Lebanon’s Dilemma—or Hezbollah’s?
Lebanon’s core dilemma lies in the fact that, since its establishment in 1943, it has been built upon a sectarian power-sharing system. Hezbollah’s problem, however, is that it has sought to appropriate this system in service of its own partisan and regional project, dragging Lebanon into two wars: one it claimed was in “support of Gaza,” which ultimately harmed Lebanon without benefiting Gaza, and another it did not explicitly describe as support for Iran, though in reality it was precisely that.
In truth, the crisis of Lebanon’s political system is deep and complex. The aspiration to build a secular state in which all Lebanese enjoy equal rights and duties—regardless of religion or sect—has become a deferred dream, even if it remains a legitimate one. The pressing question, then, is how to resolve the Hezbollah dilemma in the absence of a solution to Lebanon’s broader political system. How, moreover, can the military support relationship between Hezbollah and Iran be dismantled?
The issue of Iran’s regional proxies is itself a multilayered international, regional, and domestic problem. The Houthis, for instance, are no longer a primary concern following the decline of their role, and the Shiite militias in Iraq are likewise not a top priority for Israel. At the same time, U.S. pressure has succeeded in pushing the Iraqi state toward understandings with these groups. The central issue remains Hezbollah, positioned on Israel’s border, possessing significant military capabilities, and having demonstrated its ability to strike the Israeli state. Yet its fundamental problem lies with the majority of the Lebanese people, who reject the usurpation of the state’s authority over decisions of war and peace—regardless of the state’s own shortcomings.
Hezbollah’s dilemma is not confined to severing its ties with Iran; it also lies in resolving its internal dispute with the Lebanese public. The current leadership’s declaration rejecting the handover of the party’s weapons to the state—or, more precisely, rejecting the principle that arms should be exclusively in the hands of the state—along with Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem’s assertion that “the idea of disarmament must be removed from the lexicon,” underscores this tension. Lebanon is not required to submit to Israeli conditions, nor should it accept the narrative advanced by Hezbollah and Iranian leaders that calls for exclusive state control of arms are merely a response to Israeli aggression. Such claims overlook the longstanding position of the majority of Lebanese citizens—voiced well before Israeli escalations—who have consistently demanded that weapons be monopolized by the state.
It is true that Lebanon’s system is rooted in sectarian power-sharing. However, since the Taif Agreement—which explicitly stipulated that arms should be held exclusively by the state—nearly all armed groups have respected this provision and surrendered their medium and heavy weaponry, with the notable exception of Hezbollah.
The dilemma of Hezbollah’s arms is that they embody, in part, an ideological and political stance opposed to Israel. Yet there is another dimension the party has been careful to obscure or avoid addressing directly: for a significant segment of its Shiite constituency, these weapons are also perceived as instruments of internal status and protection. This makes the issue of exclusive state control over arms more profound and complex than a mere principled or legal matter—one that requires gradual resolution rather than retreat.
Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm.
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