Libya Between Power Deals and the Mystery of Political Assassinations

The protests unfolding in Tripoli and other cities in western Libya reveal a crisis that runs far deeper than deteriorating public services. Demonstrators are not merely expressing dissatisfaction with the government of Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh; they are challenging the entire management of Libya's transitional period and rejecting attempts to engineer new political settlements that preserve the same ruling forces, even if positions of power are simply redistributed among them.

Behind the scenes, international and regional actors are exploring proposals to reshape Libya's political landscape. Among the ideas reportedly under discussion is a formula that would keep Dbeibeh as prime minister while granting Saddam Haftar a central role in overseeing the country's next phase.

From an external perspective, such an arrangement might appear to be a pragmatic compromise between Libya's eastern and western power centers, particularly if it facilitates the reunification of state institutions and boosts oil production. Many Libyans, however, may view it instead as a bargain between influential political families designed to redistribute authority rather than return it to the electorate.

The international community continues to prioritize stability by negotiating with those who control money, arms, and territory. At the same time, a growing number of Libyans believe that these very actors are responsible for delaying elections and benefiting from the prolonged transitional period.

The assassination of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the author argues, was not the direct cause of the current protests, but it has become part of a broader atmosphere of suspicion and declining public trust.

Saif al-Islam represented a significant political and social constituency and was widely regarded as a potential presidential candidate capable of disrupting the plans of the country's dominant political factions. His assassination, followed by the ambiguity surrounding the investigation, has reinforced perceptions that Libya's political process continues to operate by eliminating potential rivals rather than allowing electoral competition to determine political outcomes.

Even so, it would be premature to describe the current unrest as a nationwide Libyan uprising.

The center of gravity remains in Tripoli and western Libya. Comparable, simultaneous mobilization has not yet emerged in Benghazi or in the country's eastern and southern regions. Nor has a unified national leadership capable of directing the protest movement taken shape.

This remains a fundamental weakness. Bringing down existing institutions without a broadly accepted alternative could simply recreate the same political vacuum that has fueled Libya's divisions for the past fifteen years. Moreover, the heavily militarized environment surrounding the demonstrations leaves them vulnerable to infiltration or manipulation by competing armed factions.

The greatest danger lies in the possibility that an armed group could intervene to suppress the protests or that one of Libya's rival power centers might attempt to exploit the demonstrations to settle political scores with the Dbeibeh government. Should that occur, civil disobedience could quickly evolve into armed confrontation, protesters could lose their independence, and their demands could become little more than instruments in the struggle among competing militias.

According to the author, Libya now faces three possible scenarios.

The first is that the government succeeds in containing public anger by improving electricity services and offering limited reforms and concessions.

The second is that the protests expand sufficiently to force a restructuring of political authority without fundamentally dismantling the existing system.

The third—and most dangerous—is that armed groups enter the confrontation directly, causing the capital to descend once again into violence.

What Libya is experiencing today is not yet a full-scale revolution, but it is certainly more than a dispute over electricity shortages.

It is a warning that the political formula governing Libya over the past several years may be approaching the limits of its viability. Electricity may have ignited the protests, but the real fuel lies in a growing public perception that political division has become a mechanism for protecting entrenched elites, and that settlements negotiated in the name of stability may amount to little more than another redistribution of power among the same political actors.

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm (Egypt).