The War That Is Reshaping Negotiations

After more than a dozen successive waves of U.S. strikes against Iran—twelve at the time of writing—and with Iranian retaliation continuing alongside active regional mediation efforts, an increasingly pressing question has emerged: Is this a war aimed at achieving a decisive military victory, or is it a means of imposing new negotiating terms?

The answer is far from straightforward because the current situation combines two seemingly contradictory realities. While Washington and Tehran continue to exchange military strikes, mediation channels remain active, and political messages continue to be exchanged alongside missiles. This suggests that neither side has truly abandoned the negotiating table; rather, they have shifted part of the negotiation onto the battlefield.

The United States does not appear to be pursuing a war designed to overthrow the Iranian government or occupy Iranian territory. Instead, its objective seems to be depriving Tehran of one of its most important strategic assets: its ability to threaten maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and use that capability as a source of political and economic leverage.

Iran, for its part, seeks to demonstrate that Gulf security cannot be guaranteed without its participation and that any regional security architecture that excludes Tehran will remain incomplete and inherently unstable.

For this reason, the Strait of Hormuz is no longer merely a strategic waterway. It has become the central arena in the struggle over who has the authority to shape the rules governing security in the Gulf.

Washington seeks freedom of navigation independent of Iranian influence, while Tehran argues that its geographical position gives it a legitimate and unavoidable role in managing this vital maritime corridor.

Yet this type of conflict carries growing risks.

Each new round of military strikes reduces both sides' ability to control the trajectory of escalation. An Iranian attack causing significant American casualties could compel Washington to respond with greater force. Likewise, a U.S. strike against a target that Tehran regards as essential to its sovereignty or survival could transform a limited confrontation into a conflict that becomes increasingly difficult to contain.

At that point, decision-making would no longer rest solely with political leaders. Public opinion, military institutions, and the dynamics of reciprocal retaliation could begin to dictate the course of events.

Even so, the defining characteristics of a full-scale war have not yet materialized.

There are no American ground forces operating inside Iran, no military campaign explicitly aimed at regime change, and although maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has been disrupted, the waterway has not been completely closed. Regional mediators also continue their efforts to broker either a ceasefire or a formula capable of bringing both sides back to negotiations.

Herein lies the central paradox.

Both parties are using military force to improve their bargaining positions. Yet if the fighting continues, the war itself may begin to determine the future of negotiations rather than serve as an instrument supporting them.

Each additional day of bombardment raises the political cost of compromise, making any eventual settlement appear to domestic audiences as an act of concession rather than strategic diplomacy.

The central question is therefore no longer whether the situation represents war or negotiation.

Instead, it has become: Can diplomacy catch up with the war before the conflict escapes the political objectives that originally defined it?

For the moment, the possibility of a new agreement remains alive. But that window narrows with every additional military strike. Should the current trajectory continue for an extended period, the limited conflict could evolve from a tool of political pressure into a lasting strategic reality—one capable of reshaping the balance of power across the entire Middle East.

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm (Egypt).