Competition or Hostility?

The tensions in Turkish-Israeli relations are undeniable. The repeated verbal exchanges between the Turkish president and the Israeli prime minister, as well as the Turkish public’s clear sympathy for and support of the Palestinian cause, are evident. Yet none of this necessarily means that relations between the two countries have reached the stage of outright hostility and unconstrained conflict—particularly following Israel’s bombing of the Abu al-Duhur airbase in Syria, near the Turkish border, and Turkey’s subsequent request to the International Criminal Court for the arrest of Benjamin Netanyahu, to which Netanyahu responded by accusing Turkey of antisemitism and dictatorship.

The reality is that a rising and powerful Turkey is highly adept at managing its foreign policy and international alliances, and capable of maneuvering to advance its interests. It has consequently come to be regarded as one of the major powers. Major powers do not deal with their adversaries—or even their enemies—through emotional reactions, slogans, or empty rhetoric. Rather, the conflict between Turkey and Israel is partly the result of genuine competition for influence in the region and beyond, and partly a product of political and ideological rivalry.

Major powers calculate their interests and do not allow themselves to be driven by anger, impulsive reactions, or solely by their political or ideological positions toward their adversaries, as some Arab regimes have done. Instead, calculations of competition and interest remain present—and at times prevail—in the management of such conflicts. This is why we should not be surprised that when Turkey called on the International Criminal Court to arrest Netanyahu, it invoked the issue of Israel’s attacks on Turkish and international activists aboard the Freedom Flotilla, choosing an issue that touches Turkish national sentiment more directly than others.

There is no doubt that Turkey’s relationship with Israel is tense and that competition between the two countries exists, particularly over Turkey’s presence and influence in Syria. Nevertheless, the relationship is not governed by ideological or moral considerations in isolation from calculations of interests and the limits of competition.

The world still remembers how relations between Russia and Turkey came close to confrontation after Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24 aircraft more than a decade ago. Many expected Syria to become an arena for direct confrontation between the two countries, but that did not happen. Instead, the two sides succeeded in managing their differences through a “non-zero-sum” approach and coordinated on other issues. Indeed, the open channel between the two countries contributed to facilitating the entry of Syrian opposition factions into Damascus without Russian intervention.

It is not easy for a country to maintain a channel of communication with another country that supports the regime confronting its allies, as happened between Turkey and Russia in Syria. Yet Turkey’s ability to preserve what might be described as a “Muawiya’s thread”—maintaining a line of communication even amid disagreement or conflict—has been a recurring feature of its foreign policy.

It is not easy for Turkey to enter into a confrontation with Israel, and it would be even more difficult for Israel to attack Turkey. Israel is aware of Turkey’s power and weight, and knows that it is a member of NATO. This is particularly significant given Israel’s history of confronting weaker adversaries, whether in Gaza, Lebanon, or Syria. However, Israel would carefully calculate any reckless move against a major state, especially while it has yet to emerge from its war with Iran.

Source: Al-Masry Al-Youm