Washington, Beijing… and Tehran as Well

I write this article while U.S. President Donald Trump prepares to travel to Beijing for a historic visit whose counterpart will be Chinese President Xi Jinping. By the time the reader encounters these lines, the outcomes and atmosphere of the visit—and perhaps some of what the two sides agreed to reveal—will already be known.

The meeting takes place at a moment when the international system appears to have settled into a triangular structure of great powers. At the apex stands the United States, whose GDP now exceeds $32 trillion and which, while gradually withdrawing from Europe, is simultaneously expanding its military presence in the Middle East with the largest military force known in contemporary history.

China occupies the second side of this triangle, positioned as the principal competitor racing to narrow the gap with Washington, fueled by a historic economic and technological transformation. Apart from the issue of Taiwan, Beijing, despite its great-power status, has little reason to wage war. At this stage of its rise, it is sufficient for China to embrace international law—even concerning the Russo-Ukrainian War. Although Beijing leans toward Moscow, it still refuses to recognize the annexation of Ukrainian territories, including Crimea, into Russia.

Russia itself forms the third side of the triangle, standing at some distance from both powers. Yet its nuclear and space capabilities still allow it to remain within the circle of great powers. Moscow remains close to Beijing while simultaneously maintaining a vague and complicated connection between the Russian and American presidents.

The bilateral meeting undoubtedly unfolds within the broader process of shaping a new global order that emerged after the decline of American-style globalization. China now lies at the heart of that globalization through trade, supply chains, and the Belt and Road Initiative.

This reality naturally suggests that the meeting would focus heavily on economic issues, especially since trade disputes represented the first major confrontation between the two countries. Added to this is a subject that has become increasingly central in Washington: when a country possesses such a vast economy, it inevitably requires enormous quantities of critical minerals—resources found abundantly in China, Greenland, and other strategically significant regions attracting American attention.

In truth, economics—and perhaps environmental concerns as well—constitute areas where common ground still exists between Washington and Beijing. What remains unresolved, however, is the question of who will govern a world powered by electric engines on land, sea, air, and even beyond Earth itself.

China, which once rebelled against the international order well into the post-Mao Zedong era, has become one of the strongest advocates of multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization and other global frameworks related to food, the environment, and communications.

By contrast, Trump’s Washington is deeply uncomfortable with such structures and instead prefers a world organized around spheres of influence: the Americas reserved for the United States under a revived Monroe Doctrine; Southeast Asia falling under Chinese influence; and perhaps Russia reclaiming parts of Eastern Europe once integrated into the former Soviet Union.

Despite the richness of the agenda before the two leaders, the entire international system now faces the same kind of tests that confronted all previous global orders. The post-World War I order was tested by the Second World War. The post-World War II system was tested during the Cold War and the era of decolonization following the Suez Crisis. Globalization itself was tested as the United States entered and exited conflicts in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Historically, such tests have centered on whether major powers could preserve a system of coexistence and managed competition—or whether contradictions would ultimately be resolved through direct or proxy warfare.

The wars in Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran now represent the first historic examinations of this emerging order, and they place all parties in an uncomfortable position. Washington entered the Middle Eastern conflict on Israel’s side, while Beijing possesses extensive energy and economic interests throughout the region.

Iran is itself a pivotal state with deep economic ties to China, although these ties are still not greater than those between Washington and Beijing. At the same time, Iran’s political system represents something fundamentally alien to the Chinese leadership, which has become highly experienced in managing modern capitalist systems.

The greatest source of tension in all this is that President Trump arrived in Beijing uncertain whether he should resume military operations and end the ceasefire with Iran—or whether Chinese mediation could instead secure the lifting of Iran’s pressure on the Strait of Hormuz, thereby restoring freedom of navigation and trade between the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean.

Trump must surely have reflected on the fact that China has no real interest in the emergence of a nuclear Iran governed by a system of religious fundamentalism capable of igniting the entire region with missiles.

There are, in fact, many shared interests between Washington and Beijing.

Quoted from: Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper