Iran Between Fragmentation and Change

The war with Iran has been ongoing for more than two years, its spark ignited by the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023.

After the weakening and downsizing of Iran’s regional proxies, a fundamental question now emerges: what is the ultimate objective of this war against Iran?

There appears to be an American-Israeli consensus on initiating the war, yet each side seems to hold a different vision regarding how it should end. Israel seeks the overthrow of the Iranian regime, while the administration of President Donald Trump speaks instead about changing the leadership while preserving the structure of the regime itself—that is, something resembling the Venezuelan model—or compelling Tehran to make strategic concessions, foremost among them ending domestic uranium enrichment.

Regarding Israel’s objectives, I discussed in a previous article the views of Israeli political analyst Daniel Levy, who argues that Israel seeks not only regime change but also the fragmentation of Iran into smaller states. According to Levy, this aligns with Israel’s broader regional vision of managing and containing large regional powers.

Discussing such proposals requires pausing at a fundamental principle in dealing even with adversaries: preserving the unity of states, respecting their borders, and avoiding direct involvement in forcibly changing regimes.

Iran, like all major regional powers, contains deep structural complexities that make any radical transformation a potential source of broad regional instability. One must remember that the fall of the Shah and the rise of Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979 occurred without a single shot being fired and was initially viewed as a relatively peaceful transition, especially given the assumption that Iran possessed established institutions such as the military and the civil state. Yet the years that followed revealed that what happened in Tehran plunged the entire region into cycles of chaos and conflict.

Indeed, the idea of changing the regime in Tehran enjoys a certain degree of international acceptance—even if quietly—including among European states, despite their differences with Washington over aspects of the war. Even Iran’s allies are hardly enthusiastic about Tehran’s policies. Moscow, for instance, does not fully align with Iran on the nuclear issue and supports external enrichment, while China opposes aspects of Iran’s regional conduct.

Nevertheless, both powers fear either the installation of a pro-American regime in Tehran or the possibility that post-collapse chaos could threaten their strategic interests.

Theoretically, neighboring states may view the overthrow of the Iranian regime positively and believe its consequences could be contained, drawing comparisons with the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, where neighboring borders remained relatively stable. Yet such comparisons are misleading because Iraq was effectively controlled by nearly 200,000 American troops—an option that does not appear feasible in the Iranian case.

Consequently, the risks associated with regime change in Iran for the surrounding region could be immense and extend over many years.

Similarly, discussions about fragmenting Iran or supporting separatist projects may appear politically attractive or strategically convenient to some actors, but they may also carry enormous long-term dangers.

Great powers calculate differently from regional states. The United States, as a geographically distant superpower, possesses the ability to overthrow regimes and even destroy states—and if its projects fail, it can simply pack its bags and leave. Regional states, however, cannot escape the legacy and repercussions of crises unfolding around them.

This does not mean abstaining from influencing Iran’s internal dynamics, which differs fundamentally from pursuing direct regime-change projects through hard power.

The reason Iran faces such intense targeting today is that it itself failed to respect the rules of the regional order and therefore bears responsibility for much of what it now confronts.

The expansion of Tehran’s influence and its dominance over four Arab capitals ultimately dragged the Syrian Arab Republic under Bashar al-Assad toward collapse, weakened the Iraqi and Lebanese states, and fueled chaos and war in Yemen.

As a result of these policies, Tehran now finds itself increasingly isolated and facing perhaps its most dangerous crisis since the establishment of the Islamic Republic.

Some observers ask: if the regime truly feels threatened, why does it continue adopting hardline positions in negotiations instead of retreating?

The answer lies in the regime’s understanding that making concessions to external powers would weaken it internally, potentially triggering divisions and exposing the system itself to collapse.

The regime appears to believe that “resistance” against an external enemy is easier to manage than confronting internal rebellions or a possible revolution.