What, After All, Is the State?

Just as defining the concept of the “citizen,” which we discussed in our article published on Sunday, August 16, was necessary because of the ambiguity surrounding the term in the minds of both the general public and specialists, the state itself is similarly shrouded in ambiguity.

Generally speaking, if the “citizen” is portrayed as helpless and of limited means, bearing no responsibility whatsoever for the emptiness of his pockets, then the state bears full responsibility—particularly since it never ceases to impose taxes, raise the prices of goods, and undertake projects that generate no returns. There is, of course, an element of political blackmail in this equation between the citizen and the state: the suggestion that the citizen may once again take to the streets in a “January Revolution” against the very state whose national projects he once worked on and benefited from; the state that introduced him to the era of natural gas after the days of LPG cylinders, and provided modern public transportation and communications systems that brought him closer to the standards of the developed world.

Historians of the January Revolution have failed to identify the economic causes behind what happened. But our subject here is what immediately followed: the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to leadership and, subsequently, its assumption of political power for the first time in Egypt’s history—and its complete failure to present a national program for the Egyptian state, as opposed to a project for a “caliphate state.”

If there is some clarity in defining the citizen, the profound confusion surrounding the concept of the state, particularly the Egyptian state, remains difficult to overcome.

The traditional definition of the state is that it is a social entity comprising a community of people settled within a defined territory and possessing, for the sake of maintaining order, a “political” authority that governs the affairs of its people in the present and the future. It is the source of sovereignty, the protector of the land and national dignity, and the guardian of the collective identity and the interests of future generations.

The state is not the “government,” which is merely the executive instrument of what has been established as the “general will.” It is the legitimate political authority vested with the monopoly over the use of force, the enforcement of law, and the implementation of the national objectives agreed upon by the national community.

What commonly occurs within Egypt’s political and economic elite is that the state is viewed as nothing more than a provider of services to citizens, particularly the poor. According to this view, the state was not created to lead them, preserve their identity, protect them from threats, or—in Egypt’s case—pursue progress, enhance the country’s standing, and guarantee a decent life for future generations.

Since the state began formulating ambitious programs to build a new Egypt, the fundamental objection to what has been taking place has been that “priorities” should instead focus on redistributing wealth to the poor, and that there is no need for costly investments whose benefits do not flow directly into the pockets of “citizens.”

Within the elite, there are those who reduce the question of “state priorities” to specific sectors, all of them service-oriented, such as “education” and “health,” without examining what has happened to these two sectors as a result of government policies and the practices of the private sector.

The latter occupies a contradictory position within the elite: it constantly complains of its limited ability to act in the face of the overwhelming power of the “state,” while at the same time complaining that the public authorities are “competing” with it.

Such dynamics exist in many societies and states. Ultimately, however, the matter comes down to who possesses the legitimacy to lead—a responsibility shaped by numerous considerations.

The “elite,” whether openly critical or expressing its criticism through insinuation and indirect reproach, often recognizes the “ring of fire” surrounding Egypt: to the east, Palestine and Israel, the Arab Levant, and the Arabian Peninsula, across which Iran looms, along with the strategic maritime chokepoints; to the west, Libya and Chad; and to the south, Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia, where civil wars rage and strategic water resources are contested.

But recognizing these threats is not enough. One must also understand the cost of living in a volatile environment marked by terrorism, war, hunger, and refugees.

Across the political, economic, and cultural spectrum, the elite has done little more than identify the dangers. The tools needed to confront them and mobilize the necessary resources remain absent.

Since the Egyptian Center for Strategic Thought and Studies undertook its comprehensive research and published its seminal study, The Cost of Terrorism, no comparable work has been produced. What is certain, however, is that terrorism, its consequences, and the means of preventing it place a heavy burden on the state as a community encompassing rich and poor citizens alike, as well as all the social, geographic, and professional groups in between.

The responsibility of the state, as understood in political thought since the time of Plato, is to take into account the changes taking place both domestically and internationally.

Domestically, this means building upon what previous generations have accomplished. In Egypt’s case, this includes emerging from Ottoman rule and overcoming British occupation and Israeli occupation on two occasions. Externally, it means competing in the global race and securing for Egypt the position it deserves.

The massive projects undertaken by the state and implemented by the government and both the public and private sectors illustrate Egypt’s current position: a state engaged in construction and stability within a turbulent regional environment; an international actor that mediates to halt wars and establish peace; and a global actor and destination, drawing people from around the world to the Grand Egyptian Museum and to the “greatest gathering place,” as well as to the region’s largest development hub—the Suez Canal Economic Zone—which has become a safe haven and gateway for supporting and safeguarding international trade and industry.

The contemporary Egyptian state draws its inspiration from an immensely rich and monumental Egyptian heritage, in which the legacies of Ramses II, Muhammad Ali, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Anwar Sadat all resonate.

Egypt’s regional leadership is no longer based on the “Voice of the Arabs,” but on its position as the largest economic market in the Middle East, whether measured in terms of consumption or investment.

None of this has been easy. At times, it has depended on heavy debt. Yet Egypt has never missed a debt repayment deadline; instead, its debts have been transformed into assets and wealth.

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm.