Nile Waters Recede, Reviving the Debate Over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

Images circulating in recent days showing the receding water levels of the Nile in Sudan are cause for concern, given the potentially serious warning signs they carry. The problem has not been limited to the emergence of sandbanks as the river retreats—to the point that, in some areas, it has begun to resemble a shallow stream that people can cross on foot. It has also triggered drinking-water shortages in parts of Khartoum North and Omdurman, after major water stations ceased operating because of the low river level. Agricultural projects have likewise been affected as irrigation pumps were forced out of service, while signs of the retreat have appeared across several states, extending as far as northern Sudan.

This decline has come at a time when water levels would normally be expected to rise with the onset of the rainy season, reigniting debate over the impact of Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). According to a number of water-resources experts, although natural factors—particularly delayed rainfall—have played a role, the main cause is linked to the operation of the GERD, which has altered the river’s natural flow pattern.

Some experts have described the receding waters as a warning to Sudan and Egypt about the potential consequences of the dam, particularly as Ethiopia continues to manage its technical operations unilaterally and control water releases without sharing adequate data on reservoir storage and discharge. This leaves Sudan, as a transit country, and Egypt, as the downstream state, vulnerable to decisions taken in Addis Ababa.

Concerns have intensified amid Ethiopia’s statements about plans to construct additional dams. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed referred to such ambitions in a televised interview from the GERD site in September 2025, describing the dam’s inauguration as the beginning of a new phase that would “strengthen Ethiopia’s geopolitical standing.”

The issue has returned to the forefront following reports published by Israeli media outlets claiming that Addis Ababa has drawn up designs for three additional dams farther upstream on the Blue Nile. Such projects would inevitably require the retention of substantial volumes of water for reservoir storage and could give Ethiopia unprecedented control over the river’s flow.

This unilateral approach poses a challenge to both Sudan and Egypt and stands in contrast to Ethiopia’s stated position that it seeks to turn water projects into instruments of cooperation and mutual benefit rather than sources of conflict. Since the GERD project was launched 15 years ago, successive rounds of negotiations have failed to produce binding agreements. Even the Declaration of Principles signed in Khartoum in 2015 by Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia with the stated aim of promoting consultation and cooperation has remained largely ink on paper, yielding little tangible progress.

Under these circumstances, talk of potential benefits—or assurances that Ethiopia’s water projects will not harm its neighbors—has little meaning in the absence of an agreement governing operating rules and data sharing. There is broad agreement among water-resources experts that the absence of a binding legal framework among the countries concerned remains at the heart of the problem. The solution lies in institutionalized regional cooperation based on transparency, data exchange, and coordinated management of shared water resources.

Water is the lifeblood of nations. With growing populations, expanding development needs, rising demand for resources, and accelerating climate change, cooperation among states is becoming more urgent than ever. The alternative is a deepening of disputes and the opening of the door to conflicts whose costs would be immense for everyone involved.

The world is not without successful models for managing shared rivers. The Organization for the Development of the Senegal River, established in 1972 by Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal, is one of the most prominent examples of water-benefit sharing. Its member states agreed to share the economic benefits generated by water resources regardless of the geographical location of dams, while establishing a system for the joint management of major projects, including collective ownership of certain dams.

The Mekong River Commission, whose institutional origins date to 1975 and which brings together Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam within a framework of regional water cooperation, offers another model. Its approach is based on prior consultation over water-development projects, hydropower generation, and the protection of fisheries, with the aim of limiting disputes and fostering cooperation in resource management. It provides a platform for sustained dialogue, the exchange of hydrological data, and joint planning in areas that directly affect participating states.

If the Mekong model is built around the institutionalization of regional consultation, the Senegal River experience goes even further by embracing shared management of projects, financing, and benefits.

History, however, also offers numerous examples of water becoming an instrument of conflict. Different eras have witnessed disputes and wars associated with control over water resources or their deliberate use for military purposes. Water has been used to flood areas and create defensive barriers, as the Dutch did in the seventeenth century to halt the French advance, and water supplies have been deliberately cut off, as occurred during the Bosnian War.

The future of the Nile Basin, therefore, should not be built on balances of power or unilateral actions, but on clear rules of cooperation, transparency, and benefit sharing. The management of international rivers is no longer merely an engineering or technical matter. It has become a test of states’ ability to build sustainable partnerships capable of preventing water—the very foundation of life—from becoming yet another cause of conflict and war.