D.r: Amr El-Shobaki

Protests in Tunisia

Free opinions - D.r: Amr El-Shobaki
D.r: Amr El-Shobaki
A researcher specializing in political systems, Islamist movements, and counter-extremism, as well as an expert on Turkish politics, European Islam, and Arab–European relations.

 

Tunisia witnessed anti-government protests last week calling for the resignation of President Kais Saied. Such demonstrations, however, remain a normal feature of political life and occur in many countries, whether under democratic systems or more restricted forms of political pluralism. They reflect dissatisfaction with the performance of the ruling authorities but do not, in themselves, constitute a threat to the country's institutions or to civil peace.

It is well known that a broad segment of Tunisian society believes that President Saied has deviated from the country's democratic path since his exceptional measures in 2021, when he suspended key constitutional arrangements and fundamentally reshaped the political system. At the same time, another significant segment regards his intervention and the introduction of a new presidential constitution—replacing the previous hybrid system—as a major achievement, even though the new constitutional framework can hardly be described as a fully democratic presidential system because it grants the president extensive executive powers.

One distinguishing feature of Tunisia's political experience since the 2011 revolution has been that its principal political actors have remained civilian. President Saied, whom protesters have labeled a "dictator," is nevertheless a civilian autocrat, emerging from the country's civilian legal establishment. Whether by choice or by circumstance, he has allowed protests to take place—or has been unable to prevent them. Likewise, while dozens of political figures have been imprisoned, the country has not witnessed the mass arrests on the scale seen elsewhere.

Tunisia's model of civilian authoritarianism still contains political and labor institutions whose activities the president cannot simply nationalize or suppress through coercive means alone. Some political parties, such as the People's Movement, continue to support the current political course—albeit with reservations—while seeking reforms from within. Others, including the Ennahda Movement and the National Salvation Front, oppose it fundamentally.

Equally significant is the presence of the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), a powerful trade union federation with a genuine and deeply rooted social base that operates independently of the state. Although the union initially supported President Saied's decisions, it has since disagreed with him on numerous issues, even while refraining from participating in the latest demonstrations. Its continued influence illustrates that Tunisia still possesses political and labor institutions with meaningful public support—institutions capable of acting as a safeguard against crises escalating into serious threats to national unity and state cohesion.

Since the establishment of the republic, Tunisia has experienced varying degrees of authoritarian rule. Yet these systems never completely eliminated civic initiatives, nationalized labor unions, or extinguished political life. Compared with many other authoritarian systems, Tunisia has consistently maintained a broader margin for political participation.

The recent protests are likely to represent a turning point in the evolution of Tunisia's political system—not merely because of the growing number of participants or because the demonstrators called for the fall of the regime rather than its reform, but because they unfolded within a political space that has continued to exist throughout President Saied's tenure. That political space has helped shield the country from widespread chaos, violence, and institutional collapse.

Tunisia now appears to face one of two possible paths. The first is that President Saied respects the constitutional framework and leaves office at the end of his second term in 2029. The second is that mounting public pressure compels him to step down before then. Either outcome, the argument goes, is unlikely to result in state collapse or widespread disorder, although the constitutional transfer of power would undoubtedly be the preferable scenario.

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm (Egypt).