Putin in China… Pragmatism, Not Ideology

Egyptian writer and researcher specializing in international affairs. Author of several books and studies on political affairs.

Why does Russian President Vladimir Putin visit China only a few days after the departure of the master of the White House, Donald Trump?

It is difficult to provide a complete and definitive answer. Yet, بعيداً عن نظريات المؤامرة التاريخية، it seems reasonable to suggest that the Kremlin leader may be concerned about the possibility that “Uncle Sam” could drive a wedge into Sino-Russian relations — a development that would be extremely dangerous for Moscow at the present moment.

According to the statement published on the website of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the visit comes at the invitation of Chinese President Xi Jinping to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between the two countries.

The Kremlin also describes the visit as an opportunity for the two leaders to deepen their strategic partnership and cooperation.

This is certainly possible. Yet the question dominating discussions beyond the formalities of diplomatic protocol is this: during these forty-eight hours of meetings, could Xi play a decisive mediating role between Moscow and Kyiv to end a war that is now approaching its fifth year?

It is impossible to formulate an answer without first realistically assessing the depth and nature of relations between Beijing and Moscow, and determining whether they are truly ideological strategic allies or merely pragmatic partners driven by shared interests — particularly containing American power and challenging broader Western dominance.

To begin with, China and Russia are not formally allied through mutual defense treaties, nor are they committed to defending one another militarily. Nevertheless, their partnership has caused considerable concern in Washington, especially after Xi declared in 2022 that his partnership with Putin had “no limits.”

Xi has described Putin as his “best friend and colleague,” while Putin has referred to Xi as his “dear friend,” praising the Belt and Road Initiative as an attempt to establish “a fairer and more multipolar world order.”

Although Russia and China generally support one another — or at least avoid opposing each other — in the United Nations Security Council on major resolutions, the civilizational layers beneath the relationship appear far less comfortable philosophically and socially.

For this reason, a degree of mistrust persists among many officials, business leaders, and citizens on both sides, often driven by historical grievances and even latent racial anxieties about the future.

What is particularly striking is that while Xi and Putin enjoy a visibly cordial relationship, previous leaders of the two countries experienced far more estrangement than harmony.

The Russo-Ukrainian War has also placed China in an uncomfortable position. Although Beijing has not openly provided military support for Moscow’s war effort, NATO has repeatedly accused China of complicity with Russia’s military campaign.

These concerns were not entirely dispelled by Xi’s statements during his visit to Moscow in March 2023, when he strongly warned against the possibility of Russia resorting to nuclear weapons.

At the same time, Sino-Russian military cooperation itself contains structural limitations and contradictions. One of the major constraints lies in Russia’s concerns about Chinese intellectual-property theft from Russian defense companies — concerns rooted in repeated cases of Chinese reverse engineering of Russian military technology.

From a geopolitical perspective, Russia has also allocated fewer military resources to its Far Eastern borders, yielding short-term security benefits. Yet in the long term, this reduction may facilitate expanding Chinese economic and political influence in regions Moscow has historically regarded as within its own sphere of influence, especially in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Moreover, China is not entirely comfortable with the depth of Russian-Indian relations or Moscow’s continued transfer of weapons to India.

Returning to the primary objective of the visit — namely whether Putin seeks to preempt any possible Sino-American rapprochement — it can be argued that every step toward confidence-building between Beijing and Washington may be perceived in Moscow as a relative loss in its relationship with China.

Here it must be noted that Putin’s ambitions depend heavily on consolidating Russia’s status as a great power, ensuring that Moscow remains strategically valuable to both Beijing and perhaps even Washington.

In any case, Putin still possesses important leverage in major global issues, including the wars in Ukraine and Iran, global energy security, and the future of the international order.

Yet it is not impossible that he worries about waking up one day to discover that Chinese pragmatism has tilted decisively toward Washington — especially given the absence of any genuine ideological bond between Moscow and Beijing.

For this reason, the world will be closely watching both the visit itself and the consequences that may emerge from it.

Quoted from: Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper