Will China Actually Do It?

The American president’s visit to Beijing and his meeting with Xi Jinping were not primarily about the war with Iran. The main focus was on U.S.-Chinese relations, particularly their economic and trade dimensions. Naturally, however, the Iranian war and the anticipated Chinese role in ending it and facilitating the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement between Tehran and Washington were also discussed.

In reality, China’s political role on the global stage still remains far smaller than its enormous economic power and influence on the world economy. This is perhaps why Donald Trump chose to pressure Beijing from this angle. He understands that China is the largest purchaser of Iranian oil and that it previously played—through what became known as “shadow companies”—a major role in helping Iran circumvent sanctions by facilitating oil exports before and during the period of American sanctions on Tehran. Trump reportedly told the Chinese leadership that he was prepared to lift sanctions on a number of Chinese companies in exchange for Beijing playing a greater role in pressuring Iran to end the war, leading some American reports to describe Trump’s proposals as an “undeclared deal.”

Trump—not Xi Jinping—stated that the Chinese president had informed him that China “would not supply Iran with military equipment,” a claim whose accuracy remains to be seen.

What is certain is that both sides agree that Iran “must not possess a nuclear weapon.” They also called for keeping the Strait of Hormuz open to global shipping and energy flows, while China emphasized its rejection of the “militarization of the strait.”

Chinese statements, however, were extremely cautious and diplomatic. Beijing neither abandoned Tehran nor offered it full support. China declared its opposition to militarization and its desire to continue purchasing Iranian oil, while at the same time supporting the principle that Iran should not reach the status of a “nuclear threshold state”—that is, a state capable of producing a nuclear bomb within a very short period even without officially declaring possession of one.

The U.S.-China summit reflected the two great powers’ greater interest in resolving their trade disputes than in ending the war itself. Even when discussing the conflict, the conversation was dominated by concerns over its economic repercussions and its negative impact on the global economy and the conditions of both countries.

It is true that political issues were also discussed, and much of the discussion appears to have become accepted even by the American side: namely, that Washington will not be able to overthrow the Iranian regime. China likewise expressed opposition to resuming war for the purpose of toppling the Islamic Republic or supporting strikes targeting Iranian leadership figures, civilian infrastructure, or energy facilities.

China seeks to contain the war, but it employs tools that are more cautious and more neutral than those used by Russia. This is not only because the Chinese economy is vastly larger than the Russian economy, but also because China is deeply integrated into the global system, and because the interdependence between Chinese and American industries remains one of the reasons behind the success of both countries.

Perhaps China, thanks to its extensive interests with the United States, may succeed in offering convincing guarantees to both sides that could help end the war—even if its primary focus continues to center on economic interests and energy security.