What Does Triggering the “Snapback Mechanism” Against Iran Mean?

With the activation of the “Snapback” mechanism and the re-imposition of United Nations sanctions on Iran, the nuclear agreement—long in a state of political coma for years—has effectively come to an end, bringing a decade of attempts to reach a settlement with the West to a close and erecting an even larger wall of mistrust in the negotiation process.

The repercussions of activating the “Snapback” mechanism and the vote in the United Nations Security Council to restore international sanctions on Iran extend beyond the economic sphere. The internal and external conditions of Tehran can also be understood through the symbolic significance of activating this mechanism.

Inside Iran, the consequences will not be limited to the economic effects that will intensify pressure on citizens. They also extend to Iran’s relationship with the West and to the balance between the hardline and reformist currents within the country. In other words, the development raises the question of which path is more valid: continued negotiations with the West or disengagement from it.

More importantly, these repercussions have deepened mistrust and built an even greater wall of suspicion toward the West. This reinforces within the mindset of Iranian decision-makers the belief that the Iranian regime itself is being targeted. Consequently, it strengthens the conviction that Iran must not abandon its regional arena, including the network of regional proxies and the missile system upon which its strategic posture relies.

Regarding internal political competition, the voice of the hardline conservative camp has grown louder. From their perspective, the path of negotiations and diplomacy has ended with the re-imposition of sanctions that had been lifted ten years ago. By contrast, the reformist camp, including former president Hassan Rouhani, argues that the sanctions now returning were originally imposed during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose confrontational rhetoric toward the West burdened Iran with a legacy of sanctions.

At the same time, hardliners have intensified calls for President Masoud Pezeshkian to resign, arguing that he failed to fulfill his promises to lift sanctions and resolve the nuclear issue. Instead, they contend, he has presided over the return of sanctions that had been lifted a decade ago—an outcome viewed as a failure in foreign policy. Sanctions have not been lifted; rather, the Security Council sanctions imposed during Ahmadinejad’s era have been reinstated. Meanwhile, inflation remains high, unfair quota systems in universities persist, and the value of the national currency continues to decline day by day.

There are also voices calling for withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a proposal that has been raised within the parliamentary National Security Committee. Meetings have reportedly taken place with Ali Larijani to strengthen internal consensus within the political establishment. Hardline factions in parliament have even signaled the possibility of withdrawing from the NPT, while other voices are calling for the cancellation of the Cairo agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Although Article 10 of the NPT stipulates that “each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests,” such withdrawal requires notifying all treaty parties and the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Nevertheless, Iran is unlikely to withdraw from the treaty because it seeks to remain within the framework of international legitimacy; otherwise, it would provide Israel and the United States with justification to mobilize the international community against it over its nuclear program.

Therefore, alongside the faction calling for withdrawal from the NPT, another current proposes withdrawing only from the ratification procedures related to the treaty. In practice, this would mean that Iran remains formally committed to nuclear non-proliferation but would bar international inspectors and monitoring mechanisms from overseeing its nuclear program. Such a step would almost certainly give Western countries greater reason to doubt Iran’s nuclear activities and would further increase the ambiguity surrounding its nuclear program.

Within Iran, the prevailing view is that activating the “Snapback” mechanism is largely symbolic rather than substantive—essentially a form of psychological warfare. This perception stems from the fact that the sanctions already imposed on Iran by the United States and Europe have exceeded the total scope of sanctions previously resulting from the six earlier United Nations Security Council resolutions.

While the United Kingdom, France, and Germany issued a statement announcing the reimposition of European Union sanctions on Iran under the framework of the Security Council mechanism—stating that they had no choice but to restore sanctions while remaining open to negotiations with Tehran for a new agreement—the U.S. State Department also affirmed that the diplomatic option with Iran remained possible.

From Iran’s perspective, however, the American and European positions represent a form of Western arrogance and an attempt to impose unfair negotiating conditions on Tehran. Iranian officials argue that the European stance is intended to align with Washington’s “maximum pressure” policy and to mirror the hardline position of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio toward Iran, possibly as part of broader geopolitical maneuvering related to the Ukrainian file. Beyond these calculations, Iran’s leadership believes that it has repeatedly suffered major setbacks despite engaging in negotiations with the West.

Iran argues that it was attacked by Israel and later by Washington at a time when it was preparing for the sixth round of negotiations. Moreover, United Nations sanctions were reinstated through the European troika despite Tehran’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency during talks in Cairo. The Iranian president had also publicly declared that Tehran had no intention of withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and had expressed readiness for direct negotiations with Washington—yet the vote to restore UN sanctions still went forward.

Iran also considers the activation of the Snapback mechanism to be illegal and inconsistent with both the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and international law. Consequently, Tehran views the reimposition of Security Council sanctions as unlawful and unacceptable. A key point in this context is that China and Russia, as permanent members of the Security Council, supported Iran’s position. During the vote on extending the activation mechanism, Russia’s deputy ambassador to the United Nations stated that Moscow believes the mechanism has not yet been legally triggered. Accordingly, Russia intends to consider Resolution 2231 terminated on October 18 and has informed the Security Council Secretariat that it should not make administrative arrangements to enforce sanctions against Iran.

Iran will now seek to strengthen its diplomatic ties with China and Russia—two of the five permanent members of the Security Council. These countries are not expected to participate in monitoring the implementation of Security Council sanctions against Iran, given their position that the Snapback mechanism was activated unlawfully. As a result, Iran anticipates that the sanctions may fail to gain broad acceptance among other states.

Tehran is also attempting to frame the stance of Russia and China toward the Security Council decision as a form of solidarity among countries rejecting American dominance over the international order and over institutions perceived as operating according to Western values and standards. In Iran’s narrative, this stance reflects the emergence of a new global order and the formation of alternative regional alliances.

Thus, the issue has broader implications related to the dominance of the American-led international system and its growing rejection by states advocating a multipolar world order. China, in particular, has spoken about establishing a fairer global system, as reflected in statements by the Chinese president during the Shanghai summit, where Beijing emphasized that its doors remain open to countries protesting the policies of the existing international system.

By activating the Snapback mechanism, European countries have effectively exhausted their available tools of pressure against Iran. Consequently, the parties now face only two possible paths: a military path—where Israel might act on behalf of Washington—or a negotiating path that would impose additional restrictions not only on Iran’s nuclear program but also on its missile program, which is of primary concern to European states. This would also include pressure regarding Iran’s supply of drones to Russia, which European governments view as a threat to European security.

With only these two paths currently visible, both Iran and Israel have announced their military readiness for any potential future confrontation. At the same time, an unusual agreement has reportedly been reached between Iran and the U.S. administration concerning the transfer of Iranian migrants back to Iran—an occurrence rarely seen before.

The coming days may therefore witness either a second round of conflict between Iran and Israel or limited, short-term arrangements between Tehran and Washington. However, such arrangements are unlikely to address the issue of ballistic missiles, which remain the principal security concern for Israel and a cornerstone of Iran’s defensive strategy.

Source: Independent Arabia