"The New Libya": From Structured Dialogue to Power-Sharing

In a notable television interview, one of the participants in the structured dialogue sponsored by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) revealed that the proposal put forward by Massad Boulos regarding the unification of Libya’s institutions through a power-sharing arrangement had a significant impact on the discussions among participants. According to the interviewee, the proposal prompted participants to delve deeper into questions concerning the future structure of the Libyan state, drawing heavily on governance concepts across various sectors. At the heart of this observation lies the fact that the American plan, despite being presented as a broad framework for institutional unification coupled with power-sharing—and notably detached from the principle of elections as a means of ending the current transitional phase—introduced a degree of ambiguity into the structured dialogue. Rather than producing, in line with the objectives outlined by the UN mission, a practical roadmap leading toward elections and the conclusion of the transitional period, discussions became dominated by broad governance principles lacking a concrete implementation strategy.

The structured dialogue had already faced substantial criticism due to the manner in which participants were selected, with many arguing that the absence of transparent criteria excluded important segments of Libyan society from the process. The final statement added another layer of criticism by highlighting the lack of a practical and actionable vision and the predominance of abstract principles. Nevertheless, these criticisms cannot be separated from the broader competitive environment surrounding Libya, where numerous international and regional initiatives have emerged over the past fifteen years without succeeding in moving the country from a prolonged transitional state toward a sustainable constitutional order. The adoption of a constitution through a free popular referendum remains a central pillar of any meaningful and lasting transformation in Libya.

This competitive landscape helps explain the United States’ decision, through its special envoy Massad Boulos, a close associate of President Donald Trump, to advance a proposal centered on institutional unification through a power-sharing arrangement between Libya’s two principal centers of power. Under the proposal, the western bloc, represented by internationally recognized Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, would retain leadership of the government, while the eastern bloc, represented by the family of military commander Khalifa Haftar, would assume leadership of an executive council composed of three figures—a president and two deputies. The initiative is accompanied by promises of American investment in Libya’s oil and financial sectors, as well as expanded military cooperation through joint training programs organized by AFRICOM involving forces from both eastern and western Libya.

In practical terms, the American vision sidelines elections, at least for an unspecified period, while simultaneously provoking concerns among other political actors whose influence may be more limited but whose interests remain deeply affected. This approach reflects the pragmatic nature of American foreign policy, which often prioritizes tangible achievements on the ground even when their long-term sustainability remains uncertain, while favoring direct engagement with the most influential actors. Although the American envoy presented his initiative as complementary to, rather than a substitute for, United Nations efforts, many Libyans perceive it as yet another manifestation of competition among external initiatives. The proliferation of such competing approaches has contributed to prolonged political deadlock, economic difficulties, and unprecedented social fragmentation, reinforcing factional and regional interests at the expense of Libya’s broader national interests. At the same time, important questions remain regarding the initiative’s capacity to produce genuine stability through the proposed power-sharing framework. Libya’s eastern leadership has expressed openness toward the proposal, viewing it as reflective of Libya’s complex realities, but only under conditions that preserve national unity and maintain a pathway toward elections.

Undoubtedly, the unification of Libya’s military, security, political, and financial institutions is an essential objective. Yet what matters even more is that such unification occurs through a clearly defined political process that enjoys broad public legitimacy. The principal gateway to achieving this remains free and inclusive elections in which all segments of Libyan society can participate. Such elections would provide both legal legitimacy and popular consent for any political transformation intended to secure stability, safeguard national resources, and protect Libyan sovereignty.

Against this backdrop, the decisions announced five days ago by Libya’s three principal institutions—the House of Representatives, the High Council of State, and the Presidential Council—carry considerable significance. These decisions emphasized the completion of a genuinely national process based on a Libyan-led roadmap. Central to this effort is the reactivation of the 6+6 Committee and the restoration of its mandate to draft and formulate the legal framework governing both the political and electoral processes. The plan also calls for the formation of a unified government capable of overseeing simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections no later than February 27, 2027, effectively within only eight months, while urging Parliament to adopt the electoral legislation already prepared by the committee.

The document further includes a broad set of political, constitutional, and institutional understandings, alongside commitments to complete the legal and constitutional arrangements necessary for holding elections. It also proposes the establishment of a High Sovereign Committee to oversee the electoral process and a joint technical committee tasked with preparing a unified national budget for 2027. Additionally, the National Oil Corporation and the Libyan Foreign Investment Company would be incorporated into the sovereign institutions covered by Article 15 of the Libyan Political Agreement.

These decisions reflect a growing recognition among Libya’s three leading institutions that the time for short-sighted political maneuvering has passed. If Libyans fail to fill the country’s political vacuum themselves, external actors will inevitably do so, driven by interests and motivations that extend far beyond the goals of stability and national sovereignty. Once again, a comprehensive Libyan vision has emerged. Yet its success will depend not only on political will and genuine determination but, above all, on broad popular support capable of protecting and sustaining it.