Egypt and Confronting the Great Regional Explosion

Since the June 30 Revolution of 2013, Egypt has pursued a strategic vision built upon a fundamental principle: advancing the country toward the ranks of modern and developed nations while simultaneously confronting the mounting challenges imposed by an increasingly volatile regional and international environment.

Over the past decade, this strategy has been tested repeatedly, most notably in Egypt's confrontation with terrorism, whether originating from the Muslim Brotherhood or from ideologically affiliated extremist organizations. By the end of the decade, Egypt had effectively dismantled organized terrorist capabilities across the Nile Valley, the Sinai Peninsula, and along its western border with Libya. This achievement stood as a testament to the professionalism and sacrifices of the Egyptian Armed Forces and the national police.

At the same time, the country's modernization agenda never paused. Massive investments in infrastructure, the expansion of productive capacity, and gradual economic reform continued despite successive crises. These efforts were reflected in a range of positive economic indicators that emerged before and during the early years of the third decade of the twenty-first century. Even the COVID-19 pandemic failed to derail this trajectory, as Egypt's response proved comparatively effective and, in several respects, more successful than that of many other countries.

Today, however, this developmental foundation faces an unprecedented regional crisis.

The current escalation began with Hamas's attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, before rapidly evolving into a devastating war against the Palestinian people, accompanied by the systematic destruction of Palestinian political institutions—already weakened by the long-standing division between Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

The conflict soon expanded beyond Gaza. Israel accelerated settlement construction across the occupied West Bank, launched military operations in southern Lebanon against Hezbollah, and extended its military presence into southern Syria, occupying additional territory while relying, according to the article, on support from the Druze community.

At the same time, a new strategic dynamic emerged between Iran and Israel.

While Iran had spent years constructing what it described as a strategy of "forward defense" across four Arab states—Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen—through armed militias operating outside the authority of sovereign governments, Israel has increasingly sought to dismantle these militias, using their continued existence as justification for expanding its military footprint on Arab territory.

This convergence has produced an increasingly volatile regional landscape, transforming the Gaza war into part of a broader regional confrontation that now extends to the Arabian Gulf. The United States has become directly involved alongside Israel through successive military operations and repeated attempts to secure a ceasefire. According to the article, those diplomatic efforts had collapsed by the end of last week, with both Washington and Tehran signaling a return to military confrontation.

The assessment presented here is that the next round of fighting is likely to be substantially more intense than the previous, unsuccessful confrontation.

The United States is expected to adopt a far more coercive strategy. Politically, it has already moved to tighten pressure around the Strait of Hormuz, initially announcing—and later withdrawing—a proposal to impose American security fees on maritime traffic through the waterway, while instead encouraging greater Arab investment in regional security arrangements, a process that the article argues has effectively been underway since President Donald Trump's visit to the Gulf in May 2025.

The region may once again witness a comprehensive blockade targeting Iranian ports.

Nor does the article rule out the possibility that President Trump could reconsider his current approach toward America's principal European allies—France, Britain, Germany, and Italy—and invite them to participate directly in military operations, given their shared strategic interest in preserving the security and uninterrupted operation of the Strait of Hormuz.

At the time of writing, the article notes that Israel was exerting significant pressure to join any future military campaign. Trump, however, had thus far kept Israel formally outside direct participation—at least temporarily. Instead, the more probable scenario, according to the article, would be requests for greater involvement from Arab states, particularly those already facing threats from Iran and its allied militias in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, thereby completing a strategic arc of instability stretching from the Arabian Gulf through the Fertile Crescent to the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

Throughout the regional crisis that began on October 7, 2023, Egypt's policy has rested upon several principal pillars.

The first has been an unwavering effort to halt the war in Gaza. Egypt hosted the first international peace conference on October 21, 2023, which produced the initial joint declaration by nine Arab states outlining a political framework for addressing the Palestinian crisis.

Second, Cairo actively supported broader Arab diplomatic initiatives that ultimately contributed to an unprecedented wave of international recognition of the State of Palestine, with 157 countries extending recognition.

Third, Egyptian diplomacy succeeded in convening the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit, which established the foundations for a ceasefire in Gaza, the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and the launch of future reconstruction efforts.

Fourth, Egypt provided firm political support to fellow Arab states confronted by Iranian attacks while simultaneously participating, alongside Pakistan, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia, in mediation efforts aimed at ending the U.S.-Iran confrontation.

Fifth, all of these regional initiatives unfolded while Egypt continued its ambitious domestic development agenda. The state pressed ahead with major national projects extending into the country's deserts, including the New Delta project, the creation of a new agricultural corridor in the Western Desert, and the transfer of treated Nile water into Sinai to reclaim an additional half-million feddans of farmland.

Finally, Egypt sought to reinforce its strategic position by deepening coordination with Saudi Arabia, thereby reducing the impact of Iranian pressure on the Strait of Hormuz through an alternative energy route in which oil shipped from the Saudi port of Yanbu is transported to Egypt via the SUMED Pipeline and the Suez Canal before continuing onward to European markets.

Originally published in Al-Masry Al-Youm.