Peace, War, and the Lost Certainty

Israel has not stopped bombing Lebanese territory during the ongoing negotiations in Washington, D.C. between delegations from the two countries under American sponsorship—not even temporarily—in order to avoid weakening the Lebanese government, which is trying, through every “safe” means possible, to confine weapons to the hands of the state.

Nor does Israel wish to lose the support of sectors outside the environment of Hezbollah, sectors increasingly horrified by the systematic Israeli targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure, and increasingly doubtful of the government’s ability to deter an occupying force that continues its bombardment without restraint.

Lebanon’s situation is more complicated than that of any other country that has entered peace or war negotiations with Israel, because Lebanon as a state did not enter this war. Rather, an armed organization independently decided to ignite what it called a war of “support for Iran.”

This differs fundamentally from the case of a country like Egypt, which fought in 1973 to liberate its occupied territory before entering disengagement negotiations and later witnessing President Anwar Sadat initiate his historic visit to Jerusalem and sign a separate peace agreement through which Egypt regained its occupied lands.

Meanwhile, the broader Arab–Israeli conflict remained unresolved, particularly the Palestinian issue, until the Oslo Accords in 1993—agreements that Israel itself ultimately undermined through settlement expansion in the West Bank and the blockade of Gaza Strip.

Certainly, the behavior of the current Israeli government differs markedly from that of previous governments, especially after profound transformations within Israeli society itself. Political division is no longer primarily between Likud and Labor, or between left, center, and right, but rather between extremists and those even more extreme.

This transformation has directly affected confidence in peace as a secure and reliable alternative for all parties.

In contrast, during Sadat’s era, both he and his supporters possessed a deep confidence—even certainty—in the value and results of peace. Peace was viewed as synonymous with prosperity, development, and the resolution of Egypt’s economic problems. More importantly, it produced tangible results on the ground: Israel withdrew from Sinai Peninsula, which returned to Egyptian sovereignty, and the Camp David Accords became one of the enduring “constants” of the region for nearly half a century, despite all the transformations that followed.

This confidence in peace made the option of war seem increasingly unlikely—especially since those who carried the banner of confrontation at the Arab level, such as the so-called “Steadfastness and Confrontation Front,” often fought among themselves rather than against Israel.

The situation changed after the Iranian Revolution, when Iran developed regional allies and armed proxies that all adopted the banner of war and armed resistance, eventually leading to the October 7, 2023 operation launched by Hamas, followed by Lebanon’s involvement in a war ignited by Hezbollah “in support of Gaza” and later “in support of Iran,” culminating in the U.S.–Israeli war against Iran with all its negative consequences for the region and the world.

The reality, however, is that the outcomes of these wars did not advance the liberation of Palestine, nor can they truly be described as “popular liberation wars” like those fought by many nations seeking independence.

Instead, they preserved the occupation, expanded its reach in Gaza and Lebanon, weakened Iran’s capabilities, and generated growing skepticism even within the very constituencies that once championed armed resistance regarding its effectiveness in the current context—and even its ability to achieve the goals it originally proclaimed.

The choice between war and peace in the Arab–Israeli conflict has historically been accompanied by a level of confidence approaching certainty among advocates of each path.

Those who fought in 1948, 1967, and 1973—regardless of military outcomes—believed deeply that war was the only path toward liberating land and restoring rights. The Egyptian soldier crossing the Suez Canal had no doubt that this was the sole route toward reclaiming Sinai and the Arab territories occupied in 1967.

A similar certainty later accompanied Sadat’s peace initiative, albeit in reverse form. Sadat himself had no doubt that peace would achieve his objective and return Sinai completely to Egypt—as famously celebrated in the patriotic songs of Shadia—even though many opposed his bold move.

It is increasingly evident that confidence in both war and peace as regional options was shaken after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and has nearly disappeared altogether over the past three years.

War and armed resistance no longer inspire the same certainty they once did, even in cases such as the liberation of southern Lebanon in 2000, when there was widespread conviction that armed resistance, including Hezbollah, would compel Israel to withdraw.

Today, the situation has fundamentally changed. The wars fought by armed organizations have failed. Yet at the same time, those committed to moderation, peace, and civil and legal resistance against occupation are now expected not to abandon the tools of deterrence.

They must also recognize that this “new Israel” no longer truly distinguishes between friend and enemy—and that any state shielded from accountability and above international law ultimately becomes a threat to everyone.

Quoted from: Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper