Agreement or Truce to Delay the Explosion?

The circulating leaks regarding a draft U.S.–Iran agreement reportedly facilitated through Pakistani mediation do not appear impossible, yet they also do not resemble a genuine “peace agreement” at this stage. Rather, they reflect an urgent attempt to prevent a full-scale regional explosion. As leaked, the draft bears the characteristics of a temporary understanding designed to manage the crisis rather than provide a definitive settlement to the conflict.

On the surface, the proposed terms appear reasonable: a comprehensive ceasefire, guarantees for freedom of navigation in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, an end to media warfare, the launch of negotiations within days, and the gradual lifting of sanctions in exchange for Iranian commitments. However, the real issue lies not in the wording of the clauses themselves, but in what remains unaddressed.

The core issues that originally triggered the crisis remain ambiguous. What about Iran’s nuclear program? What about uranium enrichment? What about ballistic missiles? What about Iran’s regional proxies? And what about the security guarantees demanded by Israel and the Gulf states?

This is where the true nature of the potential agreement becomes apparent: it is an attempt to freeze tensions rather than resolve them.

Today, the United States appears more concerned with preventing a comprehensive war than achieving a “complete victory,” recognizing that continued escalation in the Gulf threatens the global economy and energy markets while placing the Trump administration under mounting domestic and international pressure. Consequently, Washington may be willing to accept an interim agreement capable of achieving three immediate objectives: securing maritime navigation, reducing military tensions, and keeping the door open for future negotiations.

This does not necessarily mean that Washington has abandoned its fundamental objectives toward Iran. Rather, it may simply be rearranging its priorities. Iran, for its part, appears prepared to make tactical concessions due to the scale of the economic and military pressures it faces, particularly amid maritime restrictions, repeated strikes, and growing domestic anxiety. Nevertheless, Tehran is unlikely to accept any agreement that portrays it as being in a position of “defeat.” Instead, it seeks a formula that allows it to preserve the core of its strategic project while obtaining relief from sanctions and pressure.

Yet the most complicated actor in this equation remains Israel, which views any agreement lacking strict and explicit restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program as merely a “postponement of the problem” rather than a solution. Accordingly, Netanyahu’s government—or any future Israeli government—is likely to approach any U.S.–Iran understanding with extreme caution unless it provides Tel Aviv with genuine security guarantees.

The Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, face a more complex dilemma than it may initially appear. On one hand, they seek de-escalation and the protection of maritime routes and energy infrastructure. On the other hand, they fear that any agreement could evolve into implicit recognition of a permanent Iranian sphere of influence in the Gulf. Consequently, Gulf capitals are likely to focus less on the ceasefire provisions themselves and more on issues related to freedom of navigation, monitoring mechanisms, and security guarantees.

This suggests that any forthcoming agreement will most likely constitute a fragile “strategic truce” rather than an actual end to the conflict. Perhaps the most accurate description of the current moment is that it does not represent genuine peace, but rather an attempt to prevent a descent into a war whose consequences no party is truly capable of bearing.

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm