The Iranian President's Realism

Iranian reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian recently delivered a series of remarks emphasizing the need for realism in confronting the ongoing war, stressing that safeguarding the economy and protecting citizens' livelihoods are no less important than military performance on the battlefield.

Declaring that "Iran is fighting a comprehensive war," Pezeshkian urged Iranians to recognize the gravity of the current moment. "We must be realistic and accept the natural consequences of this resistance," he said—a statement that sparked widespread debate because it implicitly called on the public to prepare for the inevitable costs of war rather than underestimate them, as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the country's hardline factions have often sought to do.

In reality, the president's appeal for realism carries a clear political message: the American strikes have already inflicted, and will continue to inflict, significant costs on Iran. Consequently, it remains essential to keep diplomatic channels open.

Pezeshkian therefore voiced support for mediation efforts, noting that international intermediaries had resumed contacts with both sides despite the continuation of military operations.

The Iranian president's pragmatic tone has been reinforced by comments from former President Mohammad Khatami, one of the country's most prominent reformist figures. Khatami recently advocated what he described as an "honorable peace," warning that "those who call for war and revenge are, knowingly or unknowingly, advancing the very path Israel desires."

One of the enduring strengths of the Iranian political system has been the existence of competition among its various factions, particularly the long-standing rivalry between reformists and conservatives. This internal political contest has contributed to the system's resilience and longevity.

Yet the fundamental limitation has always remained the restricted authority of the elected president. In practice, the office resembles that of a prime minister operating within a political system ultimately dominated by another center of power. In Iran, the country's effective leader is Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, who exercises ultimate authority over the executive establishment.

Indeed, one of the defining structural challenges of Iran's political system is the duality embedded within the executive branch itself, divided between the Supreme Leader and the President of the Republic.

The Supreme Leader occupies the country's most powerful political position, a role rooted in the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), established by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and Iran's first Supreme Leader.

He serves as commander-in-chief of all branches of the armed forces, possesses constitutional authority to declare war and peace, order military mobilization, appoint and dismiss six clerical members of the Guardian Council, appoint the head of the judiciary, and designate the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. In addition, the Supreme Leader appoints representatives to virtually every important ministry and state institution, giving his office extensive influence over nearly every aspect of governance.

Against this institutional backdrop, Pezeshkian's call for political realism remains cautious and deliberately nuanced. His remarks were carefully framed so as not to challenge the prevailing consensus in Tehran, reaffirming Iran's commitment to confronting the United States while simultaneously signaling the importance of preserving diplomatic options.

Had Iran functioned as a conventional civilian presidential system—without its overlapping centers of authority embodied in the regular armed forces and the Revolutionary Guard, the presidency and the Supreme Leadership, the parliament and the Assembly of Experts—it might have been possible to argue that the elected president possessed the authority to bring the conflict to an end.

There is, unquestionably, a rational reformist current within Iran's political establishment.

The more pressing question is whether a similarly pragmatic current can emerge within the American administration—one that is not constrained by the volatility and increasingly confrontational instincts of President Donald Trump.

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm.