Conflicting Proposals

Anyone who has followed the reciprocal proposals exchanged between Tehran and Washington over the course of this week and the previous one will realize that we are facing a hellish cycle of proposals and counterproposals. Last week witnessed the American one-page memorandum, which included nine points, among them a gradual lifting by both sides—within one month—of the blockade on Iranian ports and the Strait of Hormuz, alongside the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear project.

The amended Iranian response, however, called for the withdrawal of American forces from Iran’s immediate surroundings rather than from the entire region, the lifting of the naval blockade, the release of frozen assets, the payment of compensation, and an end to the war on all fronts, including Lebanon. In its “revised proposal,” Iran accepted freezing uranium enrichment for fifteen years, thereby moving closer to the American proposal, which had stipulated twenty years. In its latest proposal, Tehran eventually accepted the twenty-year period and also expressed readiness to gradually dispose of highly enriched uranium by sending it to a neutral country or to a mutually agreed-upon state.

The United States responded by rejecting the Iranian proposal and refusing to fully lift restrictions on Tehran’s frozen assets. Washington demanded a complete halt to enrichment activities and permitted only one nuclear reactor to remain operational. At the same time, it agreed to suspend oil-related sanctions on Iran during the negotiation period, although this has not yet materialized.

Iran then answered the American response by submitting a new fourteen-point proposal carrying the same number of clauses as its original proposal, but with certain amendments. These focused on negotiations to end the war and on confidence-building measures expected from the American side. Tehran also maintained its insistence on the gradual release of its frozen assets, while Washington remained firm in rejecting compensation payments to Iran and agreed only to release 25 percent of the frozen assets. It further linked any cessation of war to the initiation of formal negotiations.

In reality, both the Iranian and American positions remain fundamentally unchanged. Washington has refused to compensate Iran and has agreed only to release 25 percent of Tehran’s frozen funds, which Iran considers usurped rights. Tehran rejects the American approach of dealing with these rights “piecemeal” and only after the signing of a final agreement between the two countries.

The statement by the Iranian foreign minister in Pakistan asserted that the United States is imposing “excessive conditions” and has not offered “any tangible concession.” Meanwhile, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has repeatedly declared that Washington seeks to extract concessions it failed to secure through war, a stance that has effectively pushed the negotiations into deadlock.

These conflicting proposals exchanged between the two countries reflect, in part, a fundamental disagreement over the Iranian nuclear file. Iran has already made what it views as genuine concessions, yet Washington considers them insufficient. I believe Tehran may offer further concessions in this file in exchange for even a partial lifting of sanctions, access to frozen assets, and the complete removal of the blockade. Nevertheless, Iran is likely to preserve its missile program—unless Benjamin Netanyahu signals to Donald Trump that it should be brought back onto the negotiating table, despite its absence from discussions thus far.