A Tale of Two Losers

When Benjamin Netanyahu met Donald Trump at the White House two days ago, he tried to appear as though he were entirely at home. He crossed one leg over the other, and the smile never left his face. As soon as the meeting ended, he declared that it had been one of their best encounters ever.

According to the author, Netanyahu was not telling the truth. He knew it, and so did everyone else. Yet he had little choice but to apply what the author describes as political "makeup"—a conspicuous attempt to disguise a far less favorable reality.

Israel's parliamentary elections are scheduled for October, and opinion polls suggest that Netanyahu faces serious difficulty securing the parliamentary majority needed to remain in power. He therefore sought to capitalize on his relationship with Trump as one of the few remaining political assets capable of improving his electoral prospects.

However, the five months that have passed since the outbreak of the American-Israeli military campaign against Iran have, in the author's view, weakened the once exceptionally close relationship in which Trump appeared willing to accommodate nearly every request made by the Israeli prime minister.

Previous meetings between the two leaders featured highly publicized receptions and ceremonial welcomes through the White House's main entrance. This latest meeting, however—which the author portrays as one Netanyahu actively sought—was markedly different.

Netanyahu reportedly entered through a side entrance without an official presidential استقبال, there was no gathering of journalists, no joint press conference, and no live television coverage. Only a handful of official photographs were released.

For two political figures known for their appreciation of media attention and public spectacle, the author argues, such details were far from insignificant.

More revealing than the photographs themselves were the private discussions that took place behind closed doors.

Netanyahu reportedly arrived believing he possessed decisive evidence that would persuade Trump to adopt a tougher policy toward Iran. He claimed that Tehran had resumed rebuilding elements of its nuclear program at the "Pickaxe Mountain" facility in Isfahan Province.

Trump's reported response was simple: it was "not a major problem."

The author argues that Netanyahu attempted repeatedly to convince Trump that Iran's challenge could only be resolved by resuming military operations and ultimately overthrowing the Iranian government.

Trump, however, remained unconvinced.

According to the article, the American president continues to grapple with the political consequences of what the author characterizes as a costly decision to participate in military strikes against Iran after being persuaded by Netanyahu that the Iranian government would collapse within days—or, at most, weeks.

Instead, events unfolded very differently.

The author contends that Trump now faces the prospect of significant losses in the upcoming U.S. midterm congressional elections, driven in part by widespread public opposition to continued military involvement.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu's political standing in Washington has also weakened considerably.

What had once been nearly unconditional political support has increasingly given way to unusually public criticism.

The article claims that Trump has described Netanyahu as "crazy" and confronted him by saying, "Because of you, everyone hates Israel now."

It also argues that Vice President J.D. Vance has expanded those criticisms beyond Netanyahu personally to include his hardline government while rejecting accusations that criticism of Israeli government policies should automatically be equated with antisemitism.

According to the author, the political paths of Trump and Netanyahu have now diverged—or are close to doing so.

Trump seeks an exit from the current strategic predicament, whereas Netanyahu continues to advocate for expanding the war.

Despite these differences, the author concludes that both leaders share one defining characteristic:

They are both losing.

Their alliance against Iran has, in his assessment, failed to achieve its principal objectives. Even more importantly, its political consequences have undermined the popularity of both leaders.

This growing distance between them does not imply the end of the broader U.S.-Israeli relationship. Shared strategic interests between the two countries remain far deeper and more enduring than disagreements between their current leaders.

The author speculates that this recent meeting may ultimately prove to be the last between Trump and Netanyahu while both remain in their present political positions.

Netanyahu is expected to focus on the approaching elections, whose outcome may not favor him. Should he lose power, the corruption cases awaiting him could once again become central, potentially resulting in criminal conviction and imprisonment.

Nor, the author argues, would a political split between the two leaders necessarily mean the end of military confrontation with Iran.

Any future American military action would increasingly be driven by Washington's own strategic calculations rather than by Israeli pressure alone, although Trump's personal political instincts would also remain an important factor.

If the United States ultimately resumes military operations against Iran, Netanyahu may claim that such a decision resulted from his own influence.

Yet, the author concludes, the Israeli prime minister likely understands that his own political era is rapidly approaching its end.

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm (Egypt).