The Reality of the Libyan Political Landscape: Trajectories and Policies

Studies and research - Foresight

Published in: 28 April 2026 (1 week ago)

Dr. Abdulwahab Mohammed Al-Har
Professor of International Relations, Faculty Member, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Misrata University, Libya

Abstract:

The Libyan crisis represents a distinctive case, as it has been shaped by rapid and dramatic transformations since 2011 across its various phases. This can be attributed to two primary factors. The first relates to the absence of a mature institutional structure capable of managing settlement processes and achieving stability, thereby deepening the state of chaos and crisis, while continuously reshaping maps of conflict and alliances.

The second factor is linked to the nature of the political change in 2011, which necessitated military intervention to overthrow the regime of Colonel Gaddafi. This, in turn, opened the door to multiple external interventions that have further complicated the Libyan scene.

From this standpoint, the paper seeks to examine three levels of analysis: the current configurations of political forces, the successive crises within the Libyan political landscape, and the trajectories of settlement along with their potential future outcomes.

Keywords:
Libyan crisis, Libyan political landscape, settlement trajectories, political change, external interventions.

Introduction:

The Libyan crisis has gone through multiple phases characterized by shifting alliances and conflicts, turning Libya into a battleground for international power struggles over influence, interests, and strategic positioning among major and regional powers. This has had a direct and profound impact on the course of events within the Libyan political landscape, which continues to experience deep societal divisions over fundamental issues related to state-building and governance.

Libyan society has not fully internalized a culture of dialogue and remains influenced by tribal imaginaries that elevate tribal identity and loyalties. This is compounded by persistent debates over national identity and political character. These dynamics have accompanied the Libyan state throughout its historical phases. However, the absence of a strong central authority since 2011, its fragility, and its frequent lack of legitimacy—alongside the proliferation of armed groups—have led to successive transitional phases marked by intensifying conflict, alliances, and polarization.

As a result, achieving political stability has become extremely difficult. Recurrent political crises have emerged, including the inability to reach consensus on a constitution capable of organizing political life and transitioning it from improvisation and chaos to rational governance. Consequently, predicting the outcomes of settlement processes and resolving the Libyan crisis has become highly complex and uncertain.

Accordingly, the central hypothesis of this paper is that the entanglement of a fragmented domestic environment with a deeply conflicting external environment has directly shaped the trajectory of events and crises, rendering settlement paths and their outcomes increasingly ambiguous and distant from achieving the desired stability.

First: Current Maps of Political Forces

The nature of the Libyan revolution has clearly influenced the formation of local power configurations, alliances, and conflicts over governance, influence, and control. This has resulted in the emergence, transformation, and decline of various local actors. However, the constant factor remains the continuity of conflict and the subordination of many actors to external forces.

Most local actors are linked, in one way or another, to armed groups. Additionally, tribal affiliations play a significant role, as some armed groups represent tribal interests and aspirations for political and economic power-sharing. Furthermore, certain actors adopt religious orientations tied to alliance-based interests.

A clear example of this dynamic occurred in May 2014, when Khalifa Haftar announced his coup in a televised address, leading to the alignment of the Muslim Brotherhood with the government in Tripoli, while Salafi currents allied with Haftar. This rivalry among religious currents persists to this day, including competition over religious and media platforms between Salafi and Sufi currents, as well as the so-called “Mufti current.” These conflicts pose serious threats to stability, especially given the presence of armed groups that may align with various political rivals.

In reality, political division in Libya has produced enduring patterns of armed conflict. The offensive on Tripoli on April 4, 2019, may have been one of its most significant episodes, but it is unlikely to be the last. The existence of parallel governments and the ongoing struggle for control over Tripoli have become central concerns. The centralization of the state has reinforced the perception that controlling Tripoli equates to controlling Libya—a notion widely understood by all Libyan political actors.

As a result, successive governments have operated under implicit control of armed militias, both within and outside Tripoli. Moreover, the political division has created a dual power structure: control over the oil crescent and control over Tripoli have become the key determinants of political leverage in negotiations over authority, positions, and resources.

Consequently, the international community, in its search for a governing authority in Libya, has been compelled to operate within this framework of influence and control as manifested across Libyan geography. This has further complicated alliances, making them interest-based rather than rooted in ideology or principles. Political parties and civil society organizations have thus lost much of their significance within the political landscape, often forced to shift positions in response to changing alignments.

This is clearly observable in the Libyan context, where political parties have been subsumed into the dual conflict structure. Since the Skhirat Agreement, which produced the Government of National Accord composed of multiple influential actors with strong ties on the ground, parties have been only implicitly represented—and can be considered the weakest component due to their limited influence and power.

Overall, three main political forces can be identified as having successfully incorporated armed groups and secured their loyalty and protection.

1. Western Libya Bloc:

This bloc derived its strength from its possession of internationally recognized governments. The first emerged from the Skhirat Agreement, which produced the Government of National Accord (GNA). This government was able to manage, accommodate, and, at times, submit to armed groups in western Libya, benefiting from the centrality of state institutions.

The second phase was marked by the emergence of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Geneva, which inherited a similar pattern of interaction with armed groups, albeit with varying degrees of effectiveness in governance. This formation resulted from a complex political arrangement in which power configurations shifted and expanded to include tribal components, figures from the former regime, social forces, media activists, political actors, and other stakeholders.

This composition reflects both the international community’s uncertainty and the complexity of settlement pathways in Libya. It also highlights the extent of divergence and fragmentation, which would not have been sufficient to obstruct political stability without a supportive external environment at both regional and international levels.

2. Eastern Libya Bloc:

This bloc based its strength on its control over oil resources, as well as external support from regional actors such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. It also benefited from tribal backing and alliances with elements of the former regime, seeking to capitalize on their aspirations to re-enter the political scene.

This was reinforced by the political division, through which the House of Representatives was utilized to produce executive authorities at various stages. These authorities exercised their powers within the framework of the “General Command of the Army,” under the leadership of General Khalifa Haftar.

3. Self-Proclaimed Neutral Actors:

These actors claim to maintain equal distance from rival factions. They engage with the state of division from two main perspectives:

The first is a desire to prevent a descent into total chaos and political deadlock.
The second relates to personal and material interests that may be achieved by certain tribal leaders and regional figures through acting as trusted mediators in political processes, as well as in national reconciliation, social justice initiatives, and efforts to promote societal cohesion.

Conclusion on Political Power Mapping:

In sum, the Libyan political landscape has increasingly been shaped by the ability of the two main rival actors—the internationally recognized government and Khalifa Haftar—to manage and contain armed groups, tribal formations, and remnants of the former regime.

Additionally, both sides have utilized de facto institutions—namely the House of Representatives and the High Council of State—as political tools to either obstruct or facilitate political processes.

It is also crucial to note that both actors must demonstrate the capacity to accurately interpret international developments and their implications for the Libyan crisis. This, in turn, underscores the importance of understanding and analyzing internal political crises.

Second: Mapping Internal Political Crises

The successive turnover of governments following the February 2011 revolution, coupled with their inability to meet political obligations necessary for achieving stability, reflects the profound challenges facing Libyan society in constructing a viable political system for a state with unique characteristics.

Libya possesses institutions of authority rather than fully developed state institutions, as it has not undergone the expected processes of political modernization. The former regime established institutions aimed primarily at preserving power, rather than fostering the principles of statehood, rule of law, constitutional governance, political participation, anti-corruption frameworks, or a balanced relationship between the individual and authority.

Moreover, the absence of political parties, the dominance of tribal structures, and unresolved questions regarding centralization versus decentralization all represent values that should have been developed and institutionalized to ensure a stable and balanced political life.

The continuous structural reshaping of Libyan institutions has further undermined their capacity for sustained development and strategic planning, negatively affecting the political culture of society. This has deprived Libya of the conditions necessary for the emergence of a modern democratic civic culture, leaving it ill-equipped to address the challenges of state-building and democratic transition.

This heavy legacy has directly impacted both society and the state in the post-revolution period. Libyan society has not internalized a culture of dialogue; instead, a culture of violence and exclusion has become entrenched. Trust has eroded, and governance has been characterized by improvisation and the absence of a clear vision.

As a result, the post-revolution years can be described as a period of failure in transitioning from (revolution) to (statehood).

Even with the presence of political parties and civil society organizations, Libyan society has largely remained reliant on traditional power structures, particularly tribal affiliations and their associated expectations. Narrow factional and regional interests have often taken precedence over the national interest.

The fact that Libya witnessed the turnover of nine prime ministers between November 2011 and June 2023 is a clear indicator of the depth of its political crises. Nevertheless, an attempt can be made to identify the key determinants of these crises as follows:

1. Political Division:

Political division in Libya has deep-rooted causes, primarily stemming from a climate of mistrust that has long characterized the relationship between (authority) and societal components throughout the three historical phases of the Libyan state. This has been compounded by accumulated grievances related to marginalization resulting from centralization, as well as the spread of corruption.

These negative dynamics intensified following the February 2011 revolution, particularly with the proliferation of weapons, the expansion of militia influence, and the inability of political and military actors to achieve social harmony, civil peace, and ultimately national reconciliation. A central reason for this failure lies in the absence of genuine state sovereignty, as the Libyan political elite has, since 2011, remained unable to escape the influence of regional and international external actors.

Furthermore, political authorities have failed to effectively manage ideological and political differences among Libyan parties and factions. As a result, national interest has been sidelined, and opportunities to preserve Libya’s political unity have been lost. The pursuit of regional and personal interests by political elites has, in many cases, led to reckless behavior—even at the expense of Libyan lives and livelihoods—clearly reflected in the practices of various political actors.

In practical terms, political division became institutionalized when state institutions and apparatuses were increasingly instrumentalized to serve narrow elite interests related to control, influence, and coercion. May 2014 marked a critical turning point, coinciding with controversies surrounding elections and their legitimacy, which the Supreme Court ultimately declared unconstitutional. This led to a political deadlock that resulted in the division of both legislative and executive authorities between the General National Congress in Tripoli and the House of Representatives in Tobruk, alongside competing executive governments in al-Bayda (the Interim Government) and Tripoli (the National Salvation Government).

At that stage, both domestic and international actors recognized the difficulty of forming a unified government capable of exercising authority over the entire territory.

Consequently, Libya entered a new phase in which the United Nations Support Mission assumed a central role. The formation of Libyan governments became increasingly tied to UN-sponsored negotiations, reflecting an understanding that any viable government must represent the key actors on the ground in order to achieve stability and end political division.

This phase unfolded through two main milestones:

The first was the Skhirat Agreement, which established the Government of National Accord and sought to include representation of rival factions.
However, the agreement was not fully respected, culminating in the rejection by the House of Representatives and the April 4, 2019 offensive on Tripoli led by General Khalifa Haftar with regional and international support, despite expectations surrounding the planned National Conference in Ghadames.
The second milestone was the Geneva Agreement, which produced the Government of National Unity. This initiative primarily aimed at de-escalation and post-conflict governance but remained subject to political bargaining and pressure—hallmarks of Libyan political dynamics.

Ultimately, this political division has generated a new and dangerous layer of crises within Libya’s broader conflict landscape.

2. Institutional Division:

Institutional division represents one of the most serious threats to the unity and integrity of the Libyan state, particularly with regard to financial, economic, security, and military institutions. This fragmentation has deepened the absence of a unified national vision capable of addressing comprehensive national security strategies.

The existence of parallel financial institutions—particularly two central banking systems—has exacerbated economic hardships for Libyans. This includes rising inflation driven by parallel markets, the devaluation of the Libyan dinar through excessive currency printing, and the absence of a coherent economic strategy to address liquidity crises.

Additionally, the repeated shutdown of oil production facilities has been used as a tool for political leverage and regional bargaining, further aggravating economic instability.

On the security front, the situation reflects and reinforces the broader crisis simultaneously. Lawlessness, the proliferation of armed groups, the limited capacity of security and judicial institutions, and the division within the armed forces all contribute to a fragile and unstable environment.

The nature of the security landscape remains highly fluid and subject to rapid change, making it difficult to establish a stable conflict map among Libyan actors. Despite more than a decade since 2011, the situation continues to evolve. Conflicts are multifaceted and are expected to leave a lasting impact on constitution-making processes.

Future disputes are likely to intensify around the distribution of power, influence, and resources, as well as issues related to decentralization, federalism, and the rights of ethnic minorities.

There is also the potential for a deeply concerning conflict over religious identity—specifically regarding which religious doctrine the emerging state will adopt. The arenas of this conflict include media platforms, religious institutions, and state institutions, while the means are متعددّة (multiple), particularly given that many of these religious currents possess weapons and maintain influence on the ground.

3. The Constitutional Crisis:

The failure to draft and agree upon a constitution represents one of the most persistent crises facing both Libyan society and the state. The absence of a constitutional framework regulating governance is part of the heavy legacy inherited from a regime that ruled the country for 42 years.

As a result, the process of drafting a constitution has been accompanied by controversy and negative repercussions throughout the 12 years since the revolution. Libyans have been unable to transition from a state of (revolution) and disorder to one of (statehood) and constitutional governance, leaving the country trapped in prolonged transitional phases that continue to dominate the political landscape.

The Constituent Assembly for Drafting the Libyan Constitution began its legal mandate following its election in April 2014, with equal representation across Libya’s three regions—20 members per region. This arrangement diverges from standard constitutional practices, where representation is typically proportional to population size. Moreover, the electoral process itself negatively impacted the Assembly, as some members lacked sufficient constitutional expertise, leading to delays beyond the legally prescribed timeframe.

The Assembly commenced its work at the height of political division, resulting in significant polarization that directly affected its performance. Internal disputes led the Assembly’s president, Dr. Ali Tarhouni, to adopt a controversial draft outside the agreed deliberative framework, ultimately triggering legal action that resulted in his dismissal.

Numerous initiatives sought to revive and advance the constitutional process; however, both internal and external challenges hindered progress, even preventing the current draft from being submitted to a public referendum. The core disagreements surrounding the constitution are not merely technical but fundamentally political, requiring consensus rather than procedural adjustments.

Accordingly, it has become necessary to adopt alternative political frameworks that link constitution-making to the broader political process. The assumption that the two can be treated separately lacks realism, as such complex issues require integrated political solutions.

In summary, the difficulty of reaching agreement on establishing an effective central state governed by a legitimate and widely accepted constitution—capable of unifying state institutions and monopolizing coercive authority—remains a defining feature of the Libyan crisis. At the same time, Libyan institutions suffer from a lack of professionalism, being shaped by personalization and ideological bias rather than adherence to the rule of law and principles of the civil state.

Additionally, armed groups continue to be instrumentalized by political elites, often serving regional and international agendas. This reality underscores the importance of analyzing settlement trajectories as proposed by internal Libyan actors.

Third: Settlement Trajectories Proposed by Libyan Actors

The failure of Khalifa Haftar’s military campaign to seize control of Tripoli forced both international and regional actors to recognize a fundamental reality of the Libyan conflict: the difficulty—if not impossibility—of achieving a decisive military outcome.

At the same time, this reality compelled Libyan actors, particularly Haftar, to engage in political settlement processes. In doing so, he has utilized the House of Representatives both formally and informally as a key instrument in shaping negotiation pathways.

It is also important to highlight the role of the “5+5 Joint Military Commission,” which Haftar has viewed as a mechanism to buy time or create opportunities to revive his longstanding ambition of achieving control and dominance. This strategy has been supported by regional actors, particularly Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, whose visions of settlement trajectories have significantly influenced the direction of the political process.

Translation (continued, professional academic style):

In contrast, the Government of National Unity (GNU), which emerged following the de-escalation and ceasefire imposed by international actors after the Geneva Agreement, operates with a relatively flexible margin of maneuver. However, its actions are largely grounded in political deal-making, often conducted through shadow actors and pressure groups that rely on informal mechanisms rather than structured settlement initiatives.

Ultimately, it can be argued that settlement trajectories in Libya have consistently revolved around the distribution of power, financial resources, and wealth. Notably, the High Council of State—an advisory body based in Tripoli and a key component of the settlement framework—has not demonstrated alignment in its initiatives or behavior with either the GNU or the Presidential Council, the latter of which lacks the effectiveness required to play a decisive role in the Libyan political landscape.

In practice, the House of Representatives’ vote of confidence in the GNU in March 2021 marked the beginning of a new transitional phase—the fifth since 2011. While this created a degree of de-escalation, it did not eliminate political division. This was particularly evident in Khalifa Haftar’s refusal to submit to the authority of the new government, his continued influence over parliamentary behavior, and his persistent pursuit of personal and factional interests.

As a result, the GNU’s ability to exercise authority across Libya was significantly constrained, with its effective governance largely limited to the northwestern region. This deepened political divisions once again, culminating in the House of Representatives withdrawing confidence from the GNU and appointing Fathi Bashagha as prime minister.

This appointment further complicated an already fragile and complex political landscape, serving as a strategy by Haftar and his allies within the House of Representatives to exert pressure on both domestic and international actors. At the same time, the GNU failed to establish a coherent national vision capable of setting clear priorities or proposing structured political settlement pathways. Instead, it relied primarily on informal negotiations aimed at power-sharing arrangements with Haftar.

It can therefore be concluded that the settlement efforts pursued by Libyan actors in international conferences have largely been driven by the logic of dividing power, influence, and wealth, rather than establishing an inclusive and trust-building political framework. These actors have tended to adopt tactics of maneuvering and prolonging the crisis, allowing institutions—already suffering from legitimacy deficits—to persist without producing viable solutions.

Notably, discussions of both conflict and settlement scenarios appear equally plausible, given the deep interconnection between political and military tracks in Libya. The relationship between the two can be characterized as one of action and reaction.

Recent shifts toward dialogue and settlement have largely been driven by United States support for the UN Special Envoy’s efforts to revive the political process and move it beyond stagnation toward the possibility of holding elections. Such elections are seen as a pathway to forming a new government capable of accommodating Libyan factions and coordinating efforts to secure the withdrawal of Wagner Group forces, whose presence has become an increasing concern for U.S. interests in Africa.

Accordingly, the United States has shown renewed commitment to reshaping the dynamics of the Libyan political landscape and advancing settlement efforts. This is reflected in its diplomatic and legislative initiatives, including the adoption by the U.S. Congress of the “Deutch Act,” which emphasizes support for a peaceful resolution to the Libyan conflict, deterrence of foreign interference, sanctions against actors obstructing peace or violating human rights, as well as support for good governance, anti-corruption efforts, and the organization of free and fair elections.

Within this context, the UN Special Envoy Abdoulaye Bathily introduced an initiative aimed at pressuring both the House of Representatives and the High Council of State by limiting their ability to maneuver and compelling them to agree on a constitutional basis for elections. The initiative also sought to direct Libyan public opinion toward the urgency of holding elections and advancing national reconciliation, under the auspices of the Presidential Council and the African Union.

It appears that the UN Envoy is fully aware of the structural disagreements between the two legislative bodies. Accordingly, his initiative suggested alternative pathways for determining the course of settlement, including the possibility of bypassing both institutions should they fail to reach consensus on a constitutional framework, and proceeding instead toward presidential and parliamentary elections.

In response, the two bodies moved to establish the “6+6 Committee” tasked with resolving contentious issues such as dual nationality, the eligibility of military personnel to run for office, and the legal framework governing elections—issues widely regarded as major obstacles to the electoral process.

In conclusion, all indicators suggest that reaching a comprehensive agreement capable of satisfying all parties remains more within the realm of optimism than reality. The Libyan context continues to evolve in a highly dynamic and unpredictable manner, characterized by rapid shifts and frequent surprises.

Conclusion:

Through three interconnected analytical dimensions—examining power configurations, internal crises, and settlement trajectories—this study has sought to understand and interpret the dynamics shaping the Libyan political landscape and influencing the behavior and choices of its actors. Accordingly, the following conclusions can be drawn:

The nature of the conflict among Libyan actors reflects the significant influence of external powers on the behavior and decision-making processes of local forces.
The Libyan landscape is highly complex and prone to sudden shifts, largely due to the unstructured nature of society and the limited role of civil society organizations and political parties in articulating coherent visions for stability and settlement.
Since May 2014, the conflict has entered a critical phase in which regional actors have played a decisive role in shaping alliances and imposing agendas, alongside an increasing reliance on military solutions—culminating in the most severe attack on the capital on April 4, 2019.
The perceptions of Libyan actors regarding political settlement are often driven by the pursuit of personal and factional interests, with a noticeable absence of national visions grounded in comprehensive national security considerations.
Libyan institutions suffer from a dual crisis: a legitimacy deficit due to the expiration of their legal mandates, and the persistence of their leadership under a de facto “fait accompli” approach, which the international community continues to tolerate to avoid political vacuum and instability.
Armed groups in Libya have evolved in their strategies over the past twelve years—from direct coercion to formal integration within state institutions—where leaders of such groups increasingly occupy key security and administrative positions.
Libya faces profound challenges related to defining its national identity and political character. The absence of agreed-upon foundations has fueled conflict, particularly regarding religious orientation, historical narratives, and interpretations of past and present events, which negatively impacts prospects for future state-building.
Predicting settlement trajectories in Libya remains extremely difficult due to the rapid pace of developments and the multiplicity of influencing actors.

Research Recommendations:

It is essential for civil society organizations and political parties to play a more active role in fostering political awareness and formulating national visions aimed at unifying institutions, advancing national reconciliation, and drafting a constitution that ends the current state of political division.
Libyan actors must recognize that any sustainable solution must emerge from a genuine national will that prioritizes national interests and comprehensive national security concerns.
Libyan parties should distance themselves from the polarization strategies imposed by external actors in order to remove Libya from the arena of regional and international proxy conflicts.
Libya should capitalize on shifting and sometimes contradictory dynamics among international powers to create opportunities for stability and national consensus.

Footnotes (Translated into English – APA-style adapted for academic use):

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