debate within Iran itself.
As feelings of retaliation and the desire to respond to the strikes against Iran grow stronger, a harder line may become more politically attractive than restraint. The United States has consistently declared that it will respond forcefully to the killing of any American soldier. Against that backdrop, the author asks how Iran could be expected to treat the assassination of its Supreme Leader or the elimination of its senior leadership as events that could simply be overlooked. In the author's view, it is difficult to imagine Tehran proceeding as though nothing had happened or responding to Washington in the manner that postwar Japan eventually did following the atomic bombings.
In March 2023, General Mark Milley, then Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the House Armed Services Committee that Iran already possessed the technical capabilities necessary to produce a nuclear weapon within a matter of months if its political leadership made the decision to do so. He also stated that Iran could produce enough weapons-grade nuclear material in less than two weeks.
According to the author, Washington's decision to rely on military pressure rather than diplomacy has heightened tensions and increased instability both inside Iran and across the region. Under such circumstances, the Iranian leadership could be encouraged to reconsider its longstanding nuclear doctrine, potentially abandoning the religious rulings issued by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and later reaffirmed by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which prohibited the acquisition of nuclear weapons, should the regime conclude that it faces an existential threat.
The Calculations of Iran's Partners
Despite their strategic partnerships with Tehran, neither Russia nor China appears eager to see Iran become a nuclear-armed state.
According to the author, an Iranian nuclear capability would fundamentally alter the balance of power in the Middle East and create a new regional reality that could complicate Moscow's and Beijing's relations with the Gulf states—relationships that are economically and strategically as important to them as their ties with Iran.
Israel, meanwhile, did not wait for open warfare before acting against Iran's nuclear ambitions. For years, it has conducted what the author describes as an extensive intelligence campaign targeting Iranian nuclear scientists and facilities in an effort to delay the country's progress toward a military nuclear capability, based on the belief that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose an existential threat.
The United States and its Western allies, by contrast, primarily relied on economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure to constrain Iran's nuclear program. These efforts culminated in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), negotiated under the Obama administration, which subjected Iran's nuclear activities to extensive international monitoring.
However, President Donald Trump's withdrawal from the agreement, the author argues, effectively returned the crisis to its starting point, closing off a diplomatic pathway that might otherwise have been strengthened and shifting the trajectory from containment toward renewed escalation.
Where Is the Region Heading?
If Iran were ultimately to acquire nuclear weapons, would countries such as Egypt, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia simply accept the resulting strategic imbalance?
The author considers such an outcome unlikely. A significant shift in the regional balance of power would almost certainly trigger a broader arms race whose financial, political, and security costs would be considerable.
It is true that, since the end of the Second World War, nuclear weapons have functioned primarily as instruments of deterrence rather than weapons intended for battlefield use. Yet the mere possession of such capabilities fundamentally alters strategic calculations.
Wars, the author argues, do not necessarily prevent nuclear proliferation. On the contrary, they may encourage states to pursue nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantee of national survival.
If the objective of American military pressure is to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, then the continuation of military confrontation could ultimately produce the opposite result—making the decision to pursue a nuclear deterrent appear more urgent than ever before.
The author concludes that relying exclusively on military force is a highly risky strategy. In a region already burdened by instability and conflict, diplomacy remains the least costly option and the one most likely to prevent a regional nuclear arms race that would ultimately serve no country's long-term interests.
Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm (Egypt).
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