Iran’s Iraqi Front

Iran has used Iraq as a platform to launch attacks against Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, while also targeting areas surrounding Emirati nuclear facilities. Iraq, as an Iranian front, represents a growing danger that is increasingly becoming an international issue and signals the emergence of a new regional reality that will require collective coordination to confront.

The arrest and extradition by Turkey of Mohammad Baqir al-Saadi, commander of the Iranian-backed Kata'ib Hezbollah, who was later transferred to a prison in New York City, forced the Iraqi government to break its silence in an attempt to distance itself from what Iran has been doing on Iraqi soil—without explicitly mentioning Tehran by name.

This development places Baghdad directly within the circle of crisis and exposes the threatened states of the region to confrontation with what may be described as “Iran’s Iraq.” The geographical scope of the crisis extends beyond the Gulf states to include Syria, Jordan, and Israel, all of which now face a new regional reality shaped by Iran, much as it previously did in the Strait of Hormuz.

From a strategic perspective, the picture is becoming increasingly clear. Tehran does not view Iraqi militias merely as temporary pressure tools for the current conflict, but rather as part of its long-term security doctrine based on projecting offensive depth beyond its borders.

Since the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has deliberately sought to move confrontation away from its own territory by creating local forces ideologically, financially, and militarily tied to Tehran. These groups function simultaneously as advanced lines of attack and as centers of political influence.

Iran is also undermining everything Iraqis have attempted to build in terms of civil governance institutions, public services, private-sector development, and regional and international relations. This makes the Iraqi people, across their various communities, natural allies against Iranian domination rather than enemies to be punished through isolation or sanctions.

The Iraqi case today reflects what might be called a “hybrid state,” similar to Lebanon: the militia launches attacks while the government disavows responsibility. The danger of militias lies not only in their possession of weapons, but in their transformation into structures parallel to the state itself—possessing financial resources, political influence, and partial legitimacy. More importantly, they now possess the ability to shape or obstruct Iraqi sovereign decision-making.

The Iraqi front has effectively been opened, as Iran activated its Iraqi militias to circumvent the truce. Meanwhile, Washington responded with a dual strategy: first, by directly targeting militia leaders who believed themselves immune; and second, by beginning efforts to dry up their financial resources.

Mohammad Baqir al-Saadi, who was arrested, is considered one of the most prominent Iraqi militia leaders and is accused of orchestrating transnational terrorist operations. As head of Kata'ib Hezbollah, he represents one of Iran’s most significant models of regional penetration—a locally armed force loyal to Tehran, resembling the model of Hezbollah in Lebanon, though developed in a shorter time and sustained through state-linked funding.

Iranian influence expanded on the shoulders of Iraq’s fragile “institutional democratic” system, which enabled Tehran and its allies to dominate political decision-making.

Another important dimension of this new development is that Tehran’s activation of Iraqi militias during the truce suggests that Iran is determined to maintain an active military front against its regional adversaries even if a peace agreement were reached with the United States and Israel. Tehran appears intent on returning to its strategy of proxy warfare while elevating the role of Iraqi militias to compensate for three major losses: the collapse of the Assad regime’s strategic role, the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the decline of Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza.

The post-war phase may prove no less dangerous, particularly if American military operations decline—whether due to commitments under a potential agreement ending the war, or because the U.S. administration seeks to reduce its military footprint in the region after securing a nuclear enrichment deal that excludes Iran’s proxy networks.

The current Iran–U.S.–Israel confrontation has demonstrated what many had long anticipated: Lebanese and Iraqi militias are not isolated local actors, but integral components of Iran’s transnational military system, and therefore deserve to be treated with the same seriousness as the nuclear enrichment issue itself.

Tehran has historically circumvented direct agreements by transferring escalation to proxy arenas, making the militia issue an organic part of the regional security equation rather than a separate file.

Quoted from: Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper