What Tehran May Be Overlooking

The government in Tehran must surely find itself in an awkward position as it reads, along with the rest of us, that U.S. President Donald Trump postponed returning to military strikes against Iran in response to appeals from several Gulf leaders.

And perhaps President Trump himself may feel a similar sense of discomfort if he reflects honestly on what it means that leaders in the Gulf capitals advised him to delay a return to war and instead pursue diplomacy and peace.

The Iranian leadership will likely feel uneasy because, perhaps for the first time in practical terms, it will clearly see that the Gulf states were opposed to the outbreak of war from the very beginning. They had advised the American administration to give diplomacy a genuine chance, and they repeatedly whispered in the ear of the White House that war in the Gulf was neither a solution nor a viable path forward, and that diplomacy and politics must remain the priority.

The Gulf states did not hide this position. They declared it openly. The problem, however, was that they could not compel Trump to adopt their view, nor could they prevent him from listening to the extremist government in Tel Aviv, which continuously pushed him toward war rather than peace.

It is no secret that the end of the war on the eighth of last month, after forty days of fighting, did not please Israel’s hardline government. Nor is it a secret that since the ceasefire, it has been attempting to reignite the embers of conflict. Throughout the period following the truce, Israeli Defense Ministry officials repeatedly declared that their country was merely waiting for a “green light” from Washington to resume the war against Iran.

That alone should have been enough for Iran to compare positions and distinguish between six Gulf states on the western shore of the Gulf—states that view the Gulf as a bridge of communication with their Iranian neighbor on the eastern shore—and an Israeli state on the Mediterranean that misses no opportunity to pressure and entice the United States toward confrontation with the Iranians.

When President Trump decided to launch what he called “Operation Freedom” to forcibly reopen the Strait of Hormuz to navigation, Saudi Arabia refused to allow its territory to be used in support of the operation. Its refusal reportedly contributed to delaying the launch of the plan. Riyadh did not itself publicize the decision, although it could easily have done so and leveraged the announcement politically as it wished. Instead, it chose to let its position speak for itself—to the world and to Iran alike—as another step in a long regional approach it has consistently pursued.

For all these reasons—and they are only part of a much larger picture—the government in Tehran should find itself in a difficult position. It ought to regret the hostile actions that at times targeted Saudi territory and at other times affected other Gulf states. Were it not for pride and political stubbornness, Tehran might well have apologized and admitted that it failed to distinguish between neighboring states that respect the sanctity of coexistence and another state occupying Palestinian land that sees no issue in targeting others across the region.

As for President Trump’s own discomfort, he may only recognize it if he pauses to reflect on the path he followed after lending his ears almost exclusively to the Israeli government and those around him who shared its inclinations.

It is true that the United States secured certain gains from the war. Yet it could have achieved similar outcomes without going to war. Washington possessed many tools capable of bringing the Iranians to sign a binding agreement—tools other than a war that was unnecessary, unproductive, and devoid of meaningful returns.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu must surely be among the most disappointed observers, seeing that the American decision-maker has finally listened to Gulf leaders—perhaps even with both ears—after experiencing the consequences of listening exclusively to Israel.

The Israeli government will certainly not give up. It will continue trying to dominate the American president’s thinking in hopes of persuading him that returning to war serves U.S. interests.

At the same time, Trump’s unpredictability leaves the region cautious that he may suddenly reverse the very position he announced in response to Gulf mediation.

Iran, however, still has the opportunity to block such a path and deny both Trump and the Israeli government the momentum they seek. But this can only happen if Tehran abandons its confrontational posture toward the Gulf states and ceases manufacturing new tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz.

The strait is not an exclusively Iranian passage, nor does it lie solely within Iranian territory. It is a shared waterway bordered on one side by Oman, one of the six Gulf states.

These are political and geographical realities that Tehran appears to overlook amid its desire to claim victory. Yet victory cannot come at the expense of neighboring states, because such behavior ultimately amounts to aggression.

And if Iran truly feels the kind of embarrassment described here—and it should—then the least it could do would be to take practical steps toward rebuilding the trust that Gulf states extended to it in good faith, only to find that goodwill repeatedly turned into a target.

Quoted from: Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper