On the ground, the Iranian regime has begun carrying out part of its threats to widen the scope of the conflict by opening two new fronts: the first in the southern Red Sea, through threats to close the Bab al-Mandab Strait using the Houthis; and the second in the northern Arabian Gulf, through direct and unprecedented threats against Kuwait.

The danger of this shift is not confined to Kuwait or the Red Sea; it extends to the entire regional security architecture. Iran is no longer limiting the confrontation to its original adversaries—the United States and Israel—but is increasingly shifting the conflict toward neighboring states and strategic waterways. This behavior is less a defensive reaction than a reflection of a strategic trajectory that Iran’s military project has pursued for decades, one based on expanding influence and establishing geopolitical leverage over surrounding countries.

Statements emanating from Iranian institutions deserve particular attention, especially as threats against Kuwait have intensified. Tasnim News Agency has issued statements strikingly reminiscent of the rhetoric emanating from Baghdad in the period preceding Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Tehran has invoked the limited U.S. military presence in Kuwait as a pretext for potential attacks, ignoring the fact that this presence dates back decades, serves primarily as a deterrent against possible aggression, and was not a principal base for recent U.S. military operations against Iran.

The question today is: How should Kuwait—and the Gulf states collectively—respond to this threat?

The challenge exceeds the capabilities of any single state and calls for a return to the principle of collective action through the formation of a cohesive regional front, backed by an international coalition that unequivocally rejects any pretexts for expanding the war or legitimizing attacks against neighboring states.

Washington, preoccupied with managing the military confrontation, may not be expected to lead the diplomatic initiative. It can, however, establish clear red lines affirming that the security of the Gulf and its maritime routes constitutes a core U.S. strategic interest. Iran has not confined itself to verbal threats against Kuwait; it has repeatedly struck water and electricity facilities and expanded the scope of its threats to include Bahrain as well.

Tehran appears to recognize that a tightening maritime blockade of its ports, coupled with the possibility of expanded U.S. military operations along its coastline, could weaken its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz—one of its most important instruments of pressure in both war and negotiations. It is therefore attempting to develop alternative sources of leverage. These include turning the Bab al-Mandab Strait into a strategic pressure point through the Houthis and seeking to impose a new security reality in the northern Gulf—an approach that, despite the very different circumstances, evokes certain features of Saddam Hussein’s policy of imposing faits accomplis in 1990.

A recurring pattern has become increasingly apparent in Iranian behavior: whenever Tehran loses a strategic card, it moves quickly to open a new front in order to recreate instruments of pressure and coercion. To reduce the political and legal costs, and to avoid appearing openly as a direct aggressor, Iran is likely to rely more heavily on its regional proxies, including militias in Yemen and Iraq.

What are the prospects for the success of this new Iranian positioning?

The answer is far from straightforward, because Iranian behavior cannot be analyzed solely through conventional assumptions of rational decision-making. The Iranian leadership also faces complex domestic calculations and fears that any perception of defeat could destabilize its position at home, particularly after decades of devoting substantial national resources to building military capabilities and financing wars.

The Houthis in Yemen appear to have been assigned the task of turning Bab al-Mandab into an operational substitute for the Strait of Hormuz, as Iran’s ability to use the latter as an instrument of pressure diminishes under U.S. military attacks. With the Houthis already moving toward threatening maritime navigation, Yemeni forces, together with the Saudi-led coalition, are likely to find regional and international support for efforts to prevent disruption to one of the world’s most vital trade arteries.

The expected response, however, need not be confined to the military sphere. Indeed, the diplomatic space for action may be broader on this particular front. Major powers that depend on navigation through the Red Sea—foremost among them China and India, alongside European states—have a direct interest in safeguarding freedom of navigation.

Consequently, any military action aimed at ending the Houthi threat to this maritime corridor could command broader international consensus, as it would be framed as a defense of the principle of freedom of international navigation rather than merely as an extension of the ongoing war in the Gulf.

In all circumstances, building such a regional and international coalition is no longer merely a political option; it has become a strategic necessity—not only for confronting current threats, but also for dealing with whatever arrangements may emerge from the eventual outcome of the war.

Iran is not simply seeking to manage a temporary crisis. It is attempting to redraw the region’s strategic map according to a new narrative of its own, so that even if the war ends sooner rather than later, Tehran emerges with different spheres of influence and new rules of engagement from those that existed before the conflict.

The debate, therefore, is no longer merely about how to end the war. It is increasingly about the shape of the regional order that will emerge in its aftermath.