The Iran War and the Collapse of the Rules of Engagement

The Trump administration has remained firmly committed to Israel's security and strategic interests. Yet it has also refused to submit to Israeli preferences whenever they conflict with broader American priorities. Washington's long-standing reliance on Israel to implement the vision of a "New Middle East"—a strategy dating back to 2006—has, according to this argument, left the region scarred by successive wars while severely damaging America's relationships and interests across the Middle East.

The article contends that Israeli policy has increasingly been driven by ideological and expansionist ambitions rather than strategic balance or American interests, creating an unprecedented rift with the U.S. administration. Vice President J. D. Vance has publicly accused Israel of financing influence campaigns targeting American public opinion and has alleged links between Jeffrey Epstein and Israel's Mossad intelligence service. These developments, the article argues, have divided Jewish organizations and public opinion in the United States between those who support Washington's approach as necessary to stabilize the region and those who view it as an abandonment of Israel. White House Press Secretary Olivia Wells reportedly affirmed that "the President and the Vice President are in complete agreement."

According to Axios, President Trump has urged Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to withdraw Israeli forces from both Syria and Lebanon, reportedly telling him, "They don't want you there. You need to redeploy." The report further claims that previous understandings between Israel and elements of the Syrian opposition in the Golan Heights had created an environment that could facilitate future coordination with the government of Ahmad Al-Sharaa after Damascus succeeded in containing terrorist threats across Syria.

Al-Sharaa, however, reportedly conditioned any future understanding with Israel on the full restoration of Syrian sovereignty over its territory. Netanyahu rejected that position, instead reinforcing permanent defensive positions while civilian settlement initiatives gradually began appearing in the occupied areas.

The article further argues that Al-Sharaa rejected direct military intervention by either the Syrian or Lebanese armies against Hezbollah, believing that such a confrontation would merely make all parties "easy prey for Israel." Instead, he has reportedly favored strengthening the Lebanese state and tightening border controls to prevent the smuggling of weapons and financial resources before allowing Lebanon's government to proceed with negotiations over Hezbollah's future disarmament, following a model similar to developments in Syria and Iraq.

On the sidelines of NATO meetings in Ankara, Trump reportedly authorized Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to deploy air defense batteries inside Syria while permitting Turkish naval assets to operate from Latakia. According to the article, the objective was to establish a deterrent balance against Israel while protecting the U.S. military presence at Al-Tanf.

Trump also received Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi, emphasizing that Iranian influence had become a burden on Iraq that should be eliminated. Al-Zaidi reportedly reaffirmed his commitment to disarm armed factions and place all weapons under exclusive state control by September 30, 2026.

According to the article, several major factions—including Saraya Al-Salam, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Imam Ali, and the Badr Organization—have accepted this process, while others—including Hezbollah Brigades, Harakat al-Nujaba, Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades, Awliya al-Dam, Ashab al-Kahf, and Karbala formations—have rejected it.

Washington has reportedly suspended cash transfers derived from Iraq's oil revenues, as well as portions of its security assistance, in order to ensure Baghdad's commitment to implementation. At the same time, the United States has pledged to replace its direct military presence with expanded strategic partnerships and increased investment by American companies. The article warns, however, that this transition could encourage Iran to transfer substantial quantities of weapons into Iraq in an effort to preserve its allied militias.

To strengthen both the Iraqi and Syrian governments, the United States is also said to be supporting the construction of the Basra–Haditha oil pipeline, estimated to cost $4.6 billion and designed to transport 2.25 million barrels per day. This project would later be connected to the rehabilitated Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline, whose reconstruction is estimated at $8 billion.

The objective would be to export Iraqi oil through the Mediterranean rather than the Strait of Hormuz, while providing Syria with approximately $200 million annually in transit revenues.

Because this route would reduce Türkiye's strategic role within the regional energy network and diminish the importance of the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline, Trump has reportedly sought to compensate Ankara by considering the removal of restrictions on the sale of F-35 fighter aircraft. According to the article, this prospect has encouraged Türkiye to explore transferring its Russian-made S-400 air defense systems to one of the Gulf states in hopes of facilitating the removal of remaining U.S. sanctions.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun also presented Trump with a plan for deploying the Lebanese Armed Forces throughout southern Lebanon while consolidating the framework agreement intended to halt Israeli military operations. Aoun reportedly acknowledged that the Lebanese Army lacks the capacity to disarm Hezbollah independently and rejected the possibility of either Israeli or Syrian forces carrying out that mission, warning that such a scenario could reignite Lebanon's civil war.

The article therefore argues that Washington's broader vision for involving Arab states in confronting Iran could ultimately generate new civil wars in Iraq and Lebanon—or even provoke direct conflict between Syria and Lebanon.

Iran's attempt to break the blockade imposed on Yemen since March 2015 is likewise portrayed as highly suspicious in both timing and purpose. According to the article, Tehran sought to draw the Houthi movement directly into the conflict in order to relieve military pressure on Iran while simultaneously increasing pressure on Washington.

The United States, anticipating this possibility, reportedly considered scenarios involving regional powers such as Egypt and Pakistan, together with NATO allies, to neutralize the Houthis and secure maritime navigation through Bab el-Mandeb, thereby allowing Washington to concentrate its efforts against Iran.

The article argues that Iran's strategy aimed to merge the Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb theaters into a single strategic front capable of disrupting global trade and energy flows.

Subsequent attacks on Sana'a International Airport, followed by strikes targeting Abha Airport and the Saudi port of Yanbu—the largest port on the eastern coast of the Red Sea—effectively ended the 2022 truce and undermined the 2023 Beijing agreement that had restored diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The conflict has thus evolved into a campaign targeting critical infrastructure across the region.

According to the article, Iranian leaders initially believed they were confronting another limited exchange of strikes similar to previous episodes. They now recognize that the conflict has evolved into a genuine war in which the traditional rules of engagement have fundamentally changed.

Relations between Iran and the Gulf states have been transformed, while Israel has deliberately maintained a lower public military profile in order not to undermine American efforts to persuade Arab states to participate directly in the confrontation. The article compares this approach to Israel's restraint during Iraq's missile attacks in the 1991 Gulf War, when it refrained from retaliation to preserve Arab participation in the coalition to liberate Kuwait.

Prospects for diplomacy have also deteriorated sharply. According to the article, President Trump canceled the proposed agreement to end the war, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps effectively closed the negotiating track by ordering Iran's delegation to return from Oman. At the same time, Ayatollah A'rafi, Director of Iran's seminaries, declared that "negotiations are over; the next stage is jihad and steadfast resistance."

The article concludes that the convergence between the Revolutionary Guard and Iran's religious establishment in favor of continued war—despite destruction described as unprecedented since the Second World War—amounts to political suicide for Iran and threatens to extend the devastation across the Gulf region.

Iran, it argues, has suffered a strategic setback comparable to those experienced by Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet its vast territory, rugged geography, and large population make prolonged occupation unrealistic. Instead, sustained military destruction may become the preferred strategy, potentially accompanied by limited occupation of strategic coastal areas and islands to secure the Strait of Hormuz.

Such an outcome, the article concludes, would constitute a profound regional security catastrophe, not only because of the destruction already inflicted, but also because of the large-scale waves of irregular migration it could generate.

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm.