The Crisis of Forming the Tenth Government in the Kurdistan Region: The Limits of Consociational Politics and the Challenge of Institutional State-Bui

Introduction

More than a year and a half after the parliamentary elections held in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in October 2024, the region remains trapped in a state of political deadlock due to the failure to form the tenth cabinet. Despite ongoing rounds of negotiations between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), political disagreements continue to prevent the conclusion of a final agreement regarding the composition of the next government and the mechanisms for power-sharing within it.

At first glance, the crisis appears to revolve around disputes over ministerial portfolios and differing interpretations of electoral entitlement. A deeper examination, however, reveals that the impasse extends far beyond the election results themselves. It reflects structural challenges related to the nature of the political system in the Kurdistan Region, the limitations of the power-sharing model that has governed the region since the 1990s, and the broader difficulties associated with transitioning from the legitimacy of historical political parties to the legitimacy of state institutions.

From this perspective, the delay in forming the government should not be viewed as a temporary political dispute. Rather, it reflects a deeper crisis concerning the future of governance in the Kurdistan Region and the capacity of Kurdish political forces to reproduce a stable framework for managing power amid rapidly evolving domestic and regional dynamics.

First: Transformations in the Party System of the Kurdistan Region

The current governmental crisis cannot be understood solely through the lens of ongoing negotiations. It must also be situated within the broader transformation of the Kurdish political system over the past two decades.

Since the establishment of Kurdish self-rule after 1991, political life in the region has been dominated by a bipolar structure represented by the KDP and the PUK. These two parties became the backbone of the region’s political, security, and administrative order. This arrangement contributed significantly to political stability, particularly following the 1998 Washington Agreement, which ended the period of internal armed conflict.

However, recent years have witnessed substantial changes in the political landscape. The emergence of new political actors, such as the Gorran Movement and later the New Generation Movement, has gradually weakened the traditional monopoly of the two dominant parties. At the same time, demographic changes and the rise of a younger generation of voters—more concerned with governance, economic performance, and public services than with historical partisan loyalties—have introduced new political demands into the system.

The 2024 elections demonstrated that while the KDP remains the largest political force, the political environment has become significantly more pluralistic and complex. Consequently, managing power through traditional mechanisms has become increasingly difficult.

The current crisis therefore reflects not merely a disagreement between two parties, but a transitional phase in which the Kurdistan Region is moving from a closed bipolar political structure toward a more pluralistic system whose institutional rules have yet to be fully consolidated.

Second: Election Results and the Challenge of Translating Electoral Legitimacy into Executive Power

The 2024 elections reshaped the balance of power within the Kurdistan Parliament without granting any single party the ability to form a government independently.

The KDP argues that its electoral success entitles it to lead the next government based on the principle of relative majority. The PUK, by contrast, continues to advocate for the principle of political partnership that has historically governed relations between the two parties.

This dispute reflects a deeper tension between two competing concepts of political legitimacy. The first is based on electoral entitlement and majority rule, while the second derives from the philosophy of ethnic and political consensus that has long defined the Kurdish political experience.

Accordingly, the disagreement is not merely about the distribution of positions. It concerns a more fundamental question regarding the future nature of governance in the region: Will the traditional model of consensual power-sharing continue, or will the political system gradually move toward a framework based on governing majorities and parliamentary opposition?

Third: From a Government Formation Crisis to a Crisis of Governance

The current impasse reveals the limitations of the consensual model that has shaped Kurdish politics for decades.

Following the end of armed confrontation between the two major parties, the political system in the Kurdistan Region was built upon principles of power-sharing and political consensus rather than conventional democratic competition. This model successfully prevented renewed internal conflict and provided a degree of political stability. However, it also created a system dependent on partisan balances rather than constitutional and institutional mechanisms.

As Kurdish society has evolved and demands for reform, transparency, and accountability have increased, the limitations of this model have become increasingly apparent.

The central paradox is that the same consensus-based system that once guaranteed stability has now become one of the principal obstacles to the production of effective governance. It is no longer fully capable of accommodating the social and political transformations taking place within the region.

Fourth: The Challenge of State-Building and Institutional Development

The current crisis highlights another paradox within the Kurdish experience: while the Kurdistan Region has succeeded in building relatively advanced governmental, administrative, and security institutions, it has been less successful in insulating those institutions from partisan influence.

Many key institutions remain closely linked to party power structures, making political disputes directly affect governmental performance and public administration.

The absence of a fully implemented regional constitution further exacerbates the problem. In consolidated parliamentary systems, constitutional provisions clearly define the authority responsible for government formation, appointment procedures, and the relevant timelines. In the Kurdistan Region, however, many aspects of the political process continue to depend on political understandings rather than stable institutional rules.

From a state-building perspective, the persistence of this relationship between parties and institutions limits the system’s ability to generate long-term stability and increases the likelihood that political disagreements will evolve into broader governance crises.

Fifth: The Crisis of Trust Between the Historic Partners

The prolonged negotiations demonstrate that the core of the crisis extends beyond disagreements over ministerial portfolios and political positions.

Rather, the crisis reflects a growing erosion of political trust between the KDP and the PUK—the two parties that have served as the pillars of the Kurdish political system for decades.

Although both parties have successfully overcome more severe crises in the past, including armed conflict during the 1990s, the political and economic transformations that have occurred in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region in recent years have created a new environment in which traditional formulas of partnership are no longer sufficient for managing disagreements.

The fundamental challenge, therefore, lies not in allocating positions within the next government, but in rebuilding political trust and establishing a new framework for cooperation that reflects the political realities produced by the most recent elections.

Sixth: Baghdad as an Indirect Actor in Government Formation

The crisis cannot be separated from the complex relationship between Erbil and Baghdad.

Issues such as the federal budget, public-sector salaries, oil and gas management, and constitutional competencies have become critical factors shaping the calculations of Kurdish political actors.

The composition of the next regional government will directly affect the Kurdistan Region’s ability to negotiate with the federal government on these unresolved matters, particularly given the constantly evolving political environment in Iraq.

Consequently, the current dispute concerns not only the governance of the region itself but also the future nature of Kurdistan’s relationship with the Iraqi state.

Seventh: The Geostrategic Dimension of the Crisis

The significance of the government formation crisis is amplified by the Kurdistan Region’s strategic geopolitical location.

The region lies at the intersection of the interests of major regional and international actors, including Turkey, Iran, and the United States. It is also linked to critical issues such as energy security, border stability, foreign investment, and regional trade.

These actors closely monitor political developments in the Kurdistan Region because its stability is considered an important component of broader stability in northern Iraq.

As a result, a prolonged governmental vacuum could undermine investor confidence, weaken the region’s external relations, and reduce its influence within changing regional dynamics.

Government formation, therefore, is not merely a domestic political matter; it is also an issue with broader regional implications.

Eighth: Future Scenarios

Based on current dynamics, three primary scenarios can be identified:

1. The Consensus Government Scenario

This scenario involves the successful negotiation of a new power-sharing arrangement between the KDP and the PUK that combines electoral legitimacy with political balance. Given the realities of the political system, this remains the most likely outcome in the short term.

2. The Majority Government Scenario

Under this scenario, the KDP attempts to form a government with other political forces while excluding the PUK. However, such an approach would face substantial political and institutional challenges and could deepen polarization within the region.

3. The Prolonged Deadlock Scenario

This scenario involves the continuation of political disagreements and further delays in government formation. It represents the most costly option in terms of political stability and economic performance and could gradually erode public confidence in political institutions.

Conclusion

The crisis surrounding the formation of the tenth government in the Kurdistan Region is far more than a temporary political dispute. It represents a critical test of the Kurdish political system’s ability to adapt to the transformations that have occurred over the past two decades.

The current impasse exposes the limitations of the traditional consociational model that has long provided stability. At the same time, it highlights the urgent need to develop stronger institutions capable of managing political competition within a clear constitutional framework.

Ultimately, the future stability of the Kurdistan Region will depend not merely on the successful formation of the next government, but on the willingness of Kurdish political actors to move beyond the logic of power-sharing toward a more sustainable model centered on state-building and institutional development.

As long as the production of political authority remains dependent on informal partisan arrangements, the likelihood of recurring political crises will remain high. Conversely, if Kurdish political forces succeed in establishing a more institutionalized and resilient framework of governance, the current crisis may ultimately become a turning point toward a new phase of political and institutional maturity in the Kurdistan Region, strengthening both its internal stability and its role within Iraq and the wider regional order.