Sudan: Peace Deferred in the Maze of Exclusion

Amid an atmosphere dominated by disagreements reflected in public statements and political positions over the past few days, a number of Sudanese political forces have gathered in consultative meetings in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, from June 3 to 5. The stated objective is to advance efforts aimed at ending the war and launching a new political process.

In reality, however, the chances of success for these meetings—organized by the “Quint Mechanism” (the European Union, the African Union, the United Nations, the Arab League, and IGAD)—appear limited. This assessment is based on the outcomes of previous scattered initiatives, the deep divisions among political actors, the exclusion of some influential parties, attempts to marginalize the military, the prevalence of exclusionary politics, and the lack of genuine popular legitimacy among many participants.

Since the outbreak of the war, dozens of meetings, conferences, and consultations have been held. Yet most have revolved in a vicious circle, serving largely as platforms for speeches and statements with little tangible impact on realities on the ground.

This cycle is fueled by several fundamental factors, foremost among them the crisis of representation and legitimacy. Most of the participating political groups suffer from severe internal divisions and lack a genuine popular mandate, making their participation appear more like an effort to remain politically relevant than a serious attempt to end the conflict.

Compounding the problem are the contradictory—or at times ambiguous—positions adopted toward the two sides of the war. In a situation that demands clarity, ambiguity only deepens the crisis. In an environment marked by profound mistrust, it is hardly surprising that the Sudanese Armed Forces view these meetings as attempts to bypass and marginalize them, leading to their rejection of the process.

Skepticism is further reinforced by a widespread perception among many Sudanese that some of these gatherings serve, at times, as cover for regional arrangements or for the management of competing external interests in Sudan, rather than as genuine platforms dedicated to achieving lasting peace.

Ultimately, despite the recurring final communiqués, the most significant missing element remains implementation. Recommendations are announced, rounds of dialogue continue, yet the war proceeds according to its own relentless logic.

Is There a Way Out of This Vicious Circle?

Yes—but only through political courage and a frank acknowledgment that exclusion is not merely an obstacle to peace; it is one of the root causes of Sudan’s chronic crisis.

This exclusionary mindset helped create the conditions that led to war and continues to prolong it today. On the political level, some groups, such as the “Somoud” coalition, have made the exclusion of Islamists a central demand. In response, Islamists and their supporters seek to exclude their opponents and prevent them from participating in any future settlement. The result is that political disagreement is transformed into an existential struggle, with each side seeking to eliminate the other, as though any successful solution depends on the complete disappearance of its rival.

Yet Sudan’s own experience—as well as that of other countries that have endured similar conflicts—demonstrates that comprehensive exclusion is not a recipe for stability. Rather, it is a mechanism for reproducing crises.

As long as the equation remains “either us or them,” any discussion of a comprehensive settlement will remain illusory, and every political initiative will simply become another battlefield. If excluding the other side remains a precondition for dialogue, war will continue to be seen by many as a means of preserving their place in the political landscape.

A realistic solution begins with recognizing that no single group can monopolize Sudan. The Sudanese people alone have the right to choose whom they support or reject through the ballot box, within a political system based on the peaceful transfer of power rather than the rule of arms.

More specifically, overcoming the crisis requires abandoning preconditions of exclusion and embracing a comprehensive national dialogue that excludes no one. It also requires agreement on the principles of justice and accountability, ensuring that those responsible for war crimes and corruption are prosecuted according to the law, without turning political or ideological affiliation into a crime in itself.

Sudan today needs to build what might be called a “transitional political identity”—one that postpones contentious debates over whether the state should be civil or religious to a later stage, to be decided by an elected constituent assembly. For the present, the focus should be on reaching consensus around a charter of principles that protects rights and freedoms without imposing ideological guardianship.

This, in turn, requires all parties to move from the logic of “me first” to the principle of “the nation first.”

A National Crisis Demands a National Response

Sudan needs realistic approaches and practical solutions that place the interests of the country above partisan and ideological calculations.

The country is facing an exceptional war by every measure, occurring amid foreign interventions that are no longer hidden from anyone. This phase requires clarity of purpose, adherence to national principles, defense of Sudan’s unity and sovereignty, and rejection of external interference that fuels conflict with the aim of weakening or fragmenting the state.

In the end, any viable settlement must be Sudanese in both origin and decision-making. The international community can assist and support, but it cannot create genuine peace on behalf of the Sudanese people.

This means that fundamental questions—how the war should end, the shape of the future political order, and the future role of armed actors—must be decided from within Sudan itself and through the sovereign will of the Sudanese people.