From Weapons to the State: The Test Facing Darfur Movements
From time to time, statements emerge from some leaders of the Darfur movements that signed the Juba Peace Agreement, statements that provoke both confusion and concern. These remarks often imply a willingness to rely on the logic of arms in order to retain political positions, or to bargain for rewards in exchange for continuing to fight alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces against the Rapid Support Forces.
The reality is that since the signing of the Juba Agreement, the central question is no longer whether the Darfur movements obtained their share of power, but rather how they will deal with Sudan’s new realities and the severe circumstances the country is facing: with the mindset of a state, or with the mindset of a militia? The agreement was not the end of the road so much as the beginning of a more complex test—the test of transforming from an armed organization into a responsible partner in building a state.
In this context, it is difficult to ignore that combining the privileges of the state with instruments of force outside it is not a sustainable arrangement. Even if such a balance appears workable in the short term, it in fact plants the seeds of instability in the medium and long term. By its very nature, a state cannot endure dual authority. Either there is one recognized source of force and decision-making, or the entire system becomes an arena of open contestation. If there is one lesson people have drawn from the tragedy of the current war, it is the refusal to repeat the experience of the Rapid Support Forces.
After Juba, some movements received executive positions and sovereign posts, a development understandable within the framework of a peace settlement. Yet these offices should not be treated as spoils of war, but as public responsibilities measured by results. The required transformation, therefore, is a shift from the logic of political reward to the logic of accountability. Any official occupying a public office should be judged by standards of performance, not by the balance of force that brought him there.
The problem begins when weapons are used—even implicitly—as a tool of political pressure. The threat of force in moments of disagreement does not only endanger rivals; it undermines the legitimacy of the state itself. More dangerous still is that the continuation of such a situation turns weapons from a temporary means into an acquired right. Over time, bearing arms ceases to be linked to exceptional conditions and instead becomes part of political and organizational identity, as seen in other states across the region. The fighter sees it as the source of his status, the leader links it to his influence, and any call for disarmament is perceived as an existential threat rather than a reform measure.
Alongside this, what may be called “war economies” gradually take shape. These consist of off-budget resources, informal activities, and networks of interests that benefit from the absence of oversight—or resist it. This system does not merely survive on the margins of the state; it competes with it. The longer this cycle continues, the harder it becomes to break.
No less dangerous is the continuation of mobilizational rhetoric built around the binary of “center and periphery.” Such discourse may be understandable in wartime, where identity is used as a tool of mobilization, but it becomes destructive inside the state. States are not built by dividing citizens or spreading regional hatred and exclusion, but by uniting them around a common national project. Repeating the same old slogans does not produce new solutions; it reproduces the same crisis in a different language. What is required today is genuine integration into a unifying state project, support for national institutions, and learning from wars from which Sudan has gained nothing but devastation, regression, and chronic instability.
In the current situation, some movements are fighting alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces while maintaining separate command structures. What is required today is a shift from loyalty to the movement toward loyalty to the state. This requires full engagement in a program to integrate movement forces into the army and other regular institutions according to established standards and regulations, complete registration of fighters and weapons, and the abolition of any field commands operating outside the official chain of command. The ultimate objective must be the unification of arms so that no weapon remains outside state control.
At the same time, all political forces must engage in removing the residue of war, strengthening the values of coexistence, rejecting regionalist rhetoric, and accepting the principle of peaceful democratic transfer of power. The goal is to build a stable Sudan in which legitimacy is earned through elections rather than weapons, and demands are pursued through institutions rather than by obstructing the state or taking up arms against it.
If these movements are serious about becoming sustainable political actors, they must present a national discourse that transcends regional boundaries and speaks to all Sudanese through clear programs and practical visions. This issue is not limited to the Darfur movements alone, but applies equally to all other armed movements.
The required transformation will not be easy, because it demands abandoning immediate advantages such as direct influence and financial gains. Yet it opens the door to greater and more lasting benefits: genuine political legitimacy, long-term stability, a constructive role within the state, and participation in building it rather than undermining it.
Originally published on Al Sharq Al Awsat
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