Saudi Arabia's Nuclear Program and the Difficult Questions

Much can be said about the nuclear cooperation agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United States—from its strategic significance and political implications to its potential risks, financial cost, economic and scientific value, and even its possible military dimensions.

One criticism frequently leveled against President Donald Trump is that he has favored Saudi Arabia at the expense of America's broader national interests. The facts, however, suggest otherwise. From the perspective of the U.S. foreign policy and national security establishment, the agreement itself serves those very interests. It has been negotiated under three presidents and four successive administrations.

The first Trump administration initiated serious negotiations in 2017, granting American companies the necessary licenses to engage with their Saudi counterparts. Those talks ultimately stalled because both sides failed to reconcile their expectations. The Biden administration later resumed the negotiations, elevating them to a higher political level before the October 7 attacks brought the process to a halt. Last year, negotiations were revived during Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's landmark visit to Washington.

A decade of technical, legal, and political negotiations leaves little room for the argument that the agreement was rushed because of the current conflict with Iran or that the Trump administration ignored America's long-term strategic interests. Nevertheless, opposition persists in Washington, driven by political, ideological, and electoral considerations.

What, then, are these strategic interests?

Washington recognizes that Riyadh is firmly committed to developing a civilian nuclear program. Refusing to cooperate would almost certainly encourage Saudi Arabia to seek alternative partners in Europe, China, or Russia. Such an outcome would diminish American influence and could ultimately cost the United States a strategic partner it is determined to retain over the next two decades. From this perspective, the agreement represents one of the pillars of the bilateral strategic relationship rather than merely another commercial transaction.

The same logic applies to Saudi Arabia.

Riyadh also has a compelling interest in preserving its partnership with the world's leading power. Some observers understandably question the value of that relationship, arguing that the United States has failed to prevent Iranian attacks during the current conflict. Whatever one's assessment, the war has nevertheless demonstrated Washington's willingness to defend what it considers its core strategic interests rather than retreat from them.

The conflict is far from over and remains an important test of American resolve. Only days ago, Congress approved an additional $100 billion in funding for ongoing military operations, underscoring the continuity of U.S. strategic commitments. At the same time, the war has exposed the limitations of China's regional role. Although Beijing is Saudi Arabia's largest trading partner, the crisis has highlighted the distinction between economic influence and a willingness to shoulder security responsibilities.

The Saudi nuclear project, moreover, deserves to be evaluated on its own merits, regardless of differing political interpretations of the bilateral relationship.

More than a decade ago, the Kingdom decided to diversify its energy portfolio. Nuclear energy became one of the central pillars of Saudi Vision 2030, supporting electricity generation, medical applications, industrial development, and scientific research.

Why, then, would Saudi Arabia invest in a nuclear program that appears more expensive than relying on oil?

Because nuclear energy offers a larger, more sustainable, and more versatile source of power.

The financial dimension is equally revealing.

According to the Carnegie Endowment, Iran has effectively spent close to half a trillion dollars pursuing its nuclear ambitions since the 1990s. That estimate reflects not only construction costs but also the cumulative burden of international sanctions, clandestine procurement networks, and the premium associated with building secret facilities.

It is an extraordinary sum.

Yet despite those enormous expenditures, Iran has still not succeeded in completing its nuclear project.

Nor were these losses simply the cost of construction. They were the consequence of political choices.

Iran's nuclear program, much like its broader military programs, has never been intended solely to generate electricity. Rather, it has served as an instrument of regional influence and strategic leverage. That is why many of its facilities were constructed in secret, with significant portions buried beneath mountains. As U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has asked: If the program is entirely peaceful, why is it hidden underground?

Another factor reinforcing Saudi Arabia's commitment to nuclear energy has been the Kingdom's expanding discoveries of uranium ore during recent geological exploration conducted under Vision 2030.

Preliminary findings indicate reserves sufficient to supply the two planned nuclear reactors throughout their operational lifetimes.

Naturally, no discussion of any nuclear program can ignore the most alarming scenario of all: the possibility that Iran could eventually acquire a nuclear weapon.

Saudi Arabia cannot reasonably compare its security environment with that of geopolitically stable countries such as Sweden.

The Middle East remains one of the world's most volatile regions.

The current conflict has demonstrated, according to the article, the dangers of assuming Iranian strategic restraint. Tehran has interfered with maritime navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, launched missiles and drones against eight regional states despite many of them not being direct participants in the conflict, and targeted critical infrastructure, including power stations, desalination plants, and airports.

If this is the behavior of the Iranian regime without nuclear weapons, concerns would naturally intensify should it acquire such capabilities in the future.

This brings us to the most difficult question.

Could Saudi Arabia's peaceful nuclear program eventually become the gateway to a military one?

The current agreement is explicitly based on the construction of civilian nuclear reactors and the transfer of American technology exclusively for peaceful purposes under strict U.S. safeguards and oversight.

Even so, a legitimate theoretical question remains: What if the world were to wake up one morning to the announcement that Iran had successfully developed a nuclear weapon?

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has previously stated that, under such circumstances, the Kingdom would seek to establish a credible deterrent.

It is important, however, to distinguish between a civilian nuclear energy program and broader strategic deterrence options. Developing a nuclear deterrent would not necessarily require converting the civilian nuclear program itself into a military one, as there are multiple strategic pathways through which such deterrence could be achieved.

Originally published in Asharq Al-Awsat.