The Houthis Are Reshaping the Balance of Power in the Red Sea

 

The war between Iran and the United States is no longer confined to the Persian Gulf or centered exclusively on the Strait of Hormuz. As military operations in Yemen intensify and the Iran-aligned Houthi movement advances along the country’s western coast, the conflict is beginning to encompass one of the world’s most strategically sensitive maritime corridors: the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

The development is particularly significant because Bab el-Mandeb is not simply a maritime passage between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. It constitutes the southern gateway of a broader transportation network linking the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean. Turning the area surrounding the strait into an active conflict zone could therefore add a new layer of risk to the global energy market at a time when it is already absorbing the consequences of disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

Against this backdrop, the Houthi capture of the city of Mocha and their advance toward areas and islands strategically close to Bab el-Mandeb represent developments that extend well beyond Yemen’s internal conflict. The group has gained—or is approaching—greater capacity to influence international maritime traffic, while Iran could indirectly gain an additional source of leverage in its confrontation with the United States and its regional allies.

From Hormuz to Bab el-Mandeb: The Shift in the Pressure Point

The Strait of Hormuz has emerged over recent months as Iran’s most important strategic instrument of pressure. As oil flows through the strait declined, Gulf oil producers were forced to reconsider their export routes, with Saudi Arabia in particular seeking alternative ways to reach international markets.

Data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration illustrate the scale of this shift. Average volumes of crude oil and petroleum liquids moving through the Strait of Hormuz fell from approximately 21.6 million barrels per day in the fourth quarter of 2025 to 4.9 million barrels per day in the second quarter of 2026. By contrast, flows through Bab el-Mandeb rose from 5.4 million barrels per day in the fourth quarter of 2025 to 8.1 million barrels per day in the second quarter of 2026.

These figures reveal the essence of the emerging problem: the more difficult it becomes to use Hormuz, the greater the strategic value of alternative routes—particularly those beginning at Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea ports.

This is precisely where Bab el-Mandeb becomes critical for Riyadh. Saudi seaborne crude exports through the strait between March and mid-July 2026 were reportedly eight times higher than during the same period a year earlier, highlighting the kingdom’s growing reliance on the route after shipping through the Gulf was disrupted.

The Houthi advance toward Bab el-Mandeb therefore does not threaten an isolated maritime route. It potentially targets one of the principal alternatives Saudi Arabia is relying upon to reduce its exposure to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.

Why Bab el-Mandeb Is a Different Kind of Strategic Asset

Bab el-Mandeb lies between Yemen and the Horn of Africa and connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Ships traveling between Asia and Europe through the Red Sea and Suez Canal pass through this strategic gateway.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Bab el-Mandeb, the Suez Canal, and the SUMED pipeline together constitute critical routes for transporting oil and gas from the Gulf toward European and Atlantic markets. Since the Houthi attacks on commercial shipping began in late 2023, a number of major shipping companies have diverted vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, a route that is significantly longer and more expensive.

The danger posed by Bab el-Mandeb lies in the fact that disrupting maritime traffic does not necessarily require a formal closure of the strait. A substantial increase in security risks can itself be enough to raise insurance premiums, increase shipping costs, and force companies to reconsider the entire route.

This is what gives coastal areas and islands surrounding the strait such considerable military and political value. Recent reports indicate that the Houthis have reached Perim Island, also known as Mayyun, which sits near the center of the strait, after capturing Mocha and advancing along the western coast. Such a position could provide the group with a more favorable platform for threatening shipping without having to impose a complete naval blockade.

Mocha Is More Than Just Another Yemeni City

The strategic significance of Mocha extends far beyond its size or its role in Yemen’s civil war. The city lies on Yemen’s western coast near the northern entrance to Bab el-Mandeb, making control of it part of a much broader equation involving the western coastline and the maritime corridor.

The fall of Mocha to the Houthis represented a setback for anti-Houthi forces and opened the way for the group to advance toward areas and islands closer to the strait. Reports of their control over Perim Island and other coastal areas have heightened concerns that the group could move from merely threatening maritime traffic toward acquiring greater capacity to shape the security environment through which shipping operates.

It is important, however, to distinguish between the ability to threaten Bab el-Mandeb and the ability to fully control it.

The strait is a complex international waterway, and controlling territory on the coast or some nearby islands does not automatically give the Houthis the ability to halt all maritime traffic. Nevertheless, even without achieving complete control, the group can raise the cost and risk of passage and encourage shipping companies to adopt more cautious strategies.

That distinction is central to understanding why the Houthi gains may also have strategic value for Iran.

Iran and the Houthis: A Strategic Partnership, Not a Simple Proxy Relationship

It is tempting to interpret the Houthi advance as a direct extension of Iranian strategy. Although there are significant elements supporting such an interpretation, it does not fully explain the relationship.

Iran has provided the Houthis with weapons, technology, intelligence, and technical assistance for years. Recent reports have also indicated that members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have provided operational guidance and assistance to the group during its recent campaign along Yemen’s western coast. At the same time, Tehran has denied directly directing Houthi military operations.

The relationship is therefore more complicated than a conventional “proxy and patron” model.

The Houthis’ political and military legitimacy emerged primarily from Yemen’s own conflict, and the movement has its own leadership, interests, and domestic objectives. The relationship can instead be understood as an asymmetrical strategic partnership: Iran benefits from the Houthis’ capabilities and Yemen’s geographic position, while the Houthis benefit from Iranian support in strengthening their military and regional position.

This helps explain why the two sides’ interests can converge without being completely identical.

For Iran, Houthi escalation offers an opportunity to create another pressure point against the United States and Saudi Arabia without requiring Tehran to open another direct military front.

For the Houthis, meanwhile, control of Yemen’s western coastline and access to Bab el-Mandeb could strengthen their position in Yemen and in any future negotiations over the structure of the state, the distribution of political power, resources, and control of ports.

In other words, the outcome may be beneficial to both Iran and the Houthis even if their long-term objectives are not identical.

Saudi Arabia Faces a Difficult Strategic Dilemma

Saudi Arabia finds itself at the center of this emerging equation.

On the one hand, keeping Bab el-Mandeb open is a direct economic interest for the kingdom, particularly as oil flows through Hormuz have fallen sharply. On the other hand, a major military confrontation with the Houthis could risk turning Yemen once again into a full-scale war zone after a period of relative de-escalation.

The challenge has become more acute following Houthi attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure. In early September, Saudi authorities reported attacks on facilities and sites in the kingdom’s south, while the Houthis said they had targeted energy-related facilities. The attacks reportedly caused injuries, fires, and temporary disruptions to some operations.

This highlights the direct relationship between the land and maritime dimensions of the conflict.

Pressure on Saudi oil facilities seeks to affect the kingdom’s production and export capacity, while pressure on Bab el-Mandeb targets the very route Saudi Arabia may increasingly rely upon to compensate for disruptions in the Gulf.

Riyadh could therefore face a situation in which its effort to diversify export routes becomes a new vulnerability if the Houthis acquire the ability to threaten the alternative maritime corridor.

The East-West Pipeline: Another Alternative Under Pressure

Saudi Arabia’s problem does not end with Bab el-Mandeb.

The kingdom operates the East-West Pipeline, also known as Petroline, which transports crude oil from the eastern oil fields to Red Sea ports, particularly Yanbu, allowing exports to bypass the Strait of Hormuz.

This alternative route has also faced growing security pressure. Saudi Arabia temporarily halted the pipeline’s operation following a drone attack attributed to Iran-linked groups in Iraq, at a time when Riyadh was becoming increasingly dependent on Red Sea infrastructure to circumvent disruptions in the Gulf.

The pipeline remains an important component of Saudi Arabia’s export infrastructure, meaning that any interruption increases the sensitivity of global oil markets to additional disruptions.

The resulting equation is increasingly complicated for Riyadh: Hormuz is disrupted, Bab el-Mandeb is threatened, and an alternative overland route is itself exposed to attack.

This does not mean Saudi Arabia has run out of options. The kingdom can still rely on alternative ports and infrastructure, including routes involving the Suez Canal and the SUMED pipeline. But these alternatives are generally longer, more costly, and less flexible than normal export routes.

Washington Caught Between Deterrence and Escalation

For Washington, the Houthi advance presents a dilemma no less difficult than the one confronting Riyadh.

The United States has a direct interest in protecting freedom of navigation, but it is simultaneously engaged in a broad military and political confrontation with Iran. A major campaign against the Houthis could therefore secure tactical gains in the Red Sea while also expanding the war and turning Yemen into a central theater of the broader U.S.-Iran conflict.

Recent reports indicate that Saudi Arabia has requested greater U.S. military support, while Washington has so far shown greater preference for intelligence and other forms of assistance rather than direct large-scale involvement in Yemen.

This reflects a difficult American calculation: Washington wants to protect trade and energy routes without becoming trapped in another prolonged military campaign in Yemen that could provide Iran with an opportunity to expand the conflict.

A major U.S. campaign against the Houthis could also provide the group with a political justification for intensifying attacks on American and Saudi interests and potentially widening attacks against commercial shipping.

Could the Red Sea Crisis of 2023 Return?

The current crisis did not emerge from nowhere.

Since late 2023, Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea have disrupted maritime trade and prompted major shipping companies to reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. The result has been longer voyages, higher fuel consumption, and increased shipping and insurance costs.

The current situation, however, differs significantly in its strategic context.

During the earlier phase, Red Sea disruptions were primarily associated with the conflict surrounding the war in Gaza. Today, maritime disruption in the Red Sea is occurring alongside a much broader crisis involving the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf energy supplies.

The economic consequences of simultaneous disruptions could therefore be considerably greater than those produced by either crisis individually.

EIA data illustrate the scale of the shift. During the second quarter of 2026, an average of approximately 8.1 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum liquids moved through Bab el-Mandeb, compared with only 4.9 million barrels per day through Hormuz during the same period.

These figures do not mean that all of this volume would necessarily be halted if the Houthis escalated their attacks. They do, however, demonstrate the economic importance of both maritime chokepoints.

Global Oil Markets and the Risk of a “Double Chokepoint”

The most dangerous scenario for the global economy may not necessarily be the closure of a single strait. It could be the emergence of simultaneous disruptions at several strategic points.

When Hormuz becomes inaccessible or severely constrained, countries seek alternative routes. If Bab el-Mandeb also becomes dangerous, the number of viable alternatives shrinks.

The resulting effects could spread from a regional security crisis into the global economy through three principal channels:

First: oil.
Any additional reduction in exports or increase in transportation risks could push crude prices higher. Brent crude has already moved above $100 per barrel amid the latest escalation, with markets remaining highly volatile.

Second: shipping costs.
Rerouting vessels away from the Red Sea adds thousands of nautical miles to some voyages, increasing fuel consumption and extending delivery times while raising insurance costs.

Third: inflation.
Higher energy and shipping costs do not remain confined to the energy sector. They gradually feed into transportation, manufacturing, food, and imported goods, adding to inflationary pressures in both advanced and developing economies.

Recent EIA estimates indicate that global oil inventories have come under considerable pressure during 2026, while disruptions to regional production and exports are expected to persist into 2027.

Why Could Bab el-Mandeb Matter More Than Its Size Suggests?

The paradox is that Bab el-Mandeb is narrower and normally handles less oil than Hormuz, yet its strategic importance can increase sharply during a crisis because the alternatives are limited.

This is the essence of geopolitical chokepoints: the importance of a maritime corridor is determined not only by the volume of trade passing through it under normal conditions, but also by how difficult it is to replace when disrupted.

In the case of Bab el-Mandeb, ships can theoretically bypass the Red Sea by sailing around the Cape of Good Hope. But that option adds thousands of kilometers to many journeys and significantly increases time and cost.

The Red Sea crisis since 2023 demonstrated that companies are willing to absorb these additional costs when direct passage becomes too dangerous.

Consequently, the mere possibility of a Bab el-Mandeb closure can begin to affect markets even before the strait is formally closed.

An Iranian Gain Without Direct Iranian Intervention?

One of the most important aspects of the current crisis is that Iran could benefit strategically from Houthi escalation without assuming the full cost of directly closing another international waterway.

If Tehran retains the ability to exert pressure around Hormuz while the Houthis maintain the capacity to threaten Bab el-Mandeb, Iran could potentially gain a dual maritime pressure lever stretching from the Persian Gulf to the southern Red Sea.

This does not mean that the Houthis are simply an Iranian instrument acting on direct orders. The strength of the current equation lies precisely in the fact that the group has its own motivations while its actions can simultaneously serve Iranian interests at a particularly sensitive strategic moment.

Analysts have argued that Houthi gains could partially compensate for the weakening of some of Iran’s other regional partners, particularly as Hezbollah in Lebanon has suffered major setbacks and sustained pressure during the latest phase of the regional conflict.

From this perspective, Yemen becomes part of the restructuring of Iran’s regional network rather than simply another battlefield disconnected from the central conflict.

Escalation Also Carries Risks for Iran

Yet it would be a mistake to assume that every form of escalation automatically benefits Iran.

The greater the threat to international maritime traffic, the greater the likelihood that the United States, European naval powers, and regional actors will expand their military involvement. Increased attacks on Saudi oil exports could also push Riyadh toward deeper military cooperation with Washington and other partners, potentially producing the opposite of Tehran’s intended outcome by strengthening the coalitions aligned against it.

An expansion of the Yemen war could also reopen a humanitarian and political crisis of considerable magnitude and undermine diplomatic efforts that have developed over recent years.

Iran’s potential gain therefore depends on a delicate calculation: generating enough pressure to raise the cost of the war for its opponents without crossing the threshold that triggers a broader and more difficult-to-control military response.

That balance is far from guaranteed.

Yemen Between Regional War and Domestic Calculations

Despite the clear regional dimension, it would be a mistake to reduce developments in Yemen to another chapter of the Iranian-American confrontation.

Divisions within the anti-Houthi camp, weaknesses in coordination among local forces, and the fragmentation of political and military authority in Yemen have all contributed to the group’s ability to achieve rapid territorial gains.

Houthi advances therefore cannot be explained solely by Iranian support. They are also rooted in the weaknesses of the group’s domestic opponents.

This distinction is important when assessing the future of the conflict. Even if tensions between Iran and the United States eventually decline, the Houthis may retain some of their territorial gains, giving them a stronger position in any future Yemeni negotiations.

In other words, the regional war may have accelerated the Houthis’ rise, but it does not by itself explain their capacity to survive and expand.

Three Possible Paths Ahead

Three broad scenarios can be envisioned for the next phase.

Scenario One: Containment

Regional and international actors could reach an understanding that prevents Bab el-Mandeb from becoming an open battlefield, with the Houthis retaining positions near the strait without actually closing it.

This would be the least costly scenario for global markets, but it would require complex political and security arrangements.

Scenario Two: A War of Maritime Attrition

The opposing sides could continue exchanging attacks without fully closing the strait. In that case, the greatest impact would likely be felt through higher insurance premiums, shipping costs, and oil prices, while commercial traffic would remain possible at a greater expense.

This may be the most sustainable scenario because it allows all sides to retain a degree of political and military flexibility.

Scenario Three: Bab el-Mandeb Becomes a Major Front

This would be the most dangerous scenario. It could emerge if the Houthis consolidate their position around the strait and begin disrupting maritime traffic on a large scale while instability in Hormuz continues.

At that point, the crisis would no longer be merely a Yemeni or Gulf conflict. It could develop into a crisis for the global trading system, with higher energy, transportation, and insurance costs and a greater likelihood of international military intervention.

Conclusion: Geography Returns to the Center of International Politics

The latest developments in Yemen reveal a broader reality that extends beyond the Iranian-American confrontation: maritime geography still enables regional actors to exercise strategic influence disproportionate to their military and economic weight.

Iran does not necessarily need a naval force comparable to that of the United States to affect global markets. It may be enough to possess, directly or through aligned partners, the ability to influence a limited number of maritime corridors that are difficult to replace quickly.

The Houthis, for their part, do not need complete control of Bab el-Mandeb for their territorial gains to become strategically significant. Simply possessing the ability to threaten shipping can alter the calculations of shipping companies, oil-importing states, insurers, and naval powers.

The equation, however, is not one-sided. Saudi Arabia still possesses alternative routes, while the United States and European powers retain substantial naval capabilities. Global markets can also redirect some oil and commercial flows.

But these alternatives are not cost-free. They require additional time, capacity, fuel, and insurance, and they expose the global economy to higher transportation costs.

The struggle over Bab el-Mandeb is therefore not simply a contest over control of a maritime strait. It is a contest over who has the ability to determine the cost of passage through one of the critical arteries connecting global energy and trade markets.

More importantly, the current developments may be shifting the nature of the conflict from the concept of a single “closed strait” toward a more complex model of distributed chokepoints. The more capable the warring parties become of threatening multiple routes simultaneously, the less room governments and markets have to absorb the resulting shock.

That is the real danger posed by the Houthi advance: not necessarily that Bab el-Mandeb will be closed, but that it introduces another potential source of disruption into a global energy system already under pressure from the crisis in Hormuz.

Ultimately, the significance of developments in Yemen will depend on a question that goes beyond control of Mocha or Perim: Can regional and international actors contain Bab el-Mandeb as a limited instrument of pressure, or will the maritime corridor become a full-scale military front capable of reshaping both the war and global energy markets?

There is no definitive answer yet. But one conclusion is increasingly difficult to dispute: Yemen has returned to the center of the Middle East’s strategic equation—not simply because of its civil war, but because of its position on the map through which global energy and trade flows.